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Civil Procedure.  Ho-Rath v. R. I. Hospital, 115 A.3d 938 (R.I. 
2015).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the statute of 
limitations for medical malpractice actions provides a minor 
Plaintiff with an option of: (1) a parent or guardian filing on the 
minor’s behalf within three years of the alleged malpractice or of 
its reasonable discovery or (2) the minor filing on his or her own 
behalf when the minor reaches the age of eighteen, at which time 
a parent’s loss-of-consortium claim may be tolled alongside the 
minor’s claim. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On July 16 2010, the Plaintiffs Jean and Bunsan Ho-Rath1 
(“Jean” and “Bunsan”) sued Rhode Island Hospital and associated 
medical professionals,2 (collectively “RIH”) and Woman and 
Infants Hospital of Rhode Island and associated medical 
professionals3 (collectively “WIH”)4, on behalf of their minor 
daughter, Yendee Ho-Rath (“Yendee”), who was born on January 
9, 1998.5  The Plaintiffs’ claims were founded on theories of 
negligence, lack of informed consent, corporate liability, and 
vicarious liability in connection with the diagnosis and treatment 
of Yendee’s genetic blood disorder, alpha thalassemia.6  The 
 
 1.  Ho-Rath v. R. I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 940 (R.I. 2015).  The Plaintiffs 
will be referenced by their first names, just as the case did, in order to avoid 
confusion.   
 2.  Id. at 941, n.2.  These medical professionals are: Lewis Glasser, 
M.D., William Ferguson, M.D., Fred Schiffman, M.D., and B.E. Barker, Ph.D.  
Id.  
 3.  Id. at 941, n.3.  These medical professionals are: Calvin E. Oyer, 
M.D., Jami Star, M.D., and Marsha Sverdup, M.S. f/k/a Marsha Pagnotto, 
M.S.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 941.  While the Plaintiffs named many other defendants in the 
complaint and amended complaint, the defendants named here are the only 
pertinent defendants discussed in this case.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 941. 
 6.  Id.  
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Plaintiffs also asserted individual loss-of-consortium claims.7  The 
Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants failed to diagnose and treat 
Yendee despite Jean, Bunsan, and Yendee’s brother being tested 
for the disorder as early as 1993.8 
On February 8, 2011, RIH moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ 
individual claims.9  On July 7, 2011, the trial justice granted the 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss and held that the statute of 
limitations barred both the Plaintiffs’ independent loss-of-
consortium claims and the claims brought on behalf of Yendee.10  
The trial justice noted that since Yendee was a minor, the tolling 
provision in section 9-1-14.1(1) would permit Yendee to sue on her 
own behalf upon reaching the age of eighteen, the age the 
disability is removed.11  Final judgments were subsequently 
entered in favor of the Defendants.12  The Plaintiffs appealed, and 
the Defendants cross-appealed.13 The Supreme Court issued its 
final decision on May 19, 2015.14 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A. Medical Malpractice Claims Brought on Behalf of Minors 
Justice Suttell wrote for the majority.15  Upon review,16 the 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id.  RIH argued that under § 9-1-14.1 of the Rhode Island General 
Laws, the Plaintiff’s loss-of-consortium claims were not part of the tolling 
portion of the statute and therefore were time-barred.  Id.  On February 28, 
2011 WIH moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims on the same theory.  Id.  
The Plaintiffs argued against the Defendant’s motions to dismiss on the 
grounds that §9-1-14.1(1) may be interpreted to permit the tolling of the 
statute of limitations for a minor who sues on a medical malpractice theory, 
until three years after the minor’s eighteenth birthday.  Id.  The Plaintiffs 
further argued that since loss-of-consortium claims derive from the claims 
brought on Yendee’s behalf, the loss-of-consortium claims are also tolled until 
three years after Yendee’s eighteenth birthday.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 942. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 938. 
 15.  Id. at 951.  Justice Goldberg did not participate in the decision. 
 16.  Id. at 942.  For the court to affirm a motion to dismiss it must be 
“clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in 
support of the plaintiffs claim.”  Id. (quoting Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 
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court looked to sections 9-1-14.1 and 9-1-1917 of the Rhode Island 
General Laws to address the dispute between the Plaintiffs18 and 
the Defendants19 regarding the Plaintiffs’ medical malpractice 
claims brought on behalf of Yendee. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, as it found the language of 
section 9-1-14.1 unequivocal; therefore, it found section 9-1-14.1 
capable of only one rational interpretation.20  Nevertheless, the 
court cited to its precedent cases of Bakalakis v. Women & Infants’ 
Hospital21 and Dowd v. Rayner22 to illustrate its decision.23  The 
 
1000 (R.I. 2012)). 
 17.  Id. at 944 (“§ 9-1-19 provides in pertinent part: ‘If any person at the 
time any such cause of action shall accrue to him or her shall be under the 
age of eighteen (18) years . . . the person may bring the cause of action, within 
the time limited under this chapter, after the impediment is removed.’”) 
(quoting R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-1-19 (1956)). 
 18.  Id.  Plaintiffs’ argument was that § 9-1-14.1(1) contains only a 
maximum time limit and does not use language explicitly requiring the minor 
to wait until the disability of age is removed. Id. Thus, according to 
Plaintiff’s, § 9-1-14.1(1) permits parents or guardians to bring medical 
malpractice claims on behalf of minors at any time until the minor’s 
eighteenth birthday, at which time he or she has three years to bring suit on 
his or her own behalf.  Id.  Thus, Plaintiffs argued their suit was timely as it 
was filed before Yendee’s twenty-first birthday. Id. 
 19.  Id.  WIH’s argument was that § 9-1-14.1(1) instead limits the tolling 
provision of § 9-1-19, by requiring that when a suit is brought on a minor’s 
behalf, it must be filed no later than three years after the alleged 
malpractice.  Id. WIH argued that Plaintiff’s interpretation of § 9-1-14.1(1) 
leaves the statute interchangeable with § 9-1-19 since it would permit a 
minor’s suit to be brought at any time before the minor’s twenty-first 
birthday.  Id.  Additionally, WIH argued that since Plaintiffs brought a claim 
on behalf of Yendee, more than three years after the alleged malpractice, 
Yendee is no longer permitted to take advantage of the § 9-1-14.1(1) tolling 
provision, and thus, Yendee may not bring a suit when she turns eighteen.  
Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  619 A.2d 1105, 1106 (R.I. 1993).  Parents filed a medical malpractice 
suit within the three-year limit of the alleged malpractice on behalf of minor-
child against doctors involved in the prenatal and delivery of the minor.  Id. 
The parents later sought to amend their complaint to add additional 
defendants after the three-year limit past.  Id. The court held that the 
general tolling statute does not affect or supersede the requirement of the 
medical malpractice statute of limitations that one who is under disability of 
age, mental incompetence, or otherwise and on whose behalf no action is 
brought within three years of occurrence must bring action within three 
years of the removal of disability.  Id. at 1107.  The court noted that to permit 
otherwise would bring about the unwelcomed situation where the action 
brought within three years would merely be preliminary to the main event to 
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court further acknowledged, “if the Legislature did not intend to 
limit24 a minor’s ability to initiate medical malpractice actions . . . 
section 9-1-14.1 would be unnecessary”25 as section 9-1-19 already 
accomplishes the same result in a general manner for medical 
malpractice cases.26  The court held that its decision provided the 
most sensible result given the dual purposes of the statute to 
promote certainty and finality and avoid stale claims, but also to 
protect individual plaintiffs from those limitations where those 
plaintiffs cannot exercise their legal rights while under certain 
constraints.27  The parents had time to file, but did not; 
accordingly, Yendee’s ability to bring suit is not jeopardized 
because she may file suit when she turns eighteen.28 
B. Loss of Consortium Claims of Parents 
Upon review, the court interpreted sections 9-1-14.1(1)29 and 
9-1-4130 of the Rhode Island General Laws to determine whether 
 
when the disability is later removed.  Id. 
 22.  655 A.2d 679, 681–82 (R.I. 1995).  The Legislature enacted the 
statute in 1976 in response to the medical malpractice “crisis” within the 
state at which time the legislature had an interest in limiting the number of 
medical malpractice suits, but also wanted provide minor victims a fair 
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated.  Id.  The rule exists to ensure 
that minors are not disadvantaged by their disability during minority to 
ensure that, the rule serves to restrict the number of suits or amendments of 
complaints when the suit is brought on behalf of the minor.  Id. at 682. 
 23.  Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 945–46. 
 24.  The Limitation of Actions Chapter of R.I. Gen Laws (2012) includes 
§§ 9-1-14.1 and 9-1-19. 
 25.  Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 945 (citing Bakalakis, 619 A.2d at 1107). 
 26.  Id. at 947. 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id. at 948. 
 29.  While courts must not interpret statutes with myopic literalism, 
“[u]nder no circumstances will this Court construe a statute to reach an 
absurd result.” Id. at 943 (quoting National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Capital 
Properties, Inc., 88 A.3d 1150,1156 (R.I. 2014)). 
 30.  Id. at 948–49.  The court provided: 
Pursuant to § 9–1–41, parents are permitted to recover damages for 
the loss-of-consortium of a minor child caused by tortious injury.  
This statute provides in pertinent part: “(c) Parents are entitled to 
recover damages for the loss of their unemancipated minor child’s 
society and companionship caused by tortious injury to the minor (d) 
Actions under this section shall be brought within the time limited 
under §§ 9–1–14 or 9–1–14.1, whichever is applicable, for actions for 
injuries to the person.”  
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the claims between the Plaintiffs31 and the Defendants,32 
derivative in nature, were time-barred. The court affirmed the 
decision to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ loss-of-consortium claims.33 The 
court declared that a parent’s loss-of-consortium claim in a 
medical malpractice case should be tolled alongside the minor’s 
claim to which it derived.34 Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ derivative 
claim may be brought alongside Yendee’s when she reaches the 
age of eighteen.35 The court ultimately found that consolidating 
the cases into one suit would be in line with the various policy 
interests regarding efficiency.36 
C. Dissent 
Justice Flaherty dissented,37 contending that section 9-1-14 
(1) of the Rhode Island General Laws was capable of two 
reasonable interpretations, that the statute: (1) prohibits a suit 
 
Id. (quoting R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-1-41 (2012)) (emphasis added).    
 31.  Id. at 948.  The Plaintiffs argued that their loss-of-consortium claims 
are derivative to those brought on behalf of Yendeee.  Id.  Accordingly, § 9-1-
14.1(1) is the applicable statute of limitations.  Id.  This statute attaches to 
the derivative claim and should be the same statute to which it derived, 
Yendee’s.  Id.  Thus, the Plaintiffs argued that their individual claims should 
benefit from §9-1-14.1(1) and not be dismissed.  Id.  
 32.  Id.  RIH argued that while the Plaintiffs’ claims are governed by § 9-
1-14.1(1), the Plaintiffs’ claims were, nevertheless, untimely, as they were 
brought more than three years after the occurrence of the alleged 
malpractice. Id.  RIH further argued that while § 9-1-14.1 applies to both the 
Plaintiffs’ loss-of-consortium claims and to those brought on behalf of Yendee, 
the statute’s application produces different results.  Id.  Since Yendee is 
“disabled” due to her age, she may file when she turns eighteen, the age the 
disability is removed.  Id.  But since the Plaintiffs’ were not “disabled,” they 
may not attach the claim to Yendee’s.  Id.  Further, RIH argued that the 
Plaintiffs’ loss-of-consortium claims were separate and distinct from the 
underlying tort claims and should, therefore, be analyzed as such.  Id.  WIH’s 
argument was consistent with RIH.  Id.  WIH further noted that since the 
Plaintiffs’ were not disabled, they were not part of the statute’s protected 
class of individuals and, thus, cannot be afforded the statute’s protections.  
Id.  WIH further argued that permitting the attachment would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of the provision since it would allow stale 
claims to be brought when there is no real impediment to bring the claims 
earlier.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 951. 
 34.  Id. at 950. 
 35.  Id. at 951. 
 36.  Id. at 950–51. 
 37.  Id. at 951. 
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until the minor’s eighteenth birthday, if a parent or guardian did 
not bring a suit on his or her own behalf within three years of the 
alleged malpractice and (2) as setting the outside limit to the 
initiation of a suit brought by the minor.38 Justice Flaherty 
believed that the majority’s interpretation did not address the 
precise issue presented and effectively “[left the] complications for 
another day,”39 Yendee’s eighteenth birthday.40 Justice Flaherty 
instead interpreted section 9-1-14(1) to mean that the Plaintiffs 
must lay all their cards on the table when the suit is brought, 
rather than extend the litigation by adding new defendants every 
three years until the minor becomes eighteen years old.41 
According to Justice Flaherty, the Legislature intended to protect 
the rights of those laboring “under a legal disability.”42 Justice 
Flaherty contended his interpretation better addressed the 
statute’s goals of eliminating drawn-out litigation while protecting 
a minor’s right to relief.43 By allowing the minor to bring suit up 
until three year’s after the disability is removed, there is less 
potential that a claim will be broken down and litigated on a 
“piecemeal” basis, as was the case here.44 
COMMENTARY 
A.  Medical Malpractice Claims Brought on Behalf of Minors 
The majority’s decision to prohibit the Plaintiffs to proceed 
with their claim brought on behalf of Yendee is sound and in 
accordance with the purpose of the statutes. While Justice 
Flaherty makes a great argument, his distinction is without a 
difference. The Legislature’s intent for enacting section 9-1-14.1 
clearly shows its intent to limit the ability to litigate medical 
malpractice cases.45  What is noteworthy is that the court does not 
 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 955 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 40.  See id. at 941. 
 41.  Id. at 953 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 42.  Id.  “[W]here suit has not been brought on a minor’s behalf within 
three years of the incident of professional malpractice, once the minor does 
bring suit, she is expected to join all defendants to the action within a three-
year period, even if she may remain a minor for many years.”  Id. at 955. 
 43.  Id. at 956. 
 44.  See id. at 952. 
 45.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.1 (1956) (“[A]n action for medical, 
veterinarian, accounting, or insurance or real estate agent or broker 
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direct attention to the specific language in the statutes. Section 9-
1-14.1, titled Limitation on Malpractice Actions, provides that “an 
action for medical . . . malpractice shall be commenced within 
three years from the time of the occurrence of the incident which 
gave rise to the claim.”46  The Legislature’s use of the word “shall” 
strengthens the majority’s argument as it shows that the 
Legislature intended that suits brought on behalf of a minor must 
be done in that time period.47  Conversely, if the parent or 
guardian fails to file suit in that time period, his or her 
opportunity to file closes. 
Justice Flaherty’s argument that section 9-1-14.1(1) provides 
a window between the alleged malpractice and Yendee’s twenty-
first birthday, is sound, but given the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the case—the Legislature’s explicit language, the 
legislative history surrounding the statutes enactment, and the 
Plaintiff’s waiting to file until 2010, despite the alleged 
malpractice dating back to 1993—his argument is outshined by 
that of the majority.  Further, this case is distinct from its 
precedent, as this is not a case where the Plaintiffs filed timely, 
and sought to amend their Complaint outside of the three years.48  
This is also not a case in which Yendee’s potential recovery is 
unknown.49  Thus, the Majority’s decision provides the best result 
given the dual purposes of the statute. 
B. Loss of Consortium Claims of Parents 
The court’s decision permitting the Plaintiffs’ loss-of-
consortium claims to toll alongside Yendee’s was an attempt by 
the court to afford the Plaintiffs relief.  Today, the medical 
malpractice litigation is under greater control50 than it was when 
 
malpractice shall be commenced within three (3) years from the time of the 
occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action.”).   
 46.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 47.  See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 950. 
 48.  See Bakalakis, 619 A.2d at 1107. 
 49.  See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955 (Flaherty, J. dissenting).  Yendee is 
disabled due to her age.  See id.  Her disability will be removed on her 
eighteenth birthday.  See id.  Thus, the time she will be able to file on her 
own behalf is certain.  See id.  However, had Yendee’s disability been mental 
incompetence, when she would be able to file on her own behalf is unknown, 
because we cannot be certain when her disability would be removed.  See id. 
 50.  See generally The Medical Liability Crisis: Talking Points, am. Med. 
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the Legislature enacted the statutes, and thus, such stringent 
application may not be needed.51 By holding that the Plaintiffs 
may bring their derivative claims alongside Yendee’s, the court is 
attempting to lessen the procedural safeguards, where it can 
interpret the laws to do so.52 
The court’s reasoning is not clear. In the court’s analysis, it 
first established that the Plaintiffs’ claims are in-fact derived from 
Yendee’s.53 The court then acknowledged that under section 9-1-
41, the statute governing derivative suits, such cases “shall be 
brought under the time limited under sections 9-1-14 or 9-1-
14.1.”54 The court seemingly interpreted this statute to permit the 
derivative suit.55 But, the court did not say how it came to this 
interpretation. Notwithstanding the majority’s decision, the 
Legislature’s intent for section 9-1-41 is clear. The Legislature’s 
use of the word “shall” and “limited” evince its intention that this 
statute is meant to curb the flow of claims, like the Legislature’s 
intent in section 9-1-14.1.56 Additionally, nothing in sections 9-1-
41 or 9-1-14.1 permit the inference that derivative claim are 
permitted to toll until the minor’s eighteenth birthday.57 Had the 
Legislature intended derivative claims to benefit from the 
disability statute, it likely would have expressly provided so. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs were not within the class of persons 
section 9-1-14.1 sought to protect. Section 9-1-14.1 tolling 
provision serves to protect the disabled, in order to ensure that he 
 
Ass’n, Jan, 2003 (on file with author) (The American Medical Association has 
cited twelve states as suffering a medical malpractice crisis; the state of 
Rhode Island is not included in that list). 
 51.  Id. at 946.  Faced with a medical malpractice crisis, the Legislature 
sought to limit the number of medical malpractice suits.  Id. (quoting Dowd v. 
Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 681–82 (R.I. 1995)). 
 52.  See Press Release, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Medical Malpractice 
Liability: A Case for Real Reform, (July 2003), http://www.abanet.org/media/ 
jul03/july_oped.html (last visited October 31, 2015) (The ABA calls for the 
legal and medical malpractice communities to work together to find a 
solution to the medical malpractice problem.  It further states that “the 
problem with medical malpractice is not the tort system; the problem with 
medical malpractice is medical malpractice”). 
 53.  Id. at 949. 
 54.  R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-1-41(d) (1956). 
 55.  Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 951. 
 56.  Id. at 946. 
 57.  Id. at 951. 
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or she has a fair chance to litigate their claim.58 By that same 
token, part of having a fair chance to litigate is having a case 
litigated properly. The Plaintiff’s failure to timely file on behalf of 
Yendee should not be rewarded by the benefits of section 9-1-14.1, 
when its only window of access to the statute’s protections is 
through the back door of section 9-1-41. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court held that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
actions provides a minor plaintiff with an option: have his or her 
parent or guardian file on his or her own behalf or wait until he or 
she turns eighteen, at which point he or she has three years to file 
on his or her own behalf. If the minor choses to file on his or her 
own behalf, a parents’ loss-of-consortium claim will be tolled along 
with it until his or her twenty-first birthday. 
Clare M. Harmon 
 
 
 58.  Id. at 946 (quoting Dowd, 655 A.2d at 681–82). 





Constitutional Law.  State v. Matthews, 111 A.3d 390 (R.I. 
2015).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed whether a 
criminal defendant’s free speech rights were violated when he was 
charged under the “fighting words” provision of the disorderly 
conduct statute.  In holding that the defendant’s speech was not 
constitutionally protected, the court reaffirmed its test for 
determining what speech constitutes fighting words, highlighting 
the necessity that the focus of these cases must be the context in 
which the words were spoken.  
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In the early morning hours of January 31, 2012, two Rhode 
Island State Police troopers, Anthony Washington and Edward 
Viera, observed what appeared to be a physical altercation 
between an African-American man and woman at the corner of 
Smith Street and West Main Road in Middletown, Rhode Island.1  
The man was later identified as Thomas H. Matthews 
(“Defendant”).2 
To assess the situation, the troopers pulled over.3  As the 
troopers got out of the police cruiser and approached the couple, 
the Defendant abruptly said, “take me now, take me now, I don’t 
care.”4  Trooper Washington asked the Defendant for his 
identification.5  The Defendant aggressively responded by 
physically moving toward the troopers calling them both 
“motherfuckers,” “queers,” “fags,” “niggers,” and threatening to 
kill them and “kick [their] asses.”6  Based on his training and 
 
 1.  State v. Matthews, 111 A.3d 390, 391–94, 403 (R.I. 2015). 
 2.  Id. at 392. 
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 392–95.  The court acknowledged that these words are likely to 
offend some readers, but explains that it has chosen to print them in its 
opinion without redaction because “what the defendant is alleged to have 
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experience, Trooper Viera believed that the Defendant’s agitated 
state posed a safety threat; he restrained the Defendant by 
placing him in an “arm bar”7 across the hood of the cruiser.8  The 
troopers attempted to calm the Defendant and “loosened” the arm 
bar, but the Defendant seemed like he might try to escape.9  For 
safety, the troopers handcuffed the Defendant and arrested him 
for disorderly conduct.10  The Defendant continued to yell, swear, 
and threaten the troopers throughout the ride to the Wickford 
Rhode Island State Police Barracks.11 
The Defendant’s trial began on June 18, 2012, in Newport 
County Superior Court.12  The State’s case against the Defendant 
consisted solely of the troopers’ testimony.13  After the State 
rested, the Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant 
to Rule 29, which the trial justice denied.14  The trial justice 
instructed the jury in accordance with the Defendant’s jury 
instructions, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.15  Pursuant to 
Rule 33, the Defendant moved for a new trial, which was also 
 
actually said is so central to the issues on appeal.”  Id. at 392, n.3.   
 7.  “Arm bar” is a restraint technique used by law enforcement to exert 
control over an individual and prevent injuries to others. Id. at 393, n.5.  
 8.  Id. at 394. 
 9.  Id. at 393. 
 10.  Id.  The Defendant was charged pursuant to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-
1(a)(3) (2015), the “fighting words” provision of the disorderly conduct 
statute, which states: “[a] person commits disorderly conduct if he or she 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly . . . [d]irects at another person in a 
public place offensive words which are likely to provoke a violent reaction on 
the part of the average person so addressed.”  Id. at 391. 
 11.  Id.  The Defendant was transferred to the Wickford Rhode Island 
State Police Barracks for processing.  Id.  Trooper Washington testified that 
the Defendant said to him once they were in the police cruiser “you’re nothing 
but a bitch-ass nigger,” “I don’t know why you’re doing this,” “you’re going 
against me,” “you’re going against your own kind.” Id. at 393 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 12.  Id. at 391–92. 
 13.  Id. at 392. 
 14.  Id. at 395–96.  The relevant section of Rule 29 of the Rhode Island 
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:  
The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion shall order 
the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in 
the indictment, information, or complaint, after the evidence on 
either side is closed, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction of such offense or offenses.   
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 29(a). 
 15.  Id. at 396. 
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denied.16  On July 5, 2012, the Defendant was sentenced to six 
months, thirty days to serve, balance suspended, with probation.17 
The Defendant filed a timely appeal contending that the trial 
justice improperly denied his motions for judgment of acquittal 
and a new trial because the weight of the evidence did not support 
the jury’s verdict, his speech to the troopers was constitutionally 
protected, and the criminal complaint did not provide sufficient 
notice of the charges against him as a matter of law.18 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first reviewed the 
Defendant’s motion for a new trial.19  The Defendant argued that 
the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support the 
jury’s verdict.20 The court concluded, however, that the trial 
justice’s assessment of the evidence was proper.21 The trial justice 
 
 16.  Id. at 391, 397.  The relevant section of Rule 33 of the Rhode Island 
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure reads, “[o]n motion of the 
defendant the court may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the 
interest of justice.”  R.I. SUPER CT. R. CRIM. P. 33. 
 17.  Id. at 391.  
 18.  Id. at 391, 399, 406. 
 19.  Id. at 398. The court started its review with the Rule 33 motion for a 
new trial because the burden of proof is less than a Rule 29 motion for 
judgment of acquittal.  Id. at 397–98.  The court explained that if the 
Defendant cannot meet his burden under Rule 33, then he necessarily cannot 
under Rule 29.  Id. at 398. 
 20.  Id. at 397. 
 21. Id. at 402.  The applicable standard of review is as follows: “[w]hen 
addressing a motion for a new trial, the trial justice places himself or herself 
in the role of a ‘thirteenth juror’ and then exercises his or her independent 
judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence.”  Id. at 398 (citing State v. Stansell, 909 A.2d 505, 511 (R.I. 2006)).  
The court set out the following approach in State v. Hie for trial justices 
acting as the “thirteenth juror”: 
In fulfilling his or her role as the thirteenth juror . . . the trial justice 
must (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, (2) 
independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or she would 
have reached a result different from that reached by the jury . . . .  If, 
after carrying out this three-step analytical process, the trial justice 
agrees with the jury’s verdict or determines that reasonable minds 
could differ, then the analysis is complete and the verdict should be 
affirmed. . . . However, if the trial justice does not agree with the 
verdict or does not agree that reasonable minds could differ, then the 
trial justice must determine whether the verdict is against the fair 
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considered the evidence in light of the jury charge by reviewing 
his own instructions to the jury in detail and then summarizing 
the testimony given at trial.”22  Additionally, the trial justice 
independently reviewed the evidence and found that the troopers’ 
testimony was not only credible, but supported each element of 
the “fighting words” violation under section 11-45-1(a)(3).23  
Further, the trial justice agreed with the jury’s verdict.24  Finding 
no clear error by the trial justice, the court affirmed his decision.25 
Next, the court addressed the Defendant’s contention that his 
conviction violated his free speech rights.26  The Defendant argued 
that under Rhode Island and United States Supreme Court 
precedent, his speech to the troopers was constitutionally 
protected.27  While “fighting words” are not protected speech, the 
Defendant argued that his speech did not rise to the level of 
“fighting words” because there was no evidence that “the troopers 
were, or likely would have been, provoked to imminent violent 
retaliation.”28  The Defendant argued words, such as 
 
preponderance of the evidence and fails to do substantial justice.  
Id. at 398 (quoting State v. Hie, 93 A.3d 963, 974–75 (R.I. 2014)). 
 22.  Id. at 402. 
 23.  Id. at 402–03. 
 24.  Id. at 403. 
 25.  Id. at 399, 403, 406. 
 26.  Id. at 399.  
 27.  Id. at 399–401.  See Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 
805, 810 (R.I. 1996) (recognizing that “there are limitations on what types of 
speech may be proscribed” and that “specifically defined areas” including 
“obscenity, fighting words, defamatory invasions of privacy, and words likely 
to produce imminent lawless action” may be controlled by the state); State v. 
McKenna, 415 A.2d 729, 731 (R.I. 1980) (holding that a young female 
defendant’s abusive language to a group of five male police officers did not 
constitute fighting words because her speech did not create “an imminent 
likelihood of provoking an imminent retaliation.”); Johnson v. Palange, 406 
A.2d 360, 365 (R.I. 1979) (stating that fighting words are “ those personally 
abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a 
matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.”); 
State v. Authelet, 385 A.2d 642, 648 (R.I. 1978) (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 
405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972)) (acknowledging that for speech to constitute 
constitutionally unprotected fighting words it must “have a direct tendency to 
cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is 
addressed.”).  In Authelet, a defendant’s speech to police officers “[h]ere come 
the motherfucking pigs again” did not constitute fighting words because it 
was not directed at the arresting police officer.  Id. at 400.  
 28.  Brief of the Defendant-Appellant at 17, State v. Matthews, 111 A.3d 
390 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2012-299-C.A.), 2014 WL 10295554. 
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“motherfucker” and “queer” would not provoke the average person 
to violence, and argued further that such words were even less 
likely to provoke a police officer.29  Further, the Defendant argued 
that his speech was “unspecific,” “idle,” and “conditional.”30  The 
Defendant contended that his response was akin to an “emotional 
outburst” and that he was not capable of following through on any 
of his threats.31 
The court provided an in-depth review of the First 
Amendment principles underpinning the “fighting words” doctrine 
and Rhode Island precedent on the issue.32  Fighting words are 
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite 
an immediate breach of the peace.”33  To be considered fighting 
words, speech must be directed at a specific person and be likely to 
provoke an average person to an imminent violent reaction.34  The 
context of the speech must be the focus of the analysis; there are 
no per se fighting words.35  Fighting words, “even when addressed 
to a police officer, do not lose their character as fighting words, 
if . . . they would cause an average person to fight.”36 
The Defendant claimed that based on the court’s prior 
reasoning in State v. McKenna, his conviction should be 
reversed.37  In McKenna, the court held that the young female 
 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Matthews, 111 A.3d at 397.  
 31.  Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 29, at 19. 
 32.  Matthews, 111 A.3d at 399. 
 33.  Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942)).  Chaplinsky is the seminal United States Supreme Court case on 
fighting words. Id. 
 34.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1(a)(3) (2015); Matthews, 111 A.3d at 400 
(emphasis added).  In Authelet, the court put forth the following test for 
determining whether speech constituted “fighting words”: 
The test to be applied when the prosecution relies on the fighting words 
theory is an objective one: Are the defendant’s expressions words which, 
when directed to the average person, would cause the addressee to fight? . . . 
It is not necessary that the person who is personally insulted react violently.  
As long as the language is inherently likely to cause an average person to 
retaliate in a violent way, the defendant’s words may be punished as fighting 
words.  Thus, . . . even though a police officer may be expected not to react to 
abusive language, words directed to an officer which would cause an average 
person to fight may be proscribed. 
Matthews, 111 A.3d at 400 (citing Authelet, 385 A.2d at 649–50). 
 35.  Matthews, 111 A.3d at 400, 404. 
 36.  Id. at 401 (quoting Johnson, 406 A.2d at 365). 
 37.  Id. at 403; see also Mckenna, 415 A.2d at 731. 
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defendant’s words did not rise to the level of “fighting words” 
when from a “nearby parking lot” she called a group of police 
officers “cocksuckers” and told them she would “blow [their] 
fucking heads off.”38  The defendant was eventually arrested after 
ignoring the officers’ requests to quiet down.39  In finding that the 
defendant’s speech was constitutionally protected, the court 
considered the defendant’s distance from the police officers, that 
she addressed the officers as a group and not individually, and 
that the officers were not threatened or provoked by her words 
because she was a “young girl” unable to “effectuate [her] 
threat[s].”40  Additionally, the State acknowledged that the 
defendant’s words were not “fighting words.”41 
Here, however, the court found that the Defendant was more 
than a bystander; he was “personally involved” in the incident as 
the actual subject of the troopers’ inquiry.42  Moreover, the 
Defendant’s physical proximity to the troopers was closer than 
that of the defendant in McKenna, and the Defendant here 
directed his speech specifically at the two troopers as 
individuals.43  Additionally, the court considered that both 
troopers testified that the Defendant’s speech provoked and 
threatened them, whereas the defendant in McKenna was more of 
an “annoyance” to the officers.44  Furthermore, the State, in this 
case, did not concede at any point that the Defendant’s words were 
not fighting words.45  Based on these differences, the court ruled 
that the Defendant’s speech did rise to the level of fighting words 
and, therefore, was not constitutionally protected.46 
Lastly, the court examined whether the criminal complaint 
against the Defendant provided him with sufficient notice as a 
matter of law.47  The Defendant argued that the criminal 
complaint was insufficient because it referenced conflicting 
sections of the disorderly conduct statute and, thus, did not give 
 
 38.  Id. at 401. 
 39.  McKenna, 415 A.2d at 729, 730. 
 40.  Matthews, 111 A.3d at 396. 
 41.  Id. at 402. 
 42.  Id. at 405. 
 43.  Id. at 404. 
 44.  Id. at 405. 
 45.  Id. at 404. 
 46.  Id. at 405–06. 
 47.  Id. at 406. 
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adequate notice of the charges against him.48  To effectively 
preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must be raised 
before the trial court.49 The court held that because the Defendant 
did not raise the notice issue at trial he could not raise it on 
appeal.50  Despite this holding, the court examined the issue and 
found the notice sufficient because the Defendant provided the 
trial court with the correct jury instructions for the applicable 
law.51 
COMMENTARY 
The United States Supreme Court has never again upheld a 
conviction for fighting words since its 1942 decision in 
Chaplinsky.52  Yet, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, as well as 
many other state courts across the country, continue to uphold 
these convictions, many of which involve police officers.53  Given 
the current state of law enforcement relations with communities 
nationwide, especially racial minorities, it is worth exploring why 
Rhode Island continues to apply this doctrine and if it is 
appropriate in situations involving police officers. 
It is well established that free speech protection is not 
absolute.54  Thus, the context of the speech in question matters.  
The court in Matthews focused heavily on this point.55  In the 
instant case, the Defendant’s words to the troopers were 
personally abusive, provocative, and offensive. The question is 
whether the standard for determining what constitutes fighting 
words should be the same for officers of the law as it is for average 
citizens. 
 
 48.  Id. at 396 n.9, 406.  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
1053–54 (5th ed. 2015).  Since 1942, the United States Supreme Court has 
overturned fighting words convictions by ruling it only applies to speech 
directed at another person likely to cause a violent response and by finding 
laws overly broad, vague, or impermissible content-based restrictions of 
speech. Id. at 1054. 
 53.  Burton Caine, The Trouble With “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire Is A Threat To First Amendment Values And Should Be 
Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 445 (2004).  
 54.  CHEMERINKSY at 1053. 
 55.  Matthews, 111 A.3d at 400. 
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In a footnote, the court briefly touched on the following 
principle embraced in Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Lewis 
v. City of New Orleans: “[A] properly trained [police] officer may 
reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint 
than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond 
belligerently to fight words.”56  In Lewis, a woman called the 
police who were arresting her son, “god-damn-mother-fucker-
police.”57  Under a city ordinance this speech was prohibited and 
Lewis was arrested.58  Justice Powell explains that this type of 
speech restriction: 
[C]onfers on police a virtually unrestrained power to 
arrest and charge persons with a violation. Many arrests 
are made in “one-on-one” situations where the only 
witnesses are the arresting officer and the person 
charged. All that is required for a conviction is that the 
court accept the testimony of the police officer.59 
The application of this standard in cases involving law 
enforcement is problematic because we expect police officers to be 
objectively restrained in situations where we might not expect the 
average person.  In Matthews, if the standard for fighting words 
was whether an average police officer would be provoked to violent 
reaction, the Defendant may never have been convicted.  
Encounters with police are ripe for emotional outbursts, including 
the use of profane and offensive language.  This increased 
tendency for the use of profane and offensive language in dealing 
with the police, coupled with the higher standard of restraint 
expected of police officers, supports the implementation of a 
different standard in fighting words cases involving law 
enforcement.  Rhode Island should reexamine this doctrine and 
why the United States Supreme Court has not upheld a conviction 
for fighting words since 1942. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court’s 
 
 56.  Matthews, 111 A.3d. at 401; Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 
130, 136 (1974). 
 57.  Lewis, 415 U.S. at 131. 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 136. 
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denial of the Defendant’s motion for a new trial and motion for 
judgment of acquittal.60  The Court reaffirmed its precedent that 
the determination of whether speech constitutes “fighting words” 
must be made on a case by case basis depending on the context in 




 60.  Id. at 406. 
 61.  Id. at 400, 406. 





Contract Law.  Emond Plumbing & Heating v. BankNewport, 
105 A.3d 85 (R.I. 2014).  Mortgagee was not unjustly enriched 
despite subcontractors, hired by property owner, remaining 
unpaid for materials and labor furnished to improve property.  
After property owner defaulted on mortgage, mortgagee set-off 
funds dispersed from a construction loan to pay for improvements 
to the mortgaged premise contracted by the property owner.  The 
court held that nonpayment by the mortgagee for the 
improvements made to the property was not inequitable because 
the mortgagee exercised its contractual right by setting off the 
property owner’s accounts and foreclosing on the property.  
Moreover, because the mortgagee had not acted in bad faith or 
made any fraudulent misrepresentations to the unpaid contractor, 
with whom the mortgagee had no contractual relationship, the 
mortgagee had no legal obligation to pay the subcontractors. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In May 2010, Anjan Dutta-Gupta, manager of AIDG 
Properties, LLC (“AIDG”), purchased an industrial office building 
in Middletown (“the property”).1  Advanced Solutions For 
Tomorrow, Inc. (“ASFT”),2 a defense contracting company, 
planned to occupy the property.3  In order to acquire and prepare 
the property for ASFT’s occupancy, AIDG and ASFT obtained a 
construction loan from BankNewport (“the Defendant”).4  AIDG 
and ASFT executed a first and second mortgage on the property to 
secure the purchase and construction loans from the Defendant.5 
In August, 2010, ABC Building Corporation (“ABC”) was 
hired by AIDG as general contractor to replace the property’s roof 
 
 1.  Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc., et al. v. BankNewport, 105 A.3d 
85, 86 (R.I. 2014). 
 2.  Dutta-Gupta was also the principal of ASFT.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
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and HVAC systems.6  Emond Plumbing and Heating (“Emond”), 
and Tecta America New England, LLC (“Tecta”)7 were awarded 
bids to perform the work and subsequently entered into 
subcontractor agreements with ABC.8  The subcontractor 
agreement provided that the subcontractor submit detailed 
payment applications to ABC.9  ABC would compile the payment 
applications submitted by the subcontractors and remit a 
consolidated payment application to AIDG.10  AIDG would then 
forward the consolidated payment application to the Defendant to 
draw funds from the construction loan from the Defendant.11  
Prior to disbursement, the Defendant would conduct an inspection 
of the property to ensure that the work on the payment 
application was properly completed.12 
The Plaintiffs began work at the property in September 2010 
and October 2010.13  The Plaintiffs, pursuant to the subcontractor 
agreement, submitted detailed payment applications to ABC.14  It 
was undisputed that the Plaintiffs had received partial payment 
for the work.15  In January 2011, the Plaintiffs had substantially 
completed the renovations to the property and, on February 3, 
2011, the Defendant’s inspector inspected the completed work and 
disbursed loan proceeds into AIDG’s account the following day.16  
Prior to paying ABC for the work performed on the property, 
Dutta-Gupta was accused of bribing a government official to 
obtain AFST’s defense contract.17  In the wake of Dutta-Gupta’s 
arrest, AFST laid off all of its employees and ceased operations.18  
The Defendant “then declared Dutta–Gupta’s arrest to be an event 
of default because it constituted a material adverse change in the 
circumstances of AIDG and its guarantors.”19  “Therefore, under 
 
 6.  Id. at 87. 
 7.  Emond and Tecta will be referred to collectively as the Plaintiffs. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id.   
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 87. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 88. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
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the terms of the loan documents, [the Defendant] accelerated the 
loans, making the full amount immediately due and payable.”20  
Additionally, the Defendant “set off the February 4, 2011 [deposit] 
that had been made into AIDG’s account by ‘reversing’ it.”21  
Unable to access construction loan proceeds, AIDG was unable to 
pay ABC, and “as a result, there [was] no dispute that Emond 
[and] Tecta” were each owed for materials and labor.22 
To protect its interest in the property, the Defendant 
petitioned the Newport County Superior Court for injunctive relief 
to enjoin any parties from entering the property.23  The Defendant 
then commenced foreclosure proceedings against AIDG; however, 
the Defendant discontinued its foreclosure proceedings after AIDG 
filed for bankruptcy protection.24  The Defendant, citing the 
Superior Court’s injunction, denied the Plaintiffs from accessing 
the property to remove materials.25  Subsequently, ABC and the 
Plaintiffs began mechanic’s lien proceedings in Superior Court.26 
On July 18, 2011, the Defendant obtained permission from 
the United States Bankruptcy Court to foreclose on the 
property.27  The following day, the Defendant petitioned the 
Superior Court for permission to foreclose the property in the 
pending mechanic’s lien cases, and without objection from 
Plaintiffs, the Defendant was granted permission by the Superior 
Court to foreclose on the property.28 
On September 16, 2011, a day after Emond notified the 
Defendant of its equitable lien on the proceeds of the foreclosure 
sale, the Defendant conducted a foreclosure sale.29  At the sale, it 
was announced that the second mortgage was being foreclosed on 
and any potential bidder would be responsible for the first 
mortgage on record.30  No bidders at the foreclosure sale bid 
against the Defendant’s opening credit bid of $1,000,000 and, on 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 89. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
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October 27, 2011, the Defendant recorded a foreclosure deed in the 
Middletown Land Evidence Records.31  Ultimately, the Defendant 
decided to use the property as its own corporate headquarters.32 
The Plaintiffs filed suit in Newport County Superior Court on 
November 15, 2011, “seeking to recover compensation for their 
work under the theory of unjust enrichment.”33  On May 29, 2013, 
the court granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
holding that, as a matter of law, the Defendant “was not  unjustly 
enriched by any improvements [the Plaintiffs] made to the 
premises when it purchased the property at foreclosure.”34  The 
Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal.35 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island conducted a de novo 
review of the case.36  Writing for the court, Justice Flaherty stated 
that “it is well established that ‘recovery for unjust enrichment is 
predicated upon the equitable principal that one shall not be 
permitted to enrich himself at the expense of another by receiving 
property or benefits without making compensation for them.’”37  
The court assumed that the Plaintiffs had met the first two prongs 
of the unjust enrichment analysis and focused on whether it was 
inequitable for the Defendant to retain the benefit without 
compensating the Plaintiffs because the court considered the third 
prong of the unjust enrichment analysis dispositive to the claim of 
unjust enrichment.38 
“The [P]laintiffs argue[d] that it would be inequitable for [the 
Defendant] to retain disbursed  portions of the construction loan, 
which it reversed and remitted to itself, as well as the improved 
collateral, because it is contrary to the purpose underlying the 
construction loan and the expectations of the parties.”39  The 
Plaintiffs cited Providence Steel & Iron Co. v. Flammand for 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 90 (quoting Narragansett Electric Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 
99 (R.I. 2006)). 
 38.  Id. at 90–91. 
 39.  Id. at 91. 
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support; in Flammond a subcontractor made a claim against a 
general contractor and landowner after not being paid for 
materials furnished to a property.40  Rejecting the Plaintiffs 
argument, the court distinguished Flammand because there, the 
general contractor had both informed the land owner that the 
subcontractor had not been paid and “the landowner used the 
construction loan proceeds that had been earmarked for the 
subcontractor to pay other subcontractors on unrelated projects.”41 
The Plaintiffs also cited Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., another unjust enrichment case involving 
a lender and a contractor.42  The court differentiated Metric as 
well, highlighting that “[u]nder the terms of the construction 
contract, payments were made directly to the plaintiff by the 
lender, as opposed to the scenario here, where the lender released 
funds to the landowner who, in turn, was to pay  plaintiffs.”43  
Furthermore, although the lender in Metric knew of the 
impending default of the landowner’s mortgage, the lender 
“induced the [subcontractor] to continue working,” ceased funding 
the project, foreclosed on the property, and refused to pay the 
subcontractor.44 
Lastly, the Plaintiffs looked to J.G. Plumbing Service, Inc. v. 
Coastal Mortgage Co., where the court held that a construction 
lender “may be held liable if it affirmatively misleads 
‘subcontractors and materialmen so as to induce them to continue 
to work upon and supply materials to the job to their 
detriment.’”45 
Here, the court stated that it was undisputed that there was 
no contractual relationship between the Plaintiffs and Defendant, 
and that the record did not show that the Plaintiff claimed that 
the Defendant had misled or acted fraudulently or in bad faith.46  
Furthermore, the court reviewed the terms in which the ABC was 
paid as being through AIDG and not directly from the 
 
 40.  Id. (citing 413 A.2d 487, 487–88 (R.I. 1980)). 
 41.  Id. (quoting 413 A.2d 487, 488 (R.I. 1980)). 
 42.  Id. (citing 72 Fed.Appx. 916 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
 43.  Id. (quoting 72 Fed.Appx. 916, 918–19 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
 44.  Id. (quoting 72 Fed.Appx. 916, 919–20 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
 45.  Id. (quoting 329 So.2d 393, 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)). 
 46.  Id. at 91–92. 
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Defendant.47 
The court held that Dutta-Gupta’s arrest constituted a 
“material adverse change that was an event of default as defined 
in the loan documents,” causing the Defendant to have the 
contractual right to reverse the February 4, 2011 disbursement of 
construction loan proceeds to AIDG.48  Moreover, the court found 
that the most important fact was the absence of a contractual 
relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant and “lack of 
any allegation that the defendant engaged in any type of 
misconduct or fraud” when it held that the Defendant’s “retention 
of the property, including the improvements thereon, was not 
inequitable under our jurisprudence on unjust enrichment.”49 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly established that the 
third prong to the unjust enrichment analysis is dispositive to the 
claim of unjust enrichment.50  Although the Plaintiffs claim that 
the Defendant had “appreciated” the benefit of the Plaintiffs 
improvements to the property where the Plaintiffs increased the 
value of the mortgaged collateral real estate, it was still essential 
to the claim of unjust enrichment that the Defendant have some 
sort of relationship with the Plaintiffs, whether by contract or 
misdealing.51 
Although the holding of the court may appear to be 
fundamentally unfair or even inequitable, specifically because the 
Defendant’s new corporate headquarters’ roof and HVAC system 
was improved at the expense of the Plaintiffs, the court had little 
sympathy for the Plaintiffs as it found that the Defendant was 
exercising its contractual rights under the terms and conditions of 
the mortgage.  It is not the fact that the Defendant came into 
ownership of the property that makes this case unique, but rather 
that the Defendant occupied the property subsequent to the 
foreclosure sale.  The Plaintiffs had the opportunity to object to 
the mortgagee’s foreclosure proceedings at the hearing on  July 29, 
2011, however, the Plaintiffs did not object to the Defendant’s 
 
 47.  Id. at 92. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 90–91. 
 51.  Id. at 90. 
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petition to foreclose the property, nor did the Plaintiffs anticipate 
the Defendant’s future occupancy of the property.52  
Notwithstanding, there would have been very little likelihood of 
success objecting to the Defendant’s petition to foreclose due to 
both the Defendant’s superior title claims to the first and second 
mortgage and the lack of any inequity as described by the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court. 
Had the court held for the Plaintiffs, the result on subsequent 
cases could have been absurd if applied to more probable 
circumstances.  For example, if the property here was a 
residential home that had been improved at the expense of unpaid 
contractors, the holding would open the door for creditors with 
inferior title status to lay superior claim to a first position 
mortgage on the premise that the collateral property was 
improved.  In that light, the only restriction of the contractor’s 
claim would be the value of improvements made to the property by 
contractors.  Thus, in theory, a disgruntled homeowner could 
contract for improvements on real estate for the homeowners own 
preference, such as a pool or a sauna, and the lender would be 
responsible to compensate the unpaid contractors regardless of the 
effect that the improvements have on the value of the underlying 
collateral, if any. 
Unfortunately for the Plaintiffs, pursuit of AIDG on the basis 
of breach of contract may be the only viable avenue of relief, 
although that claim would be difficult to collect on considering 
that AIDG’s principal is in federal prison.53 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the third prong to 
the unjust enrichment analysis is dispositive.  Additionally, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in order for it to be 
inequitable for a lender to retain a benefit to collateral property 
without making payment for the value of that benefit, the lender 
must have had a contractual relationship with the contractor on 
behalf of the landowner, paid the contractor directly, otherwise 
 
 52.  Id. at 89. 
 53.  Michael P. McKinney, Dutta-Gupta sentenced to 3 years in Navy 
kickback scheme, PROVIDENCE J. (Dec. 4, 2013, 9:42 PM), http://www.prov 
idencejournal.com/article/20131204/NEWS/312049995. 
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acted in bad faith, or made fraudulent misrepresentations to the 
claimant.  The Plaintiffs were not paid directly, had no contractual 
relationship with Defendant, and did not claim that the Defendant 
acted fraudulently, thus the Defendant was not unjustly enriched 
by the Plaintiffs improvements to the property and was not 
required to compensate the Plaintiffs as a matter of law. 
 Michael Riley 
 





Criminal Law.  D’Alessio v. State, 101 A.3d 1270 (R.I. 2014).  The 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island found it necessary to find that 
testimony of an expert witness was not sufficient or material 
enough to overturn a man’s conviction because the testimony of 
the expert witness did not meet the two prong test showing that 
the evidence should be entered in.  In order to receive post-
conviction relief, the Defendant needed to meet this two prong 
test, which here the court determined the Defendant failed to do. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In May of 2007, Rocco D’Alessio, the Defendant, filed for an 
application for post-conviction relief in the Providence County 
Superior Court.1  The Defendant had previously been convicted of 
second-degree murder of his infant daughter.2  On the night of 
January 13, 2000, the Defendant was left alone with his infant 
daughter when the infant’s mother had to leave for work.3  A little 
while earlier, the Defendant and Ms. Greenhalgh, the infant’s 
mother, got into a heated argument about the location of cocaine, 
which was hidden from the Defendant by Ms. Greenhalgh.4  After 
obtaining the location of the cocaine, the Defendant was left alone 
with the infant, but only after Ms. Greenhalgh had made sure the 
Defendant had calmed down.5  After about an hour alone with the 
child, Lieutenant Alan Fortes of the Providence Fire Department 
Rescue Company responded to a call at the Defendant’s neighbor’s 
house where he was met by the Defendant holding the infant.6  
There, the child was examined and just appeared to be “simply 
colicky, or constipated.”7  The Defendant was asked if he wanted 
 
 1.  D’Alessio v. State, 101 A.3d 1270, 1272 (R.I. 2014). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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to bring the child to the hospital, but he declined to do so.8  
Around 8 p.m., Lt. Fortes received another call, however this time 
it was from the Defendant’s actual residence.9  The first 
responders to the site were met by the Defendant who came out of 
the house holding the infant who was clearly not breathing as 
noticed by Lt. Fortes.10  The infant was pronounced dead upon 
arriving at the hospital.11 
On May 19, 2000, the Defendant was indicted for first-degree 
murder.12  At the trial, occurring two years later, Dr. Elizabeth 
Laposata, testified that the infant had died from Shaken Baby 
Syndrome.13  Dr. Laposata stated that the infant died from 
“violent trauma” via shaking and that death occurred within a 
matter of moments after the injuries were inflicted.14  The doctor 
came to this conclusion immediately upon seeing the dead 
infant.15  Before the trial, Dr. Laposata confirmed her findings 
with Dr. Selina Cortez, a neuropathologist.16  At the end of the 
trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict for second-degree murder 
and the Defendant was sentenced to serve a sixty year sentence.17 
A few years later, the Defendant filed for post-conviction relief 
hoping that the testimony of Dr. Richard Callery, the chief 
medical examiner for the state of Delaware, would alleviate his 
sentence.18  Dr. Callery was accredited to be an expert witness in 
forensic sciences.19  Dr. Callery’s testimony revealed that he was 
tasked by Dr. Laposata in reviewing and finalizing incomplete 
autopsy reports.20 Among one of the autopsy reports was the file 
of the deceased infant.21  Dr. Callery testified that upon reviewing 
the file, he was unable to come to a conclusion as to whether the 
 
 8.  Id. at 1272–73. 
 9.  Id. at 1273. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id.  However, forty years were to be served as probation.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 1274. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
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infant had died of Shaken Baby Syndrome or by other means.22  
However, Dr. Callery’s testimony revealed that he viewed the file 
in its preliminary stages and before Dr. Cortez reviewed the file 
and issued her opinion on it.23  Dr. Callery also stated that he did 
not remember what was in the file and continued to repeat that he 
was unable to make a conclusion based off what he saw when he 
received the file.24  At the end of his testimony, Dr. Callery 
conceded that the manner of death could have ranged anywhere 
between “homicide and undetermined.”25  At the conclusion of Dr. 
Callery’s testimony, the hearing justice ruled that the testimony 
was “valueless” and would not have changed the jury’s verdict.26 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, the Defendant raised three arguments that the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island heard.27  The court focused its 
attention on the Defendant’s argument that the hearing justice 
erred when he issued his ruling that the testimony of Dr. Callery 
would not change the verdict of the jury and was immaterial.28  
The court stated that when hearing new evidence for 
postconviction relief, the evidence presented must have material 
value, it cannot simply be used as cumulative or impeaching 
evidence.29  The court defined material as evidence which tends to 
create a reasonable likelihood of a different result.30  
Furthermore, the court reasoned there needs to be a “nexus 
 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id.  Dr. Callery also mentioned that it would have been possible to 
improve the file to such a degree that it would have been possible to 
determine that the infant’s cause of death was indeed homicide.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 1273–74.  Dr. Callery listed the possible forms of death that 
medical examiners usually include in their reports such as suicide, accident, 
undetermined, natural, and homicide.  Id. at 1274. 
 26.  Id. at 1275.  The hearing justice also went on to say that the 
credibility of Dr. Callery was in doubt as he seemed to be motivated by 
personal gain.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 1276.  However, the court threw out the second and third 
argument, since they were not raised in the postconviction relief proceedings.  
Id.  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
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between the new evidence and the outcome of the trial.”31  The 
court found that the testimony of Dr. Callery was immaterial in 
the sense that it would not have shifted the jury’s verdict in a 
more favorable result to the Defendant. 32  The court believed the 
testimony of Dr. Callery was trying to undermine the testimony of 
Dr. Laposata and did not add any material value to the evidence 
of the trial.33  It also found that Dr. Callery’s testimony was so 
vague and inconclusive that even if the testimony were allowed to 
be entered as evidence, it would not have shifted the jury’s 
verdict.34  The court also stated that Dr. Laposata’s testimony was 
credible and was complemented by receiving the outside opinion of 
Dr. Cortez before the start of the trial.35 
The court used a two-prong test in order to determine 
whether new evidence should be entered.36  The first prong of the 
test is a threshold prong where the new evidence must meet 
certain criteria in order to be considered for the second prong.37  
The second prong determines whether or not the evidence is of a 
credible nature to allow relief.38  Although, the court reached the 
same conclusion as hearing justice, it did so on different 
grounds.39  The hearing justice determined the evidence passed 
the first prong of the test, but  it was not credible to warrant 
relief.40  The Rhode Island Supreme Court, however, determined 
that the testimony of Dr. Callery did not even pass the first prong 
of the test since it was being offered to undermine the testimony of 
Dr. Laposata and further determined the testimony  would not 
have changed the jury’s verdict.41 
The Defendant claimed next that he had ineffective assistance 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 1276–77. 
 33.  Id. at 1277. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 1275. 
 37.  Id.  In order to satisfy the first prong, the evidence must be (1) newly 
discoverable and not available at the time of the trial; (2) it must not have 
been discoverable by due diligence; (3) it must be material, not simply 
cumulative or impeaching; and (4) it must be of the type that would likely 
change the verdict at trial.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 1277. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
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of counsel.42  However, the court ruled that since this issue was 
not raised by the Defendant or the state, it was not preserved for 
appeal and therefore the court did not address the claim.43  Even 
though the hearing justice ruled that there was no claim for 
ineffective counsel, the court said that the hearing justice should 
not have ruled on the matter as it was not at issue  before him.44 
The Defendant’s final argument and again one that the court 
dismissed, was that the prosecution tried to suppress material 
that was favorable to the Defendant thereby violating his due 
process rights.45  However, the court again ruled it was not 
preserved for appeal and therefore not reviewable by the court.46 
COMMENTARY 
Here, the Rhode Island Supreme Court properly determined 
that the testimony of Dr. Callery was not sufficient for the 
Defendant to succeed on a claim for post-conviction relief.  The 
two-prong test that the court applied to determine the viability of 
the Defendant’s new evidence may have been a difficult standard 
to pass, but it is nonetheless a fair and just standard created by 
the courts.  Here, the two-prong test was fairly applied to the 
Defendant’s new evidence of Dr. Callery’s testimony.  This test 
creates narrow guidelines in order for a Defendant to succeed to 
get post-conviction relief.  However, the narrow test is necessary 
in the sense that it helps to weed out senseless new evidence from 
those convicted trying to get out of their sentence. 
The Defendant in this case tried to introduce evidence that 
was in no way beneficial to his case.  The testimony he was trying 
to provide did not help his case, but sought to poke holes in the 
State’s case, a clear violation of the first prong of the test because 
it attempted to impeach the credibility of Dr. Laposata’s testimony 
and not actually add any value to the Defendant’s testimony.  It 
seems here as though the Defendant was simply trying to 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 1278.  
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id.  The court also rejected the Defendant’s argument that he did 
make this claim in court, but the Defendant simply points to “vague and 
scattered references” none of which the court deemed worthy of constituting 
this claim. Id. at 1278–79. 
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introduce any kind of evidence that he could muster in order to 
alleviate his sentence to some degree.  He was simply trying to 
find an “out” in order to relieve himself of his sentence. The 
sentence that also seemed fair, considering forty of the sixty years 
the Defendant was going to be allowed on probation. 
 The other two claims brought forward by the Defendant, just 
seem to be him scraping the bottom of the barrel, trying to come 
up with any and all claims that may help him win the 
postconviction relief. However, the court correctly mentioned that 
in order for him to bring these claims, he should have brought 
them at trial.  This makes procedural and common sense, as 
allowing people to make any claims they can muster when on 
appeal, backs up the court system, and allows people to bring in 
claims that were never argued in the first place. 
The test for post-conviction relief helps to weed out claims 
that people bring in order to alleviate their sentences, but do not 
actually have viable claims that will benefit them.  The 
Defendant’s claim was one like that: it had no basis to be brought 
in front of the court. This prevents bogging down the court system 
with immaterial claims or claims that Defendants such as 
D’Alessio try and bring simply for the sake of trying to get out of 
their sentence, not because they believe they were actually 
wronged. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the hearing 
justice in the Defendant’s post-conviction hearing did not err when 
he ruled that the evidence of Dr. Callery was not material and 
therefore would not have influenced the jury to arrive at a 
different verdict.  The court also determined that the Defendant’s 
other two claims had no merit before the court as they were never 
argued at trial, therefore making them non issues with this court. 
Jamison Jedziniak 
 





Criminal Law.  State v. Armour, 110 A.3d 1195 (R.I. 2015).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction 
of second-degree child molestation, holding that a defendant’s 
confession is voluntary when he is made aware of his rights, 
completely understands those rights, and subsequently provides 
an incriminating statement to law enforcement.  The court also 
held that a witness’s medical testimony was not beyond the scope 
of  proper expert testimony or unfairly prejudicial, even if the 
testimony suggested an inference that a defendant committed a 
more serious crime. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In the early morning hours of January 29, 2011, six-year-old 
Sarah awoke to a man inside her bedroom, touching her vagina.1  
The perpetrator, Defendant Joseph Armour, rented an upstairs 
unit of a multi-family home belonging to Sarah’s mother, who 
resided in the first floor unit with Sarah.2  The Defendant fled 
from Sarah’s room, where her mother found her covered under her 
blanket, with her jeans and underwear pulled down below her 
waist.3  After confirming to her mother that the Defendant 
touched her inappropriately, Sarah was taken to the local hospital 
for an examination performed by Dr. Goldberg.4  At trial, Dr. 
Goldberg testified that the victim’s examination appeared to be 
normal other than a few disclosures made by Sarah.5  Dr. 
Goldberg further testified that a normal examination does not 
necessarily mean the absence of child abuse, which raised several 
objections from defense counsel.6  Notably, the one answer to 
which defense counsel neither objected to nor moved to strike was 
 
 1.  State v. Armour, 110 A.3d 1195, 1197 (R.I. 2015). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 1197–98. 
 4.  Id. at 1198. The victim’s mother asked her daughter if he touched 
her “cookie,” to which the victim said “yes.”  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 1202. The victim told the doctor she “felt wet,” prompting the 
doctor to examine for sexual assault.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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Dr. Goldberg’s statement that “[Sarah’s] normal examination does 
not exclude the possibility of sexual abuse, or even 
penetration . . .”7 
One of the witnesses called at trial was Detective Mark Jones, 
the officer who initially spoke to the Defendant following his 
arrest.8  He testified that the Defendant agreed to speak to the 
two investigating detectives and was therefore moved to an 
interview room after being brought to the police station.9  
Detective Jones provided the Defendant a standard rights form, 
advised the Defendant of his constitutional rights that were 
included in the form, and that following his advisement, the 
Defendant initialed every item and signed the document around 
9:40 a.m.10  The Defendant then provided a full confession, which 
was typed, handed to him to confirm there were no inconsistencies 
or omissions, and then was signed by the Defendant.11  The 
Defendant never indicated the statement was incorrect, and never 
asked to speak to an attorney or make a phone call.12  The second 
detective testified that he was present when the Defendant read 
the rights form, signed and initialed the form, and provided the 
confession.13  The second detective also testified that the 
Defendant never asked for a lawyer, and that neither detective 
was advised that a lawyer attempted to contact them on the 
Defendant’s behalf.14 
The Defendant’s trial testimony of his arrest and 
interrogation was substantially different than that of the 
detectives.15  The Defendant testified that, after being arrested, 
he was subjected to intimidation tactics including threats of 
violence from a large group of law enforcement officers and 
potential future prison inmates.16  Once he was brought to the 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 1198. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 1198–1200. 
 11.  Id. at 1199.  
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See id. 
 16.  Id.  The defendant testified that the officers said they were “really in 
the mood to mess him up,” while touching their guns.  He testified that the 
officers asked him “about what he could expect from other inmates at prison.”  
Id. 
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police station, he was permitted to make a phone call from his cell 
phone, which he used to call his mother to secure an attorney for 
representation.17  The Defendant stated that before he was 
provided the rights form, he asked multiple times for his lawyer, 
but his requests were ignored by the officers who continued 
questioning him.18  He signed the form out of fear and exhaustion 
and admitted to giving a statement and signing it because he “was 
afraid not to”; although he admitted during cross-examination 
that he knew he was not required to continue answering the 
detective’s questions, but did so anyway.19  Finally, the Defendant 
testified that while being questioned, another officer entered the 
room and mentioned an outside phone call to the investigating 
detectives.20 
The Defendant’s mother also testified at trial.21  She stated 
that after receiving a phone call from her son requesting an 
attorney, she contacted the Defendant’s cousin to find him one.22  
The Defendant’s cousin then testified that he contacted and 
secured a lawyer to represent the Defendant.23  Next, the 
Defendant’s attorney testified that she contacted the police station 
around 9:45 a.m., but was denied the opportunity to speak to the 
Defendant.24  The attorney left a message for her client and 
advised him of her representation of him and that he should not 
give a statement.25 
During trial, the Defendant moved to suppress his 
incriminating statement, which was subsequently denied.26  The 
jury found the Defendant guilty of second-degree child 
molestation.27  The trial justice denied the Defendant’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to thirty years at the 
 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 1199–1200.  The defendant also claimed he signed the form 
because he thought the judge would assume he was guilty if he didn’t sign it.  
Id. at 1199. 
 20.  Id. at 1199. 
 21.  Id. at 1200. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 1197. 
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Adult Corrections Institution (ACI).28  The Defendant timely 
appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress the confession he gave to law enforcement, in 
permitting Dr. Goldberg to testify regarding the explanation of a 
normal examination over defense counsel’s objection, and in 
denying the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.29 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A. The Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 
On appeal, the Defendant asserted that the trial court erred 
in denying his motion to suppress his statement to law 
enforcement, arguing the incriminating statement was made 
involuntarily.30  The trial justice, concluding the Defendant’s 
statement was made voluntarily, found the Defendant’s testimony 
“implausible, unbelievable, and farfetched,” and determined the 
Defendant’s statement was not coerced, but rather that the 
Defendant “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 
rights.”31  In its opinion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
discussed three things: (1) the State’s burden of proof for 
establishing the voluntariness of the Defendant’s confession; (2) 
the trial justice’s standard for ruling on the motion to suppress the 
Defendant’s confession; and (3) the two-step test that this 
appellate court must apply when reviewing the lower court’s 
ruling on this motion.32 
 
 28.  Id. at 1198, 1203. 
 29.  Id. at 1197.  
 30.  Id. at 1120. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id. at 1200–01.  First, “[i]n order for the trial justice to admit a 
defendant’s statement at trial, ‘the state must establish, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waved 
his or her right against self-incrimination and that the statement was 
voluntary.’”  Id. at 1200 (quoting State v Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 790 (R.I. 
2007).  “This inquiry ‘requires an analysis of the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation.’” Id. (quoting State v Jimenez, 33 A.3d 724, 
734 (R.I. 2011).  Then, the court “applies the following two-step review of a 
trial justice’s finding of voluntariness:  
‘First, we review the trial justice’s findings of historical fact with 
deference and we will not overturn those findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Second . . . we accept the historical facts and 
credibility determinations, and we then conduct de novo review of 
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First, in ruling that the Defendant’s confession was voluntary, 
the court focused on the evidence presented at trial regarding the 
Defendant’s condition and understanding of his rights at the time 
of interrogation.33  The court reasoned that because the detectives 
advised the Defendant of his rights, both in written and oral form, 
and because the Defendant initialed and signed next to each right 
on the form, the Defendant was therefore capable at the time of 
the interrogation of providing a voluntary statement to the 
officers.34  The court also relied on the Defendant’s condition at 
the time of questioning, as he appeared alert and acknowledged 
that he understood his right to silence and to counsel.35  Finally, 
the court determined that the Defendant’s trial testimony was 
relevant to finding that his confession was voluntary, because the 
Defendant admitted at trial that he knew he was not required to 
speak to the officers during the interrogation but that he chose to 
do so anyway.36 
In asserting that the trial justice erred by denying his motion 
to suppress, the Defendant argued that he was denied his right to 
counsel when the officers refused his request to make a 
confidential phone call prior to questioning.37  The court 
acknowledged that any “person who is arrested ‘shall be afforded, 
as soon after being detained as practicable . . . the opportunity to 
make use of a telephone for the purpose of securing an 
attorney.’”38  However, the court noted that the officers allowed 
the Defendant to call his mother in an attempt to obtain counsel, 
and therefore the officers did not deny the Defendant his right to 
counsel.39 
B. Dr. Goldberg’s Medical Testimony 
The Defendant’s second assertion was that the trial justice 
erred in allowing Dr. Goldberg to testify about examination 
 
the trial justice’s conclusion that the confession was voluntary.’”   
Id. (quoting Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 790).  
 33.  Armour, 110 A.3d at 1201. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 1202. 
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information involving first-degree sexual molestation, because the 
Defendant was charged with the lesser offense of second-degree 
sexual molestation.40  The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld 
the trial justice’s admission of Dr. Goldberg’s testimony, finding 
that the testimony was relevant, within “the scope of proper 
expert testimony,” and not “substantially prejudicial.”41  In 
reviewing the trial court’s decision to admit Dr. Goldberg’s 
testimonial evidence, the court applied the “abuse of discretion” 
standard.42  Because defense counsel expressly agreed to allow the 
doctor to testify regarding the absence of injuries and the results 
of the examination, the court ruled that there had been no abuse 
of discretion and thus no error.43  Additionally, the court 
concluded that defense counsel failed to properly preserve this 
evidentiary issue for appeal under the “raise or waive” doctrine by 
failing to object to this specific line of questioning or moving to 
strike the doctor’s answer during trial.44  Moreover, the court 
ruled the doctor’s testimony was not unfairly prejudicial had the 
issue been properly preserved for appeal because of the specific 
jury instructions provided by the trial justice and the State’s 
burden to prove every element of the crime.45 Thus, the court 
found no error in admitting Dr. Goldberg’s testimony.46 
C. The Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
The Defendant’s third and final assertion was that the trial 
justice erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for judgment of 
 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id  “It is well settled that this Court will ‘review a trial justice’s 
decision admitting or excluding evidence under an abuse of discretion 
standard.’”  Id. (quoting State v Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012).  
 43.  Armour, 110 A.3d at 1202.  
 44.  Id. at 1202–03.  The raise or waive doctrine explains that the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court should “not review issues that were not presented to 
the trial court in such a posture as to alert the trial justice to the question 
being raised[.]”  See Bernard v HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1219 n.2 (R.I. 2013) 
(quoting State v Kluth, 46 A.3d 867, 876 (R.I. 2012)).  
 45.  Armour, 110 A.3d at 1203.  “In addition, ‘because the state bears the 
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, it 
has the right to present evidence establishing those elements in its case in 
chief.’”  Id. at 1203 (quoting State v Marmolejos, 990 A.2d 848, 852 (R.I. 
2010).  
 46.  Armour, 110 A.3d at 1202. 
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acquittal.47  The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that when 
ruling on a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal, the same standard applies as when the trial justice is 
initially ruling on a defendant’s motion for judgment of 
acquittal.48  The fact that the young victim testified at trial about 
the Defendant’s actions, combined with the corroborating 
testimony from the victim’s mother, Dr. Goldberg, and the 
Defendant’s own statement to police following his arrest, all led 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court to conclude that there was 
sufficient evidence to prove the Defendant committed one count of 
second-degree child molestation.49 Thus, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court held there was enough evidence to support the 




The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed two issues 
regarding the constitutionality of the Defendant’s confession to 
law enforcement: First, whether the Defendant’s confession was 
voluntary; second, whether Defendant was denied his right to a 
confidential phone call.51  As to the first issue, the court focused 
its factual determination exclusively on the events that occurred 
during the Defendant’s interrogation.52  By doing so, the court 
ignored the Defendant’s assertions that law enforcement officers 
threatened and harassed him after being arrested.53  By failing to 
address these contentions in the opinion, it could be argued the 
court purposefully limited its factual analysis to the interrogation 
and the Defendant’s understanding of his rights, excluding from 
 
 47.  Id. at 1203. 
 48.  Id.  “‘A motion for a judgment of acquittal should be granted only if 
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is 
insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Id. 
(quoting State v Heredia, 10 A.3d 443, 446 (R.I. 2010).  “‘If, however, a 
reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the motion should be denied.’”  Armour, 110 A.3d at 1203 (quoting Heredia¸ 
10 A.3d at 446).   
 49.  Armour, 110 A.3d at 1203–04. 
 50.  Id. at 1204. 
 51.  Id. at 1198. 
 52.  See id.  
 53.  Id. at 1199. 
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their inquiry any factual assertions made by the Defendant 
regarding events prior to the interrogation. 
The second issue raised by the Defendant was his right to a 
confidential phone call pursuant to Rhode Island law.54  The court 
made clear that by calling his mother and requesting her 
assistance in finding an attorney, the Defendant was afforded the 
opportunity to use the telephone in order to secure an attorney, 
and therefore was not denied his right to invoke counsel.55 
It could be argued that the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s 
conclusion on the evidentiary issue raised by the Defendant 
provides extensive latitude for prosecutors when questioning a 
medical examiner.56  The court dismissed the Defendant’s two 
arguments that the doctor’s testimony was beyond the scope of 
proper expert testimony and that it was extremely prejudicial.57  
Although the court applied the “raise or waive” doctrine as one of 
the reasons for denying the Defendant’s motion, the court also 
pointed to the State’s burden of proof in criminal cases as a 
justification for allowing the doctor’s testimony.58  In doing so, the 
court indicated that had this issue been properly preserved for 
appeal, the testimony would still be admissible even though the 
doctor was clearly describing facts consistent with a more severe 
criminal charge.  Also, the court acknowledged that defense 
counsel previously agreed to allow the doctor to testify as to the 
results of her examination.59  Even though the results of the 
examination eluded to facts outside the relevant criminal charges, 
with the possibility of a prejudicial effect on the jury, the 
testimony should still be admissible to allow the State the 
opportunity to prove every element of the crime. 
However, had Dr. Goldberg’s testimony directly accused the 
Defendant of conduct consistent with first-degree child 
molestation, as opposed to mere speculation on the issue, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court might have ruled in favor of the 
Defendant.  A direct implication of sexual penetration would likely 
mislead the jury, focusing their attention on the possibility of first-
 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id. at 1202. 
 56.  See id. at 1202–03. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 1202. 
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degree child molestation, as opposed to the charged crime of 
second-degree child molestation.  A trial justice would likely 
decide that the doctor’s testimony in this instance would have an 
unfairly prejudicial effect on the Defendant’s case, and conclude 
that this prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value of the 
testimony.  In this case, however, Dr. Goldberg’s testimony only 
suggested an inference of potential sexual penetration, which 




The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the 
Defendant’s confession was voluntary because the Defendant was 
advised of his rights, signed a form acknowledging his 
understanding of his rights, and eventually testified at trial that 
he knew he was not required to continue speaking to detectives.60  
Further, the court ruled that because defense counsel failed to 
properly object at trial, the doctor’s testimony was properly 
admitted even though it went outside the scope of the Defendant’s 




 60.  Id. at 1201. 
 61.  Id. at 1202–03. 





Criminal Law.  State v. Tucker, 111 A.3d 376 (R.I. 2015).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that evidence of a prior 
criminal act is properly admitted to establish motive if the 
evidence is powerful, relevant, extraordinarily significant, and the 
probative value of the prior criminal act does not outweigh the 
potential prejudicial effect of the evidence on the jury.  A witness’s 
testimony of committing prior crimes with a defendant does not 
create grounds for mistrial when defense counsel is on notice of 
the prior crimes and chooses to push the subject anyway.  A 
prosecutor’s closing statements are permissible where they 
pertain only to evidence presented and are not of such a nature as 
to inflame the passions of the jury. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In September 2006, Defendant Deaven Tucker (“Tucker”), 
Victoria Berardinelli (Berardinelli), and Tucker’s friends Zachery 
Brown (“Brown”), John Soares (“Soares”), Ronald Spearin 
(“Spearin”), and Eugenia Gomes (“Gomes”) went to Florida.1  
Everyone drove to Florida from Rhode Island, besides 
Berardinelli, who flew.2  When Berardinelli arrived in Florida, she 
was surprised to discover that Jennifer Durate (Jennifer) was 
with the group.3  On the group’s last night in Florida everyone 
except Brown went out to a club.4  When the group returned to the 
room where Brown was staying, Tucker declared that Spearin 
“had to be taken care of.”5  Brown testified that at that time, 
Tucker told Brown the plan he came up with to kill Spearin.6  
After the group executed the plan, Tucker, Jennifer, Brown, and 
Berardinelli packed their things and headed back to Rhode 
 
 1.  State v. Tucker, 111 A.3d 376, 379 (R.I. 2015). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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Island.7 
When the group returned to Rhode Island, Berardinelli 
warned Tucker that Jennifer “was going to tell on him.”8  
Thereafter, Tucker maintained a low profile, hiding out in various 
hotels throughout Rhode Island and Massachusetts, often 
accompanied by Jennifer.9  Soon, a detective from Florida 
contacted Berardinelli, at which time she told the detective 
nicknames of those involved in the Florida incident.10  Tucker 
learned that Florida detectives had heard everything and believed 
it would only be a matter of time before they would identify the 
remaining accomplices, including Jennifer.11  While Tucker was 
sure that Jennifer would not implicate him because she loved him, 
he was worried Jennifer might implicate Berardinelli.12  
Ultimately, Tucker declared that he did not “trust Jennifer, and 
that she had to go.”13 
On November 20, 2006, Tucker, Ruiz and Jennifer, robbed a 
bank on the East Side of Providence.14  Ruiz testified that Tucker 
had informed him before the robbery that “there’s going to be a 
good, good lick.”15  Ruiz further explained that Tucker said that 
they would rob the bank and that Jennifer would drive the 
getaway car.16  Tucker and Ruiz wore all black clothing and 
bandanas over their faces to rob the bank, however only Tucker 
wore gloves.17  The group surveyed the area for a bank to rob and 
eventually decided on one.18  According to testimony, Ruiz entered 
the bank first and ordered the tellers to put the money in his 
bag.19  The tellers complied, but Ruiz became impatient and 
 
 7.  Id. at 379–80.  Tucker ordered that “[e]verybody keep their mouth 
shut.”  Id. at 380.  
 8.  Id. at 380. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 377 
 15.  Id. at 381.  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id.  Jennifer cased the bank they chose and determined that it had 
neither security officers nor bulletproof glass, which made it a good target.  
Id.  
 19.  Id.  
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reached into the drawers.20  During the robbery, Tucker stayed 
near the entrance to maintain order by displaying his gun and 
threatening to fire.21  After about forty seconds, Tucker and Ruiz 
left the bank and fled to Jennifer’s car.22  Followiong the robbery, 
Tucker stated to the others that “he had used Jenny as much as 
he could. He didn’t trust her anymore and she had to go.”23 
In effort to prevent being connected to the Florida crime, 
Tucker decided that that Jennifer had to die.24  On November 21, 
2006, Tucker, Jennifer and two others25 parked a vehicle on the 
side of the road in Pawtucket.26  Tucker lured Jennifer from the 
car, took out a semiautomatic handgun and fired one shot at 
point-blank range into Jennifer’s back.27  Tucker then stood over 
Jennifer and fired eight more shots into her body, including three 
shots in her back, one in her upper right arm, and four in her 
head.28  Tucker left Jennifer’s body where she fell.29 
By early December 2006, the Providence Police Department 
had made significant progress in their investigation into the bank 
robbery.30  Detectives had obtained a latent fingerprint from the 
teller’s cash drawer which was determined to be Ruiz’s.31  On 
December 12, 2006, Ruiz turned himself into the police and was 
arrested on the spot.32  Tucker was arrested later that day.33  
Berardinelli visited Tucker numerous times while he was 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. Tucker asked Wilson to kill Jennifer for her share of the money 
from the bank robbery and Wilson declined.  Id.  Testimony stated that 
Tucker then made the same offer to Ruiz and Ruiz responded affirmatively, 
“F—- it. I’ll kill her.  I don’t care.”  Id.  Shortly after, Ruiz changed his mind 
and told Tucker he would not kill Jennifer and Tucker responded that he 
would take care of it.  Id. at 382.   
 24.  Id. at 378. 
 25.  The two other passengers were Jason Ruiz and Dana Wilson.  Id. at 
n.2.  
 26.  Id. at 378. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 382. 
 31.  Id.  Ruiz was contacted by his mother after the police had been to 
her home and told her they wanted Ruiz to turn himself in for questioning.  
Id.  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
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incarcerated and testified about many of their conversations.34  
Ruiz also testified at trial regarding Tucker’s plan to rob the bank, 
as well as his desire to kill Jennifer.35 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Tucker was charged with the murder of Jennifer and eleven 
other offenses.36  The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.37  
Tucker was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences plus an 
additional thirty-five consecutive, non-parolable years.38  Three 
issues were raised on appeal.  First, Tucker argued that the trial 
justice abused his discretion when he admitted certain Rule 404(b) 
evidence39 concerning the Florida incident, the Spearin murder, 
and the subsequent investigation spearheaded by one of the 
detectives.40  Next, Tucker argued that the trial justice erred 
when he denied his motion for a mistrial after Ruiz revealed, 
during cross examination by the defense, that he knew that the 
term “good lick” meant a robbery because he had previously done 
such an act with Tucker.41  Finally, Tucker claimed that the trial 
justice committed reversible error when he failed to grant a 
mistrial because of the prosecutor’s inappropriate and 
inflammatory comments during closing arguments.42 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 381.  Tucker first had a plan that consisted of Ruiz hiding near 
Jennifer’s house until he lured her outside, at which point Ruiz was to shoot 
and kill her, but that plan did not work because they were unable to get 
Jennifer out of her apartment.  Id. at 380–81.   
 36.  Id. at 378 (the murder of Jennifer was in violation of R.I. GEN. LAWS 
1956 §§ 11-23-1 and 11-23-2). 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence states:  
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove 
that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that the fear was 
reasonable.”  
R.I. R. Evid. Art. IV, Rule 404.  
 40.  Tucker, 111 A.3d at 383.  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
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A. Admission of the Florida Evidence was Proper 
Prior to the start of trial, the state filed a motion in limine 
seeking the court’s guidance with respect to the admissibility of 
certain Rule 404(b) evidence.43  The state argued that the 
evidence regarding the Florida incident was necessary to 
demonstrate Tucker’s motive for killing Jennifer and to provide 
the jury with a full description of the events leading up to 
Jennifer’s murder.44  Tucker argued that the Florida evidence 
should be excluded because its admission would violate Rule 
404(b), and because it was unfairly prejudicial, and therefore in 
violation of Rule 403.45  The Rhode Island Supreme Court held 
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion regarding the Rule 
404(b) analysis when he determined that the Florida evidence was 
relevant and probative as it established Tucker’s motive to kill 
Jennifer.46  Additionally, the court reasoned that Tucker had a 
motive to kill Jennifer because she might have implicated him or 
Berardinelli for the murder in Florida, and Tucker was firm on 
not letting that happen.47 
After the 404(b) analysis was complete, the trial judge 
balanced the relevance and probative value of the Florida evidence 
against its potential prejudice, as required by Rule 403.48 The 
court agreed with the trial judge that the probative value of the 
evidence outweighed the potential for prejudice, especially since 
the state chose to refrain from referring to the Florida incident as 
a murder.49  Moreover, the various limiting instructions the judge 
gave to the jury, including those he gave right after the Florida 
events were brought up and before closing arguments, further 
supported that the judge did not abuse his discretion when he 





 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 383–84.  
 46.  Id at 386. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 386–87. 
 50.  Id. at 387. 
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B. “Good lick” Testimony did not Warrant a Mistrial 
The court next addressed Tucker’s argument  regarding Ruiz’s 
“good lick” testimony.51  Tucker asserted that Ruiz’s testimony 
“easily could have distracted the jurors from the issues at hand 
and allowed them to convict [him] based on evidence that he and 
Ruiz were seasoned robbers.”52  Prior to Ruiz testifying, the trial 
judge conducted an extensive interview of Ruiz.53  The judge 
learned that Ruiz was testifying because he was afraid Tucker 
would “snitch” on him about other “robberies and a shooting,” and 
then warned Tucker’s counsel about the dangers of certain 
questioning that could open a door to expose Tucker to other 
shootings and robberies.54  However, Tucker’s counsel elected to 
proceed.55  After  the judge interviewed Ruiz, Tucker’s counsel 
continued his cross-examination where Ruiz responded to a 
question stating that he knew Tucker was talking about a robbery 
because he had done things like that with Tucker before.56  
Immediately after Ruiz revealed the past criminal acts he 
committed with Tucker, the trial judge granted Tucker’s motion to 
strike the statement from the record.57 
Tucker moved to pass the case at the beginning of the next 
day of trial.58  In his ruling, the trial judge explained that 
Tucker’s counsel had been forewarned that Ruiz had participated 
in uncharged robberies with Tucker however Tucker’s attorney 
continued to repeatedly question Ruiz about how he knew what 
the phrase “good lick” meant.59  The decision to pass a case and 
 
 51.  Id.  “Good lick” refers to Ruiz’s statements that he and Tucker had 
previously done similar criminal acts, so he knew the context of the phrase 
“good lick” when Tucker used it.  Id.   
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 388. The record revealed the following line of questioning:  
[Defense Counsel]: . . . that the defendant indicated that he was 
going to— there’s going to be a good lick? 
[Ruiz]: Yes. 
[Defense Counsel]: Is that right? That’s a chance to get some money? 
[Ruiz]: Yes. A lick is robbery.  It’s a slang term for, like, robbery. 
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declare a mistrial belongs to the trial justice, and this Court gave 
great weight to that decision in coming to a conclusion here.60 
Ultimately, the court ruled that the trial justice did not err 
when he denied Tucker’s motion to pass because Tucker’s counsel 
had been forewarned about Ruiz’s prior criminal experience with 
Tucker, and Tucker’s counsel still proceeded to ask Ruiz how he 
knew a “good lick” was a robbery.61  Additionally, directly after 
Ruiz stated that he had done things like that with Tucker 
previously, the trial judge ordered that statement to be stricken 
from the record.62 
C. The Prosecution’s Closing Statements Were Appropriate 
Tucker’s final argument on appeal was that the prosecutor 
made inappropriate and inflammatory comments during his 
closing argument which warranted a new trial.63  However, in 
order for a prosecutor’s comments to be deemed inappropriate the 
statements must be totally extraneous to the issues in the case 
and tend to inflame and arouse the passions of the jury.64  The 
court concluded that the prosecutor’s statement did not exceed the 
considerable latitude he was allowed because it related only to 
evidence presented at trial.65  Tucker also argued that the 
prosecutor acted improperly when he referred to victim impact 
evidence that was not introduced into evidence before closing 
arguments.66  The prosecution discussed Jennifer’s son and 
 
[Defense Counsel]: So, when you say that the defendant mentioned 
that, then you knew he was talking about a robbery? 
[Ruiz]: Yes. 
[Defense Counsel]: Not something else? 
[Ruiz]: But I knew—but—knew it was a robbery, but I didn’t know 
what kind of robbery, because I had before done things like that with 
[defendant]. 
Id. at 387.  
 60.  Id. at 388.  
 61.  Id.  “[W]hen counsel goes fishing on cross-examination, he cannot 
assume that in playing with fire, he will not get burned.”  Id. (citing State v. 
Edwards, 478 A.2d 972, 975 (R.I. 1984)).  
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 389. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id.  
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mother and the tragedy they were facing because of her murder, 
which Tucker believed to be impermissible “victim impact 
evidence.”67  However, the court disagreed with Tucker because 
his own counsel had probed a number of the state’s witnesses 
about the nature of Jennifer’s relationship with her son and how 
much time she spent with him.68  The court affirmed all of the 
trial courts findings.69 
 
COMMENTARY 
The court properly affirmed the trial justice’s ruling on the 
Rule 404(b) argument.  The trial justice did a thorough Rule 
404(b) analysis regarding Tucker’s motive and how the evidence of 
the Florida crimes would go directly to that motive.  Rule 404(b) 
expressly states that evidence of past crimes may be admitted for 
various purposes, such as to prove motive.  It is clear from Ruiz’s 
testimony that Tucker expressly stated his motive through verbal 
communication.  Next, the trial judge correctly moved on to a Rule 
403 analysis.  While the evidence could have potentially been 
prejudicial to Tucker, such prejudice does not outweigh the 
probative value of establishing a clear and convincing motive.  The 
level of prejudice was also greatly reduced by the trial judge’s 
multiple limiting instructions to the jury regarding the Florida 
evidence both before and after closing arguments.  The judge 
made a diligent effort in trying to avoid prejudice. 
As to Ruiz’s “good lick” testimony, the court seemed to be 
more passionate about emphasizing Tucker’s counsel’s clear error 
of judgment in probing the witness on the meaning of “good lick”, 
as well as in establishing that Tucker’s attorney essentially 
deserved what was coming to him than it was in evaluating 
whether the trial judge’s ruling was appropriate based on the rule.  
However, as there is a very high standard for reversing the 
decision of a trial judge70 on a mistrial ruling, this court’s 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 390. 
 70.  The standard for overruling a judge in the lower court on the 
mistrial ruling states, “a mistrial shall be declared when an “inappropriate 
remark [or action] has so inflamed the jurors that they no longer would be 
able to decide the case based on a calm and dispassionate evaluation of the 
evidence.”  Id. at 388 (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1033 (R.I. 
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affirmation of that ruling was proper.  A jury probably would not 
have been aroused to such a point, especially considering the vast 
array of testimony and evidence presented at trial. 
Lastly, Tucker’s claim that the prosecution made 
inappropriate statements seems unwarranted.  The exact 
language of the prosecution’s closing statement would probably 
better reflect the degree to which Tucker’s claim was frivolous; 
however, the brief recap the court discusses makes it quite clear 
that Tucker’s own counsel opened the doors to the subject matter 
of comments from the prosecution to which he claimed warranted 
a new trial.71  Moreover, other evidence in the trial was certainly 
more outrageous than the prosecution’s closing statements about 
Jennifer’s family’s sorrow and mourning after her death.  It would 
be a great stretch to say that such comments could inflame the 
passions of the jury so much as to impact their decision or to 
warrant the granting of a new trial. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that evidence of a prior 
crime is admissible to establish motive when the probative value 
is not outweighed by prejudice. The court determined that 
testimony by a witness of prior criminal acts committed by the 
defendant will not create grounds for mistrial when defense 
counsel was on notice that such events could come to light, and 
continues to push an issue likely to bring those facts to light. 
Finally, the Court established that prosecution’s closing 
statements will not be considered inappropriate so long as they 
are not totally extraneous to the evidence presented at trial and 
do not inflame the passions of the jury. 




 71.  The only specific example the court discusses in the opinion is when 
Tucker’s counsel asked Jennifer’s sister, Susan, about how much time 
Jennifer spent with her son.  Id. at 389.  





Criminal Law.  State v. Rosenbaum, 114 A.3d 76 (R.I. 2015). The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a person who wants a 
restitution order reduced has the burden of proof to show that he 
or she has made a good faith effort to procure the additional funds 
that are purportedly missing. The court will not accept evasive 
and vague answers as evidence. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In 2010, Defendant, Judith Rosenbaum (“Rosenbaum”), pled 
nolo contendere before the Rhode Island superior court to one 
count of uttering or delivering checks in an amount exceeding 
$1,500 with intent to defraud, one count of misappropriating 
property, and one count of obtaining goods valued at more than 
$500 by false pretenses with intent to cheat or defraud.1 
Rosenbaum was put on probation and ordered to pay $95,000 in 
restitution.2  Rosenbaum’s restitution payments were set at $500 
a month.3  On January 17, 2013, Rosenbaum appeared before a 
Superior Court magistrate in order to have her monthly payments 
reduced.4 
At the hearing before the magistrate, Rosenbaum testified 
that her husband had lost his job as a physician and that her 
financial situation had changed since she was originally ordered to 
pay $500 a month in restitution.5  Rosenbaum argued that her 
monthly payments should be reduced to $237, the amount she 
received every month from a pension benefit.6  The hearing 
focused on various (although outdated) financial documents 
Rosenbaum submitted into evidence.7  The evidence revealed that 
 
 1.  State v. Rosenbaum, 114 A.3d 76, 77 (R.I. 2015). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id. at 78 
 6.  Id. at 77 
 7.  Id. at 78 
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Rosenbaum and her husband resided in a house valued at 
$950,000, which they had incurred negative equity in the amount 
of $350,000.8  The Rosenbaum’s had had a monthly mortgage 
payment on the property for $8,850 and a property tax obligation 
of $1,542.9  At the time of the hearing, Rosenbaum and her 
husband were in the midst of foreclosure proceedings after falling 
more than a year behind on their mortgage and tax payments.10 
Rosenbaum’s financial statements showed that she and her 
husband owned two cars, making monthly payments of $856 on 
the 2007 Toyota Highlander and $680 on the 2008 Toyota Prius.11  
Rosenbaum and her husband spent $175 a month on car 
insurance and $256 a month on gas.12  Rosenbaum’s other 
monthly expenses included $804 on homeowners insurance, $745 
on life insurance, $200 on clothing and shoes, $150 on cable and 
internet and $100 on charitable donations.13 Rosenbaum and her 
husband also owed $11,000 on a line of credit with Harris Furs14, 
which the couple had been making $600 monthly payments on 
prior to Rosenbaum’s husband losing his job.15  When asked at the 
hearing if she had thought about selling any of the furs or jewelry, 
Rosenbaum made no indication that she had considered reducing 
any of her monthly expenditures.16  The magistrate denied 
Rosenbaum’s petition to have her monthly payments reduced, 
finding that Rosenbaum had failed to present evidence that she 
was financially unable to make the restitution payments without 
accessing her social security funds.17 
 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id.  Rosenbaum explained that her husband drove the Prius and she 
was previously driving the Highlander but now had “incredible difficulty 
driving” due to an injury.  Because the car went essentially unused, the court 
reasoned that Rosenbaum could sell it as a means to repay her restitution.  
Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  William Harris Furs is a luxury and couture full service fur retailer.  
See www.williamhharrisfurs.com.  
 15.  Rosenbaum, 114 A.3d at 78.  
 16.  Id. at 79 
 17.  Id.  Defendant’s cannot, by law, be forced to use their social security 
funds towards restitution payments. The magistrate made note of the fact 
that Rosenbaum had several expenditures (including monthly car payments 
on a car she hardly used) that could be allocated toward her restitution 
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Rosenbaum argued that it was an error to conclude she had 
sufficient funds to pay the $500 per month restitution and 
reminded the court that her husband was not obligated to pay 
restitution and therefore his assets could not be considered toward 
her ability to pay.18  The state argued that Rosenbaum had access 
to numerous assets that could be liquidated and could easily 
relocate funds that she was spending on unnecessary expenses in 
order to pay her restitution.19  In a hearing held in superior court, 
the hearing justice explained that the standard of review was very 
deferential to the decision of the magistrate and that under this 
standard, factual findings would only be overturned if clearly 
erroneous and issues of law would be reviewed de novo.20 
The hearing justice issued a bench decision denying 
Rosenbaum’s appeal, holdingthat Rosenbaum had “willfully failed 
to meet”21 the burden of proof in order show that she was unable 
to make her restitution amount.22  The hearing justice noted 
several unnecessary expenditures that Rosenbaum could 
eliminate from her budget that could provide her with additional 
income sufficient to make her restitution payments.23  The justice 
also vacated a previously imposed stay on the magistrate’s order 
and ordered the defendant to pay an additional $1,000.24  
Rosenbaum appealed this decision to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court.25 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In reviewing the decision of the Superior Court, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court explained that it would review the 
questions of law de novo, but that it would “not disturb the factual 
determinations of the Superior Court justice unless he or she 
made clearly erroneous findings or misconceived or overlooked 
 
obligation.  Id.  The magistrate also noted that Rosenbaum had not presented 
any evidence regarding the value of her assets in personal property.  Id.   
 18.  Id.  There was an issue determining exact financial statements as 
Rosenbaum did not provide any tax returns for after the year 2007.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 80. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
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material evidence.”26 
Rosenbaum argued that the “findings of the magistrate and 
hearing justice were ‘‘clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, 
probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.’”27  
Rosenbaum argued that the financial informative she submitted 
into evidence showed that her only source of income was from her 
social security and pension benefits.28  Rosenbaum contended that 
most of the monthly expenses the lower courts found to be 
relevant in their decision were being paid for by her husband.29  
The court rejected this argument as Rosenbaum did not produce 
any new evidence to her argument that her husband was paying 
her expenses after previously claiming, as the State noted, that 
Rosenbaum was “continually [worried] about having money to feed 
herself and her husband.”30  Much like the lower courts, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court found that Rosenbaum bore the 
burden of proving that she was unable to comply with the 
restitution order and showing that she had made sufficient efforts 
to try and acquire the necessary funds to comply with the order.31 
The court noted from Rosenbaum’s testimony that she had 
numerous assets that she could potentially liquidate.32  This, 
along with the lack of evidence to support her “vague claim that 
her husband is paying her monthly expenses,”33 and the tax 
return documents that she failed to submit after being instructed 
to do so, was noted as the reasoning for why the court was 
affirming the Superior Court’s judgement.34 
 
COMMENTARY 
In keeping with the decisions of the lower courts, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court disregarded the admittedly ridiculous 
argument of being unable to pay a $500 payment by a person who 
lives in a million-dollar home, pays a line of credit on furs, and has 
 
 26.  Id. (citing Wilby v. Savoie, 86 A.3d 362, 372 (R.I. 2014) (supporting 
deference to the hearing justices)).   
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id. at 81 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id.  
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a monthly clothing and shoe budget nearly half the amount she is 
being ordered to pay in restitution. While it is easy to want to 
agree with the court’s ruling in this instant, there are several 
factors that were overlooked in making this determination. 
Rosenbaum’s argument on appeal that it was her, and not her 
husband who owed restitution, was an argument that should have 
received more thought and attention. If Rosenbaum could have 
shown that her finances were completely separate from her 
husband’s, and that because she only personally made $237 a 
month, far less than the restitution ordered, she might have been 
more successful.35 
However, because Rosenbaum did not produce any concrete 
evidence to the fact that her husband’s finances were separate 
from her own, or that he was paying for the expenses noted on 
their financial statements, the court did not find this argument 
very compelling. This argument would have been much more 
persuasive had it been introduced at the very first appearance in 
front of the magistrate instead of only being introduced to the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court in order to argue a position such as 
this, with no evidentiary backing. 
Furthermore, though the court requested Rosenbaum’s tax 
returns, she continually failed to provide any returns after the 
year 2007.  The court also questioned why none of the financial 
statements Rosenbaum did supply indicated how she, who claims 
she only has an income of around $1,100 a month and a husband 
who lost his job, pays for any of the expenses listed.36 The court 
did not find Rosenbaum’s evidence satisfactory as it did not 
answer any of the basic questions the court had, meet the burden 
of proof or back up any of Rosenbaum’s arguments. 
In addition to the complete lack of evidence, Rosenbaum’s list 
of extravagant expenses juxtaposed with her apparent worry 
about having enough money to feed herself and her husband did 
not help help the court to sympathize with her.  In considering the 
lack of evidentiary support behind Rosenbaum’s claims as 
compared to the extravagant life style she and her husband led, 
 
 35.  Id. at 77.  She also collected $907 in Social security benefits. Id. 
However, it would be a violation of federal security law to require her to use 
money from her social security to fulfill her restitution obligation.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 81 
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the magistrate’s 
order for the Defendant to continue to pay her previously set 
restitution payments. The Defendant bore the burden of proof to 
show that she was unable to comply with the restitution order. 
The Superior Court found the Defendant did not meet this burden 
and the Supreme Court affirmed. 
Cayman Calabro 
 





Criminal Law.  State v. Austin, 114 A.3d 87 (R.I. 2015).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court adjudicated a second-degree sexual 
assault case regarding the admissibility of a complainant’s out-of-
court identification procedure of the Defendant.  When evaluating 
the reliability of testimony regarding identification of an 
assailant, the trial justice uses a five-factor test.  On appeal, the 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, a motion to suppress 
evidence of the faulty identification procedure used, and a motion 
to use the Defendant’s proposed jury instructions.  In denying the 
motion to suppress evidence and for a new trial, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court reasoned that the procedure was not “unduly 
suggestive” and that the trial justice conceded with the jury’s 
verdict.  Furthermore, the court denied the motion to use the 
Defendant’s proposed jury instructions because the instructions 
given adequately covered the law concerning eyewitness 
identifications.  Thus, the court affirmed the Superior Court’s 
conviction. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In the early afternoon on November 29, 2010, the complaining 
witness, Laura,1 boarded the Rhode Island Public Transit 
Authority (RIPTA) at Kennedy Plaza in Providence, Rhode Island 
(R.I).2  Upon entering the bus, Laura elected to sit near the back; 
shortly thereafter, a man carrying a black duffel bag sat down in 
the seat right next to her.3  The man tried to start a conversation 
with Laura, which proved unsuccessful.4 
Subsequently, as the bus approached a church5 in Barrington, 
 
 1.  The name “Laura” is used is used in this case to refer to the 
complainant in order to protect her privacy.   
 2.  State v. Austin, 114 A.3d 87 (R.I. 2015) 87, 89–90.  The bus was 
scheduled to depart along Route 114 towards Newport, Rhode Island.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  The Barrington Congregational Church, commonly known as “the 
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the man sitting next to Laura plunged his hand between her legs 
and latched onto her vaginal area.6  Laura ordered the man to 
“stop,” but he persisted despite Laura’s numerous attempts to 
push his hand away.7  At this time, no passengers came to Laura’s 
aid.8  Laura then told the man that she needed to get off the bus 
because it was her stop, although this was not true.9  The man 
acknowledged her request and moved his duffel bag out of the 
way, allowing Laura to reach the aisle.10  After Laura moved to 
the front of the bus—where she remained—she notified the bus 
driver about what had just occurred; however, the bus driver 
ignored Laura’s complaint.11  Laura then noted details of the 
incident.12  Shortly after, the bus came to another stop in 
Barrington where the man vacated the bus, being sure to hide his 
face behind his jacket as he passed Laura.13 
Soon thereafter, Laura departed the bus in Bristol and went 
directly to the Bristol police station to report the incident.14 The 
Bristol police then transported Laura to the Barrington police 
station where she met with Detective Ferreira.15  Laura stated 
that her perpetrator was a white male over six feet tall, weighing 
around 230 pounds, and was between the ages  30 and 50.16  
Laura also asserted that her assailant was clean-shaven with 
short grayish-brown hair and had been wearing a gray sweat suit 
with a purple and yellow sports jacket,17 and was carrying a black 
duffel bag.18  After Detective Ferreira received this information, 
 
white church.”  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id.  Laura then began noting details of the incident; she took note of: 
the bus and route number, the time of day that the incident occurred, and a 
description of her perpetrator.  Id. 
 12.  Id. Laura took note of: the bus and route number, the time of day 
that the incident occurred, and a description of her perpetrator. Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Detective Ferreira concluded that Laura was likely describing the 
logo for the Minnesota Vikings, whose team colors are purple and yellow.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
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he sent out a department-wide BOLO19 with a description of the 
perpetrator Laura described.20 
The following day, as a result of the BOLO, Patrolman Mark 
Haddigan (“Haddigan”) detained a man—clad in a purple and 
yellow Minnesota Vikings jacket—in Barrington.21  Haddigan 
informed the man, referred to as “McGill,” of the sexual assault 
that occurred the day before.22  McGill then voluntarily proceeded 
to the police station where he produced his RIPTA bus pass and 
was photographed.23  McGill was released shortly thereafter.24 
On December 1, Patrolman Michael Gregorezek 
(“Gregorezek”) noticed a man fitting Laura’s description waiting 
for a RIPTA bus.25  The man, identified as Robert Austin (“the 
Defendant”), was wearing a gray sweat suit, a purple and yellow 
Vikings jacket, and was lugging around a black duffel bag.26  
Patrolman Gregorezek approached the Defendant and asked him 
if he would be willing to go to the police station to answer a few 
questions.27 
While at the station, Detective Ferreria asked the Defendant 
whether he had traveled through Barrington on a RIPTA bus on 
November 29, 2010, and the Defendant replied that he had not.28  
The Defendant also informed the police that he was the only 
person in possession of his bus pass.29  After this statement, the 
officers asked the Defendant for his bus pass, and after complying, 
permitted the Defendant to leave the station.30 
Detective Ferreira then proceeded to transfer the serial 
numbers from the Defendant’s and McGill’s bus passes to the 
 
 19.  A BOLO notice alerts officers to “be on the lookout.”  See State v. 
Pitts, 960 A.2d 240, 242 n.4 (R.I. 2008). 
 20.  Austin, 114 A.3d at 89–90. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 90–91. 
 26.  Id. at 91. 
 27.  Id.  Austin complied with the patrolman’s request and went to the 
station.  Id. 
 28.  Id.  Although Austin did admit to Detective Ferreira that he had 
traveled on a bus that day, which was headed towards Warwick.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
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RIPTA Assistant General Manager, James Dean.31  The scan of 
the serial numbers disclosed no activity on McGill’s bus pass on 
the date in question; however, on the contrary, a scan of the serial 
numbers on the Defendant’s bus pass revealed that it was used on 
November 29, 2010, at 1:06 p.m. to board a bus to Newport.32  The 
bus running to Newport was number 0545, which matched the 
number Laura recorded in her notes.33 
On December 1, 2010, Detective Ferreira contacted Laura and 
arranged for her to view an array of photographs at the Bristol 
Police Station.34  After Laura read the Barrington police 
department procedure on how to correctly view a photo array, she 
was shown seven photographs in sequential order; the 
instructions stated that the array “‘may or may not contain a 
picture of the person who committed the crime.’”35  The first 
photograph was of McGill, the third was of the Defendant, and the 
remaining five photographs were taken from the Adult 
Correctional Institutions WINFACTS computer database.36  
Detective Ferreira excluded photographs of any bald, mustached, 
and non-Caucasian men, and all of the men in the array were 
between the 30 and 42 years old, while McGill and the Defendant 
were both 51 years old.37 
After analyzing all seven photographs, Laura asked to see the 
photographs identified as numbes one and three in the lineup 
again.38  After viewing the side-view of these photographs, Laura 
immediately identified the Defendant, as depicted in the third 
photograph, as her assailant.39 
Laura later testified that the side-view profile photograph of 
the Defendant helped assure her that “‘[r]ight away [she] knew 
which one it was.’”40  Detective Ferreira then presented Laura a 
photograph of the black duffel bag and a photograph of the 
Defendant, with his face concealed, wearing a purple and yellow 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
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Vikings jacket and holding a black duffel bag.41  Laura identified 
the purple and yellow Vikings jacket and black duffel bag as 
articles worn and carried by her assailant.42  Lastly, Detective 
Ferreira showed Laura a photograph of the Defendant wearing 
gray sweatpants and a Vikings Jacket.43 At that time, Laura 
declared that she was “‘one hundred percent certain’” that this 
was the individual who assaulted her on the RIPTA bus.44 
On January 27, 2011, the Defendant was charged with one 
count of second-degree sexual assault in violation of Rhode Island 
General Law 1956 §§ 11-37-4 and 11-37-5.45  Thereafter, the 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress Laura’s out-of-court 
identification.46  At the hearing on the motion, the Defendant 
argued that Laura’s out-of-court identification should be 
suppressed because of dissimilarities between the individuals in 
the photo array, the complainant’s disputable accuracy, and 
because the photo identification procedure was unduly suggestive, 
which created a high risk of misidentification.47 
The Defendant’s motion to suppress was ultimately denied 
because the trial court concluded that the identification procedure 
was not unduly suggestive.48  The state argued in response to the 
Defendant’s motion that the photo array contained photographs of 
Caucasian men that were all of similar builds, weights, and were 
all similarly cleanly shaven like the Defendant.49 The state also 
noted that Laura had four opportunities to identify her assailant 
in different photographs, and concluded after viewing these 
varying images that that the Defendant was her assailant.50  
Lastly, the trial justice considered the five-factor test for assessing 
the appropriateness of an eyewitness identification,51 and also 
 
 41.  Id. at 91–92. 
 42.  Id. at 92. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id.  The hearings were held on the motion to suppress issue on June 
28, 2012 and July 2, 2012.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id.  The five factors for assessing an eyewitness identification are: 
the opportunity to observe, the degree of attention given to hose observations; 
the accuracy of the prior description of the perpetrator; the level of certainty 
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found that the identification procedure was not unduly 
suggestive.52 
The Defendant’s trial began on July 2, 2012, and four days 
later, the trial justice gave instructions to the jury.53  The 
Defendant objected to the instructions given to the jury because 
none of the instructions given were the Defendant had  
proposed.54  Moreover, the Defendant objected because the trial 
justice did not include language concerning “‘accuracy versus 
 
demonstrated by the witness at the identification procedure; and the time 
between the crime and confrontation.  See State v. Austin, 731 A.2d 678, 682 
(R.I. 1999) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)). 
 52.  Austin, 114 A.3d at 92. 
 53.  Id.  The trial court charged the jury as follows:  
“The burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not 
only that the crime was committed but that the Defendant was the 
person who committed the crime. While this concept may seem 
rather fundamental you may consider one or more of the following as 
you determine whether the State has proven the identity of the 
Defendant as the person who committed the crime alleged in the 
complaint. 
“(One) The witness’s opportunity to observe the criminal acts and 
the person committing them, including the length of the encounter, 
the distance between the various parties, the lighting conditions at 
the time, the witness’s state of mind at the time of the offense, and 
other circumstances affecting the witness’s opportunity to observe 
the person committing the offense that you deem relevant. 
“(Two) Any subsequent identification, failure to identify or 
misidentification by the witness. Also the certainty or lack of 
certainty expressed by the witness at the time of the identification, 
the state of mind of the witness at the time of the subsequent 
procedure, the length of time that elapsed between the crime and the 
subsequent identification and any other circumstances bearing on 
the reliability of the witness’s identification that you as the jury 
deem relevant. 
“(Three) Any other direct or circumstantial evidence which may 
identify the person who committed the offense charged which 
corroborates or fails to corroborate the identification by the witness.  
“You as the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
accuracy of the identification of the Defendant before you convict 
him. If the circumstances of the identification of the Defendant are 
not convincing beyond a reasonable doubt then you must find the 
Defendant not guilty.” 
 Id. at 92–93. 
 54.  Id. at 93.  One set of proposed instructions was based on instructions 
pursuant to State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011), while the other 
proposed instructions were from the decision in State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d 
1283, 1290–91 (R.I. 2011).  Id. 
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certainty’” in his charge.55  The state’s response was that this 
issue is normally relevant in the context of a defendant’s proffered 
eyewitness expert testimony, “but that [the] Court has 
consistently rejected these experts on the ground that 
‘trustworthiness of eyewitnesses is not beyond the ken of the 
jurors.’”56  Thus, the trial justice declined to give the Defendant’s 
proposed jury instructions and held that the jury instructions 
given sufficiently covered the law concerning eyewitness 
identifications.57  On July 6, 2012, the jury returned a guilty 
verdict on one count of sexual assault.58 
The Defendant filed a motion for a new trial.59  At the hearing 
on that motion, the Defendant argued that the evidence presented 
at his trial should have generated a not guilty verdict because the 
Defendant contended that the evidence showed that Laura 
“demonstrated a level of uncertainty” upon first observing the 
photo array.60  The Defendant argued that Laura’s uncertainty 
resulted in a high likelihood of misidentification, which could have 
led a reasonable juror to find in favor of the Defendant.61  In 
response, the state asserted that Laura identified the Defendant 
as her assailant before she was shown the photograph of the 
Defendant wearing the purple and yellow jacket.62  When the trial 
justice denied the motion, he disclosed that the identification 
procedure was completed to his satisfaction and the complainant 
had testified credibly.63 
On November 13, 2012, the Defendant was sentenced to 15 
years in prison.64  Soon after, the Defendant filed a notice of 
appeal of his conviction, arguing that the trial justice erred in 
denying his motion to suppress, his motion for a new trial, and his 
 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id.  Moreover, the procedure became overly suggestive and “sloppy” 
when she was only shown a photograph of Austin in the jacket with the bag.  
Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id.  The trial justice also expressed that if this had been a bench 
trial, he also would have found the Defendant guilty.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
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request for jury instructions.65 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A. Motion to Suppress 
On appeal to the the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the 
Defendant asserted that it was error to deny his motion to 
suppress Laura’s out-of-court identification because the 
arrangement of the photos was unfair, as it was unduly 
suggestive.66  When courts evaluate the appropriateness of an 
eyewitness identification, the trial justice undertakes a two-step 
analysis.67  The first step is determining “‘whether the procedure 
used in the identification was unnecessarily suggestive.’”68 Next, 
if it is found that the identification procedure was unnecessarily 
suggestive, “‘the trial justice must “determin[e] whether in the 
totality of the circumstances the identification was nonetheless 
reliable.’”69 
In his appeal, the Defendant contended that the layout of the 
photos was unfair, and that the trial justice was incorrect to 
conclude that the physical characteristics of the men in the array 
were similar to Laura’s description of her assailant.70  The trial 
justice rejected the Defendant’s contentions, determining that all 
seven photographs in the photo array portrayed men, fitting the 
general description of Laura’s assailant.71  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court noted that is well-established that “the images 
constituting a photographic array need not be ‘look-alikes,’ but 
rather need only possess similar general characteristics.”72  Thus, 
 
 65.  Id. at 93–94. 
 66.  Id. at 94. 
 67.  See State v. Gallop, 89 A.3d 795, 801 (R.I. 2014) (quoting State v. 
Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012).   
 68.  See State v. Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012) (quoting State v. 
Texter, 923 A.2d 568, 574 (R.I. 2007)). 
 69.  Austin, 114 A.3d at 94 (quoting Brown, 42 A.3d at 1242-43). 
 70.  Id.  This was demonstrated by the fact that the photographs of the 
fiver younger men were instantly ruled out by Laura, and of the two 
remaining photographs, only the Defendant matched the weight of the 
described perpetrator. Id. 
 71.  Id.  All of the photographs depicted men between the ages of thirty 
and forty, with short hair, and no facial hair; furthermore, despite all of the 
men not matching the Defendant’s weight of 230 pounds, five of the six men 
in the photo array weighed close to 230 pounds. Id. 
 72.  State v. Imbruglia, 913 A.2d 1022, 1029 (R.I. 2007) (citing State v. 
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the court held that because the photographs in the array all 
shared roughly the same basic characteristics described by the 
complainant, the photo array was not unduly suggestive.73 
Furthermore, prior to the viewing of the photo array, 
Detective Ferreira informed Laura that the photo array “‘may or 
may not contain a picture of the person who committed the 
crime.’”74  This court reasoned that this instruction “‘mitigated the 
risk’” that Laura would select a photograph “‘simply because she 
believed she was expected to do so.’”75 
The court rejected the the Defendant’s argument that the 
display of the Defendant’s photographs after Laura’s initial 
selection was “‘impermissibly suggestive confirmation’” of Laura’s 
original selection of the Defendant from the lineup array.76  The 
court concluded that this argument failed because it was evident 
that these individual photographs of the Defendant were shown to 
Laura only after she had already identified the Defendant as her 
assailant.77  Having concluded that the photo array was in fact 
not unduly suggestive, the court found unnecessary to engage in 
step two of the analysis.78  Therefore, the court determined that 
the trial justice did not err in denying the Defendant’s motion to 
suppress the identification.79 
B. Motion for a New Trial 
The Defendant asserted that it was error for the trial justice 
to deny the motion for a new trial because the only reasonable 
response to the evidence presented was that the identification was 
erroneous.80  The Defendant also contested the probative value of 
 
Gatone, 698 A.2d 230, 236 (R.I. 1997)). 
 73.  Id. at 95. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id.; Gallop, 89 A.3d at 802 (citing Imbruglia, 913 A.2d at 1029–30). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id.  Step two being, if it is found that the identification procedure 
was unnecessarily suggestive, the trial justice must determine in the totality 
of the circumstances whether the identification was nonetheless reliable.  See 
Gallop, 89 A.3d at 803; see also Brown, 42 A.3d at 1242-43 (determining that 
a court should analyze a victim’s identification of a defendant under the 
totality of the circumstances to assess its reliability).  
 79.  Austin, 114 A.3d at 95. 
 80.  Id. at 96. 
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the testimony relating to the bus pass because he argued it was 
just as likely that the Defendant was on a Warwick-bound bus.81  
The court rejected the Defendant’s argument that the only 
reasonable response was that the identification was incorrect; in 
doing so, the trial justice assessed the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight of the evidence and determined that the 
complainant credibly testified so that a reasonable jury could, and 
did, find that the Defendant was her assailant.82  In regard to the 
probative weight of the bus pass, the trial justice indicated that 
the data contained in the bus pass weighed heavily in the state’s 
favor.83 
It is well established that because a trial justice “‘is in an 
especially good position to evaluate the facts and to judge the 
credibility of witnesses on appeal, [the Rhode Island Supreme] 
Court’s review is deferential.’”84  The court indicated that it was 
apparent the trial justice followed the appropriate procedure for 
assessing a challenge to the weight of evidence presented at 
trial.85  For those reasons, the court concluded that the trial 
justice’s denial of the Defendant’s motion for a new trial was not 
clearly erroneous.86 
C. Request for Jury Instructions 
The Defendant’s lastly asserted that the trial justice erred in 
not using the Defendant’s proposed jury instructions.87  The court 
reasoned that “[w]hile [a] defendant may request that the trial 
justice include particular language in the jury instructions, the 
trial justice is not required to use any specific words or phrases 
when instructing the jury—so long as the instructions actually 
given adequately cover the law.”88  Notwithstanding the 
Defendant’s argument, the court found that it was evident that 
the instructions given to the jury presented “the jury with the 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  State v. Watkins, 92 A.3d 172, 191 (quoting State v. Clay, 79 A.3d 
832, 842) (quoting State v. LaPierre, 57 A.3d 305, 310). 
 85.  Austin, 114 A.3d 87 at 96–97. 
 86.  Id. at 97. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Figuereo, 31 A.3d at 1290 (quoting State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467, 
477). 
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essence of [the] defendant’s requested instruction.”89  Thus, after 
review of the jury instructions given, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court concluded that the instructions adequately covered the law 
regarding eyewitness identification.90 
COMMENTARY 
In this case, The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed an 
evidentiary appeal concerning the admissibility of a complaining 
witness’s out-of-court identification.91 When Rhode Island courts 
rule on the admissibility of such evidence, it often turns to a five-
factor test to assess the propriety of eyewitness identifications.92  
The five factors used to assess an eyewitness identification are: (1) 
the opportunity to observe; (2) the degree of attention given to 
those observations; (3) the accuracy of the prior description of the 
perpetrator; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness 
at the identification procedure; and (5) the time between the crime 
and confrontation.93  Here, it cannot be said that the photo array 
presented to Laura just days after94 the assault occurred, 
constituted an identification procedure that was unduly 
suggestive.95 
For an identification procedure to be inadmissible in court, 
the procedure must have been “‘so impermissibly suggestive as to 
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.’”96 The standard of review this court adhered to 
was the clearly erroneous standard, which is a hard standard to 
overcome.97  Under a clearly erroneous standard, when a trial 
justice determines whether or not to grant a defendant’s motion to 
suppress identification evidence, the trial justice evaluates the 
available evidence in the light most favorable to the state.98  It is 
 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Austin, 114 A.3d at 98. 
 91.  Id. at 94 
 92.  Austin, 731 A.2d at 682 (quoting Manson, 432 U.S. at 114). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Austin, 114 A.3d at 91.  There was a mere 48-hour lapse between the 
assault and the identification procedure.  Id.   
 95.  Id. at 95. 
 96.  Gallop, 89 A.3d at 801 (quoting Gatone, 698 A.2d at 235). 
 97.  Austin, 114 A.3d at 96.  See also State v. Luciano, 739 A.2d 222, 226 
(R.I. 1999); State v. Gardiner, 636 A.2d 710, 716 (R.I. 1994). 
 98.  See, e.g., Gardiner, 636 A.2d at 716.  
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apparent that this court came to the correct conclusion in denying 
the Defendant’s motion to suppress. 
It is evident that Laura had numerous occasions to observe 
her assailant on the bus and during the course of the incident.99 
While in most situations, the identification of an assailant may be 
more controversial, it cannot be said that this case is one of them. 
In an incident that occurs at night, the identification of a suspect 
becomes more susceptible to inaccuracy, given the less suitable 
lighting. Moreover, where an accusation involves a more rapid 
turn of events, such as a sudden robbery, it is more likely that 
that a complainant’s description of their assailant is less reliable. 
We have none of those situations here. The man was not masked, 
the incident occurred during the day, and the man sat right next 
to her for some time on the bus before assaulting her.100 
Furthermore, when considering the description of the 
assailant that Laura initially gave to the police, it is evident that 
she had a fairly accurate perception of him; the first description 
she gave to the police was “a white male over six feet tall and 
weighing approximately 230 pounds . . . he was clean shaven, had 
short grayish-brown hair, carried a black duffel bag, and wore a 
gray sweatsuit as well as a purple and yellow sports jacket.”101  It 
follows that the Defendant’s assertion that the complaining 
witness had questionable accuracy during the out-of-court 
identification procedure is mere puffery. 
Moreover, Laura stated she was “one hundred percent 
certain”102 that the Defendant was her assailant, and this 
confidence in her identification of the assailant may have 
impermissibly persuaded the jury.  This is problematic because 
studies have shown that there is minimal, if any, correlation 
between one’s confidence and the accuracy of their identification of 
a suspect.103  In fact, although there is little correlation between 
the two, some courts have noted that an eyewitness’s confidence 
“is the most powerful single determinant of whether . . . observers 
 
 99.  Id. at 90. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 92. 
 103.  G. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedure: 
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads,  22 LAW J. HUM. BEHAV. 
603, 620 (1998).   
CRIMINAL LAW_COOPER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2016  7:05 PM 
2016] SURVEY SECTION 707 
. . . will believe that the eyewitness made an accurate 
identification.”104  Thus, the best chance a defendant may gave 
had at being found not guilty would have been having an expert 
testify as to the weakness of an eyewitness identification.105 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed on appeal a 
motion to suppress evidence of an identification procedure, a 
motion for a new trial, and motion to set aside the trial justice’s 
jury instructions.106  After careful review of the motion to 
suppress, the court concluded that the photo array was not 
unnecessarily suggestive, thereby denying the Defendant’s motion 
to suppress evidence.107  Moreover, on the Defendant’s appeal for 
a motion for a new trial, the trial justice’s denial of the 
Defendant’s motion for a new trial was not clearly erroneous.108  
Lastly, the trial justice also denied the Defendant’s request that 
his proposed jury instructions be used. For the following reasons, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Defendant’s 




 104.  Id. 
 105.  State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1110 (Utah 2009).   
 106.  Id. at 94. 
 107.  Id. at 95. 
 108.  Id. at 97. 
 109.  State v. Austin, 114 A.3d 87, 98 (R.I. 2015).  





Criminal Law.  State v. Whiting, 115 A.3d 956 (R.I. 2015). A 
statute amending the threshold amount for felony larceny during 
the pendency of a defendant’s trial is not to be applied 
retroactively under the general savings clause.  In deciding 
whether to apply a statutory change retroactively, courts consider 
the issue on a case by case basis and ask whether the application 
of the general savings clause would be clearly repugnant to the 
express provisions of the prevailing statute. Considerations 
include the language of the repealing statute, the nature of the 
amendment, the equitable considerations of the legislature, and 
the potential for inequitable application of the law. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On November 22, 2011, prosecutors charged John Whiting 
with felony larceny for stealing over $500 and criminal solicitation 
for soliciting another to receive stolen goods.1  On June 8, 2012, 
prior to the start of Whiting’s trial, the state amended its larceny 
penalty statute, increasing the threshold requirement from $500 
to $1,500.2 
The case went to a bench trial in Providence County Superior 
Court on June 18, 2012.3 During the majority of the trial, neither 
the parties nor the trial justice were aware of the amendment to 
the statute.4  However, after the close of both parties’ cases-in-
chief and before the trial justice rendered his decision, defense 
counsel informed the trial justice of the amendment to the statute 
and sought to have the charges amended to reflect the new 
statute.5  The trial justice chose to proceed with the counts as 
 
 1.  State v. Whiting, 115 A.3d 956, 957 (R.I. 2015); see also R.I. GEN 
LAWS 1956 § 11-1-9 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 §11-41-1 (1938); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS 1956 § 11-41-5 (2012).  
 2.  Whiting, 115 A.3d at 957; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-41-5.   
 3.  Whiting, 115 A.3d at 957. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
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charged, agreeing with the state’s argument that changes in the 
law are only to be applied prospectively, and that since Whiting 
had been charged prior to the amendment, he should not receive 
its benefits.6  The trial justice rendered his decision from the 
bench on July 2, 2012, and found that Whiting had stolen $714, 
thus rendering him guilty of committing larceny over $500.7  The 
trial justice also found Whiting guilty of soliciting another to 
commit a felony.8  After denying a motion to reconsider his 
decision regarding Whiting’s request to amend the charges, the 
trial justice sentenced Whiting on September 14, 2012, to two 
concurrent sentences of five years imprisonment with six months 
to serve with the remaining time suspended with probation.9 
After a final judgment of conviction was entered, Whiting 
appealed and argued that the legislative intent of the amendment 
increasing the threshold for felony larceny was to reclassify 
offenses under $1,500 from felonies to misdemeanors.10  Whiting 
further argued that  the amendment was intended to be 
ameliorative in nature, and thus should inure to the benefit of 
defendants.11 The state countered, invoking Rhode Island’s 
general savings clause, which permits prosecution and sentencing 
of defendants in pending cases in accordance with statutes 
existing at the time defendants are charged.12 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the trial court’s decision, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court traced the history of Rhode Island’s general 
savings clause, beginning with its common law predecessor of 
abatement.13  Under the abatement rule, when statutes were 
repealed or amended, courts discharged all pending proceedings 
under the repealed statute in the absence of a savings clause in 
the new statute.14  In response to the abatement rule, the General 
 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 958 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id.& n.3 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 43-3-23 (1938)). 
 13.  Id. at 958. 
 14.   Id. 
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Assembly enacted a general savings clause, in part “to save the 
necessity of the burdensome formality of attaching an identical 
saving[s] clause to all repealing legislation.”15  The court then 
summarized the first application of the general savings clause in 
State v. Lewis, where the court authorized maintenance of the 
prosecution of a driving under the influence charge under the pre-
amended form of the statute.16  There the court stated that the 
purpose of the savings clause was to abrogate the common law 
rule and to “authorize the continuance of prosecutions that were 
pending at the time of the repeal of the prior act.”17  The court 
noted that although ameliorative statutes may be applied 
retroactively, they should only do so if applying the savings clause 
“would be clearly repugnant to the express provisions of the 
repealing statute.”18  The court explained that in making such a 
determination,  courts  are to  review the statute on a case by case 
basis, considering the language of the repealing statute and the 
nature of the amendment.19 
In comparing the offense at bar to other cases applying the 
general savings clause, the court first noted the general 
presumption that “statutes will be given prospective application 
unless otherwise provided.”20  Next, it distinguished Whiting’s 
case from two situations in which charges were dismissed because 
the amendments to the statutes rendered the defendants’ conduct 
legal, noting that under either statute, Whiting’s conduct 
remained illegal, the only difference being that of degree.21  The 
court also rejected Whiting’s attempt to analogize his case to State 
v. Macarelli, where the defendant was convicted of conspiring to 
corrupt horse trainers under a statutory scheme which allowed for 
a much larger sentence for the common law offense of conspiracy 
than the underlying statutory crime of corruption of a sports 
 
 15.  Id. at 958–59 (quoting State v. Lewis, 161 A.2d 209, 212 (R.I. 1960)). 
 16.  Id. at 958. 
 17.  Id. at 959 (quoting Lewis, 161 A.2d at 212). 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. (citing State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d 783, 786 (R.I. 1999)). 
 20.  Id. (quoting State v. Briggs, 58 A.3d 164, 168 (R.I. 2013)). 
 21.  Id.; see also Mullen, 740 A.2d at 786 (applying statute retroactively 
where the amendment effectively decriminalized sodomy); State v. Babbitt, 
457 A.2d 1049, 1055 (R.I. 1983) (vacating convictions where amended statute 
added a pecuniary gain requirement to transporting another for indecent 
purposes offense). 
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participant or official.22 While the appeal was pending, the 
General Assembly codified conspiracy offenses to match the crimes 
defendants conspired to commit.23 As a result, the court in 
Macarelli amended the charges, reasoning that “it is apparent 
that the legislature thought it inequitable to punish a conspiracy 
to commit a crime more harshly than the underlying substantive 
offense itself.”24 Here, the court determined that no such equitable 
considerations existed, where the amendment contained only an 
increase in the monetary threshold.25  Unlike in Macarelli, where 
the enactment fundamentally changed the sentencing scheme 
based on equitable considerations, there was no such large shift 
here, nor an equitable principle embodied in the amendment 
which would render the old statute “clearly repugnant to the 
express provisions of the repealing statute.”26 
The court also drew guidance from the Connecticut Supreme 
Court decision of State v. Kalil, which addressed a nearly identical 
issue to Whiting’s and rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
amended statute should have applied.27  There the court reasoned 
that the amended law contained no language indicating 
retroactive application, and it expressed concern that inequities 
could result if defendants committed crimes on the same day but 
had trials on different days and thus were subject to different 
laws.28  In light of the Kalil decision and Rhode Island precedent, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the general savings 
clause was applicable to Whiting’s charge, and thus the amended 
statute should not be applied retroactively.29 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision attempts to give 
the general savings clause its full effect, while still providing for 
situations in which amended laws should be applied retroactively 
in order to comport with the legislature’s intent.  In distinguishing 
 
 22.  Id. at 960; see also State v. Macarelli, 375 A.2d 944, 944–46 (1977). 
 23.  Whiting, 115 A.3d at 960. 
 24.  Id. (quoting Macarelli, 375 A.2d at 947). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. (quoting Lewis, 161 A.2d at 212). 
 27.  Id. at 961; see also State v. Kalil, 107 A.3d 343, 361 (Conn. 2014). 
 28.  Whiting, 115 A.3d at 961; see also Kalil, 107 A.3d at 361.  
 29.  Whiting, 115 A.3d at 961. 
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the mere changing of a threshold amount for felony larceny from 
those cases in which there is a clear attempt by legislature to 
ameliorate a legislative deficiency or accommodate for a clear 
societal change, the court maintained the integrity of the savings 
clause while leaving the door open for those rare circumstances 
where retroactive application is necessary.  The court’s case by 
case analysis allows for the fair result of extreme scenarios, while 
fending off attempts to swallow the rule with its exceptions. 
The court’s formulation also bears in mind the difficulty in 
deducing legislative intent from statutory construction and 
accordingly maintains a high bar for applying statutory changes 
retroactively with its clearly repugnant test.  While here it might 
be argued that the statutory change was made in response to the 
reality of inflation and a change in government policy on criminal 
punishment, the application of the old statute to the crime does 
not so clearly undermine the new statute as to render it clearly 
repugnant.  Indeed, the legislature’s decision to amend a statute 
must necessarily stem from some consideration of the statute’s 
deficiency or inapplicability in its modern context.  However, a 
defendant’s ability to point to that vague intent alone cannot be 
enough to trigger application of the new law, else nearly every 
defendant could find some justification for receiving the benefit of 
a new statute.  The clearly repugnant test, while likely considered 
too high a bar by some, is a necessary means to prevent the 
erosion of the general savings clause, which is by its very nature 
designed to be expansive. 
Further, while not explicitly mentioned in the court’s decision 
here, applying a broad amelioration doctrine despite a lack of clear 
intent to do so in the new statute might be considered an 
overreach of judicial power.30  As addressed in Kalil, broad 
amelioration in a general savings jurisdiction flies in the face of 
the legislature, undermining the legislative process by judicial 
fiat.31  While the intent of the legislature is important in 
considering the amended statutes in cases such as this, the intent 
of the legislature in enacting the general savings clause must be 
given equal weight.  Thus,  when judicial attempts to discern the 
intent of one statute  are likely to offend another statute, it is 
 
 30.  See Kalil, 107 A.3d at 358–59. 
 31.  Id. 
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likely best left to the legislature to make the appropriate changes 
to the law.32 
Another important consideration that the court adds to its 
analysis is the concern for inconsistency of application.33  There 
can be no adequate explanation as to why two people who commit 
the same crime on the same day should be punished differently 
according to the dates of their trials.  This is a problem that not 
only could arise by mere coincidence under a different ruling, but 
one that might encourage parties to delay the conclusion of 
litigation in the face of pending litigation.  The ruling here helps 
to allay those concerns and ensures that decisions on these types 
of issues are rendered consistently. 
Overall, the court’s thorough analysis of this issue’s history 
leads it to the case’s logical conclusion, drawing a line as to the 
reach of the exception to the general savings clause, thus 
preserving that statute’s intent and avoiding inconsistent 
application of the law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that applying the 
general savings clause and prosecuting Whiting under the pre 
amendment version of  R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 11-41-5  was not 
clearly repugnant to the express provisions of the new statute.  In 
considering whether there was clear intent to apply the law 
retroactively in its language, and whether there were equitable 
concerns meriting retroactive application, the court found that no 
such evidence existed. 
Andrew J. Piombino 
 
 
 32.  See id. 
 33.  See Whiting, 115 A.3d at 961. 





Criminal Law.  State v. Virola, 115 A.3d 980 (R.I. 2015).  The 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s 
judgment of conviction and its denial of Defendant’s motion for a 
new trial.  On appeal, the Defendant claimed that the trial justice 
erred in denying his motion for a new trial and in admitting 
certain witness testimony.  The court held that the standard for 
reversal does not depend on whether the court agrees with the 
trial justice’s determination, but rather whether the trial justice 
has overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was 
otherwise clearly wrong in denying a motion for a new trial. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On August 16, 2004, Christopher Nelson, a graduate of 
Johnson & Wales University, was shot in his second floor 
apartment in Providence, Rhode Island.1  Nelson died as a result 
of the shooting.2 Following an investigation, four men were taken 
into custody—David Mercado, Lazaro “Casper” Martinez, Martin 
“Malik” White, and Wayman “Kevin” Turner.3  At that time, the 
police also issued an arrest warrant for Defendant, Ramon 
Virola.4  Mr. Mercado subsequently entered into a cooperation 
agreement with the state, and he pled nolo contendere to one 
count of conspiracy to commit robbery.5 
 
 1.  State v. Virola, 115 A.3d 980, 983 (R.I. 2015). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id.  The relevant section of Rule 11 of the Rhode Island Superior 
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:  
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the 
court, nolo contendere.  The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere 
without first addressing the defendant personally and determining 
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature 
of the charge and the consequences of the plea.  If a defendant 
refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of 
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On December 10, 2004, the Defendant, Martinez, White and 
Turner were indicted by a grand jury for the murder of 
Christopher Nelson, assault with intent to commit robbery, 
conspiracy to commit robbery, and discharge of a firearm during a 
crime of violence.6  Defendant was not apprehended until 
approximately seven years later, on November 16, 2011, in 
Glendale, Arizona, where he was then known by the name “Benny 
Delgado.”7 
At trial, Mercado and White testified that the day of Nelson’s 
murder, Martinez had discussed with the two men a plan to rob 
Mercado’s former drug dealer, who lived with Nelson.8  At the 
same time, Turner told White that the men needed a gun for the 
robbery, and Turner volunteered to attempt to acquire a gun by 
contacting the Defendant.9  Before the robbery, Mercado drove 
himself and Martinez to meet the other three men (White, Turner 
and the Defendant) who would be involved in the robbery, yet, 
Mercado had never met before.10 
On the night of the murder, Christopher Nelson had been 
watching the Olympics and playing video games with three of his 
friends in the comfort of his second floor apartment in 
Providence.11  After hearing a knock at the door, Nelson 
answered, but then appeared to be “trying to close the door” as he 
“struggle[d]” with someone.12  An intruder wearing a mask then 
stepped into the room, pointed a gun at Nelson and repeatedly 
asked: “Where is the money?”13  After Nelson replied that he did 
 
not guilty.  The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere unless it is satisfied that there is a factual 
basis for the plea.  
RI SUPER. R. CRIM. P. Rule 11. 
 6.  Virola, 115 A.3d at 983.  On November 14, 2005, Martinez plead nolo 
contender to second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit robbery.  
Turner plea of guilty to second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit the 
crime of robbery was filed and he had the remaining charges against him 
dropped.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 984.  
 8.  Id. at 985.  It is undisputed by both parties that Nelson was not 
involved in any drug activity.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 987.  
 10.  Id. at 985.  Mercado, Martinez, White and Turner drove to the site of 
the murder in one car, while the Defendant drove separately in another car.  
 11.  Id. at 984. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
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not have any money, “the gun went off” and the intruder 
continued to brandish the gun in the direction of the other 
occupants of the apartment.14  After realizing that the other 
occupants did not know where the money was, the intruder left 
the apartment.15  It was then that the other occupants realized 
that Nelson had been shot and called rescue services.16  Nelson 
was later pronounced dead.17 
After the men left the apartment, Turner, White, and the 
Defendant ran back to White’s car and fled the scene, while 
Martinez called to ask Mercado to pick him up near the 
apartment.18  When Martinez picked up Mercado, he learned that 
the Defendant had shot someone.19  The next day, when Mercado 
learned from a news broadcast that Nelson had died, he drove 
Martinez and himself to meet with Turner so they could dispose of 
the weapon.20  In an attempt to potentially dispose of the gun, 
Mercado was driving with Martinez while the gun was in a 
shoebox on the floor of the front passenger seat.21  While he and 
Martinez were en route to dispose of the weapon, the police pulled 
his car over, arrested them, and seized the weapon.22  While in 
custody, Mercado eventually gave a statement implicating 
Defendant, Martinez, White, Turner, and himself in the murder of 
Nelson.23  After learning that he had been implicated in the 
attempted robbery and the murder of Nelson, White turned 
himself in and entered into a cooperation agreement “in order to 
get the best deal.”24 
At trial, Patricia “Vicky” Gallardo testified that in 2008 she 
met Defendant, who went by the name “Benny Delgado,” in 
Arizona through an online dating service and the two eventually 
began a romantic relationship.25  The couple continued their 
 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 985, 987. 
 19.  Id. at 987. 
 20.  Id. at 986.  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 987.  
 25.  Id. 
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relationship until 2011, with a short break in 2009, when Gallardo 
complained that the Defendant had “[become] controlling and 
wanted to know everything that she was doing].”26  Gallardo 
discovered that she was pregnant with their child and moved in 
with the Defendant where she began to overhear the Defendant 
identify himself as “Ray” during phone calls.27  Prior to the end of 
their relationship, Gallardo learned that the Defendant’s first 
name was “Ramon” and that he was “wanted” by law enforcement 
authorities in Rhode Island.28  In June of 2011, Gallardo and the 
Defendant ended their relationship.29  In November 2011,  she 
came to believe that Defendant knew where she was living when 
she received a message from him stating that he “knew where she 
was” and that “he was coming.”30  Fearing for her life, Gallardo 
contacted the Chino Valley Police Department and told the police 
that the Defendant was wanted by law enforcement in Rhode 
Island.31  Subsequently, Defendant was apprehended in Phoenix, 
Arizona.32 
On March 13, 2013, a jury found the Defendant guilty of all 
four counts of the indictment, including the first-degree felony 
murder of Christopher Nelson.33  Consequently, the Defendant 
moved for a new trial, arguing that Mercado, White, and Gallardo 
were, in his view, “all compromised witnesses,” and that, 
therefore, the court should refuse to credit their testimony.  The 
Defendant thus requested that “the [c]ourt grant the motion for a 
new trial in the interest of justice.34  On April 23, 2013, the trial 
justice denied the motion and the Defendant filed a timely appeal 
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court contending (1) that, in 
denying his motion for a new trial, the trial justice inappropriately 
credited the testimony of Mercado, White, and Gallardo; and (2) 
 
 26.  Id.  During trial, Gallardo testified that the Defendant “was 
preventing her from being independent and enjoying her own life.  Gallardo 
stated that after the Defendant got physically abusive with her, she moved 
out.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 988.  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 989.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
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that the trial justice erred in permitting Gallardo to testify as to 
the Defendant’s purportedly “controlling” behavior during their 
romantic relationship.35 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A. Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial 
In his appeal, the Defendant first argued that in denying his 
motion for a new trial, the trial justice inappropriately credited 
the testimony of Mercado, White, and Gallardo because they were 
all biased witnesses with motivation to lie and were unworthy of 
belief.36  The Defendant argued that with respect to Gallardo, “it 
was clearly in her interest to do anything to make sure that the 
[D]efendant never again saw the light of day, as he was the one 
impediment to her enjoying the rest of her life with her new 
family.37  The Defendant averred that Mercado’s testimony was 
not credible for the fact that Mercado entered into a cooperative 
agreement with the State in exchange for a lenient sentence, and 
that Mercado admitted to repeatedly using marijuana on the day 
of the robbery.38  Lastly, when addressing White’s testimony, the 
Defendant claimed that it too was unworthy of credence because 
White entered into a cooperative agreement with the State.39 
In reviewing the appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
placed great weight on the trial justice’s analysis and reasoning 
for the denial of the Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial.40  The 
court reasoned that the trial justice sits in the role of the 
metaphorical “thirteenth juror;” and, in that role, the trial justice 
must exercise independent judgment on the credibility of 
witnesses and on the weight of the evidence.”41  The court 
acknowledged that it affords a great deal of respect to the factual 
determinations and credibility assessments made by each judicial 
officer and will not overturn that decision unless the trial justice 
has overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 989, 991. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  State v. Barrior, 88 A.3d 1123, 1128 (R.I. 2014). 
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otherwise clearly wrong.42  The court noted that while the 
Defendant was asking the court to second guess the credibility 
determinations of the trial justice, all the facts that would make 
those witnesses biased, were known to the jury.43 
The court took into consideration that jury knew that while 
Gallardo testified that the Defendant was a bad guy, she also said 
that he loved their child and that while he was possessive, she did 
not seek help from the police or family.44  Likewise, while Mercado 
agreed to cooperate, the jury knew that he only did so ultimately 
to save [his] own neck and “minimize the harm” that would befall 
him.45  Lastly, while the jury knew that White was testifying in 
exchange for a more lenient sentence, he agreed to make a 
statement in order to get the best deal.46  Thus, the jury was 
aware of all the information which the Defendant argued 
demonstrated the lack of credibility of the witnesses.47  The court 
stated that the trial justice found all three witnesses to be credible 
and agreed with the jury’s verdict, and further stated that “the 
mere fact that a defendant disagrees with the trial justice’s 
conclusions about credibility is not a sufficient basis to warrant 
the granting of a motion for a new trial.48 
B. The Admissibility of Gallardo’s Testimony 
The Defendant next argued that the trial justice erred in 
permitting Gallardo to testify as to the Defendant’s purportedly 
“controlling” behavior during their romantic relationship.49  The 
Defendant argued that Gallardo’s testimony, with respect to 
Defendant’s behavior during their relationship, was admitted in 
error because “the unfair prejudice of [the] testimony greatly 
outweighed its slight probative value.”50  The Defendant argued 
 
 42.  See State v. Paola, 59 A.3d 99, 106 (R.I. 2013); State v. Clay, 79 A.3d 
832, 842 (R.I. 2013). 
 43.  Virola, 115 A.3d at 993. 
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id.; see also State v. Ferreira, 21 A.3d 355, 367 (R.I. 2011).  
 49.  Virola, 115 A.3d at 989. 
 50.  Id. at 994.  Defendant provided the Court with a list of statements 
which he contends Gallardo inappropriately testified to his “controlling 
behavior;” specifically that she testified that Defendant “wanted to know 
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that the evidence was not relevant under Rule 401 of the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence, and even if the testimony were relevant, 
its admission should have been barred by the provisions of Rule 
403.51  The Defendant claimed that the only purpose served by the 
statement at issue was “to depict him as a violent individual who 
engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse during his relationship 
with Gallardo.”52 
1. Rule 401 
The Defendant first contended that the specific statements of 
Gallardo regarding his controlling behavior and refusal to be 
photographer were not relevant under Rule 401.53  The court 
recognized that “inherent in Rule 401 are two basic facets of 
relevant evidence-materiality and probativeness and if the 
evidence is offered to help prove a proposition that is not a matter 
in issue, the evidence is immaterial and should be excluded.”54  
The court was unable to detect any abuse of discretion in the trial 
justice’s decision to admit Gallardo’s testimony.55  The court 
reasoned that because that Defendant told Gallardo that his 
behavior was a result of being “wanted by the State of Rhode 
Island, this helped illustrate the [D]efendant’s consciousness of 
guilt.56 
2. Rule 403 
The Defendant next contended that, even if Gallardo’s 
 
everything she was doing and who she was talking to,” was “possessive,” and 
never let her take his photograph.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 995.  
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
RI R. Evid. Art. IV, Rule 401: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
RI R. Evid. Art. IV, Rule 403. 
 52.  Virola, 115 A.3d at 995. 
 53.  Id. at 996. 
 54.  State v. Thomas, 936 A.2d 1278, 1282 (R.I. 2007). 
 55.  Virola, 115 A.3d at 996. 
 56.  Id.   
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statements were relevant, the trial justice erred in failing to 
exclude them pursuant to Rule 403.57  The court, however, has 
applied a standard which “asks whether [the evidence] will 
inflame the jurors and therefore prejudice them beyond the 
ordinary prejudice that is always sustained by the introduction of 
relevant evidence intended to prove guilt.”58  The trial justice 
stated on the record that some of the issues surrounding 
Gallardo’s testimony about the Defendants purportedly controlling 
behavior had been “aired” in chambers.59  The justice determined, 
however, that Gallardo’s testimony, including statements properly 
at issue on appeal, were admissible the statements were evidence 
of the Defendant’s risk of flight.”60 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held on numerous 
occasions that it “will not reverse a trial justice’s ruling admitting 
evidence over a Rule 403 objection unless it constitutes a clear 
abuse of discretion,” and here, the court was satisfied that the 
trial justice soundly exercised his discretion and properly 
articulated the grounds on which he was permitting the 
testimony.61  The court agreed with the trial judge when he said: 
“This is all evidence of guilty knowledge and is very, very relevant.  
And to the extent that there’s any prejudice involved, it is 
minimal, indeed, compared to the high relevance, and I will 
certainly permit this kind of evidence to be adduced.”62 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was presented with two 
issues in State v. Virola, and the court’s opinion reaffirmed the 
importance of the role of the trial justice.  Here, the court deferred 
to the trial justice’s findings “because a trial justice, being present 
during all phases of the trial, is in an especially good position to 
evaluate the facts and to judge the credibility of the witnesses.63 
In this case, the Defendant tried to diminish the credibility of 
 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  State v. O’Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 107 (R.I. 2001).  
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Virola, 115 A.3d at 997. 
 61.  State v. Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012); See Virola, 115 A.3d 
at 997. 
 62.  Virola, 115 A.3d at 997. 
 63.  State v. Mendez, 116 A.3d 228, 247 (R.I. 2015). 
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the witnesses by arguing that each witness had motivation to 
lie.64  The Defendant contended that the trial justice erred in 
denying his motion for a new trial because Gallardo, Mercado, and 
White were all biased witnesses with motivation to lie about the 
murder of Nelson.65  With respect to Gallardo, the Defendant 
argued that it was clearly in Gallardo’s interest to do anything to 
make sure the Defendant never again saw the light of day, as he 
was the one impediment keeping her enjoying the rest of her 
life.66  As for Mercado, the Defendant avers that his testimony 
was not credible for two reasons: (1) the fact that Mercado entered 
into a cooperative agreement with the State in exchange for a 
particularly light sentence; and (2) the fact that Mercado admitted 
to repeatedly using marijuana on the day of the robbery and, 
according to Defendant, was “stoned at the time of the commission 
of the crime.”67  Lastly, the Defendant contends that White’s 
testimony was unworthy of credence because White entered into a 
cooperative agreement with the State and had access to all the 
discovery in the case, including Mercado’s statement, before 
making his statement to police.68  While this argument may have 
proven that these witnesses demonstrated bias, the trial judge 
discussed the fact that the State had called twelve witnesses and 
had never set out to prove that the Defendant had personally shot 
Nelson.69  The trial justice observed that the state intended to 
prove that the Defendant was vicariously responsible for the 
offenses as either a co-conspirator or as an aider and abettor.70  
Further, the trial justice found that there was overwhelming 
evidence that the Defendant was the one who orchestrated 
obtaining the pistol that ultimately caused Nelson’s death and 
that the jury came to the same conclusion. 
Additionally, the Defendant contended that Gallardo’s 
testimony with respect to Defendant’s behavior during their 
relationship was admitted in error because the unfair prejudice of 
the testimony greatly outweighs its slight probative value.71  
 
 64.  Virola, 115 A.3d at 992. 
 65.  Id. at 991. 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Virola, 115 A.3d at 992. 
 71.  Id. at 994.  
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However, the danger of unfair prejudice is one that all evidence at 
trials presents.72  While the defendant agued that there was no 
relevance, the trial justice found that there was. The testimony 
given by Gallardo time and time again proved the guiltiness of the 
Defendant. His possessive behavior, and fear of being 
photographed, noted by the trial justice, helped illustrate 
Defendant’s consciousness of guilt.. While the holding of this case 
reaffirmed that the Rhode Island Supreme Court will defer to the 
discretion of the trial justice absent a showing of clear error or 
that he or she overlooked or misconceived material and relevant 
evidence, it remains unclear at what point a higher court will 
overturn a trial justice who has abused his discretion.  
Historically, courts have defined the meaning of judicial discretion 
to be the exercise of judgment by a judge or court based on what is 
fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and 
principles of law.73  Therefore, only when the judge has failed to 
exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making skills has 
he abused his discretion.  This is a very broad standard because, 
as the Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated, the trial justice is 
in the best position to judge the facts of the case in relation to the 
law as the trial justice is sitting in the front row of the audience in 
the courtroom.74 
In the past decades, there have only been a limited number of 
occasions that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has reversed a 
judgment due to an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
justice.  One prominent example occurred in Beaton v. Malouin, in 
which the Court found that the trial justice failed to make any 
finding that the evidence was prejudicial, confusing, misleading, 
or would result in undue delay and that the evidence was highly 
probative and its exclusion was an abuse of discretion.75  There, 
the plaintiff was traveling west on Route 195 near the northbound 
and southbound split, when her automobile skidded on the wet 
surface of the road and ended up perpendicular in the left high-
 
 72.  United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 73.  See Stephen C. Aldrich & Michael Cass, Judicial Discretion: Melding 
Messy Facts and Pristine Law, BENCH AND BAR OF MINNESOTA (Nov. 11, 2013), 
http://mnbenchbar.com/2013/11/judicial-discretion. 
 74.  See State v. Mendez, 116 A.3d 228, 247 (R.I. 2015). 
 75.  845 A.2d 298, 302 (R.I. 2004). 
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speed lane and middle lane of traffic.76 Although several drivers 
managed to successfully avoid colliding with plaintiff’s 
automobile, the defendant came upon plaintiff and struck the rear 
quarter of her vehicle and plaintiff’s vehicle spun 180 degrees 
from its original position.77  During trial, in which the plaintiff 
filed a negligence action against the defendant, the trial court 
limited the testimony of plaintiff’s expert engineer to his own 
personal observations of the accident scene based on a finding that 
his opinion of the sight-line distance defendant had before the 
accident had not been verified by actual measurements and 
refused to permit counsel to introduce into evidence two answers 
to interrogatories provided by defendant.78  The court noted that 
the exclusion of this evidence was made in clear error, and its 
probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.79  
Therefore, it seems that only when the trial justice has clearly 
acted unreasonably in the judicial making process and has 
ordered an erroneous judgment, that the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court will overturn his judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice 
correctly executed the correct analytical approach to a motion for a 
new trial and that his ultimate agreement with the jury’s verdict 
did not overlook or misconceive material evidence and that he was 
not otherwise clearly wrong in denying Defendant’s motion for a 
new trial.  In addition, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that 
because the Defendant’s contention that the witnesses statements 
were not relevant was not persuasive and that the trial justice did 
not abuse his discretion under Rule 403 when he admitted the 




 76.  Id. at 299. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 299, 302. 
 79.  See id. at 302. 





Evidence.  State v. Arciliares, 108 A.3d 1040 (R.I. 2015).  Where a 
defendant in a criminal matter is not permitted to sufficiently 
cross-examine a material witness as to statements made by that 
witness to the defendant, reversible error has occurred, and the 
verdict must be vacated and remanded for a new trial.  The court’s 
decision in State v. Harnois,1 which limits the admissibility of 
statements made to police by a defendant that elects not to testify, 
applies only to statements made by a defendant, not to statements 
made to a defendant, and mirrors longstanding rules barring 
hearsay. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
At about 3:00 a.m. on October 30, 2010, Alfredo Barros was 
shot and killed in his vehicle while stopped at an intersection in 
Pawtucket, Rhode Island.2  After an eight-month long 
investigation, an inmate at the Rhode Island Adult Correctional 
Institute (ACI), Raymond Baccaire, came forward and provided 
testimony of an alleged jailhouse confession from defendant Victor 
Arciliares.3  Baccaire informed the lead investigator, Detective 
Richard LaForest, of an alleged conversation between Baccaire 
and Arciliares.4 Baccaire claimed Arciliares offered details of 
Barros’s murder, including admitting Arciliares’s involvement.5  
As a result of the information provided by Baccaire, a grand jury 
indicted Arciliares for, inter alia, first degree murder.6 
 
 1.  See State v. Harnois, 638 A.2d 532 (R.I. 1994). 
 2.  State v. Arciliares, 108 A.3d 1040, 1041–42 (R.I. 2015). 
 3.  Id. at 1042–43. 
 4.  Id. at 1043. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 1042. The court explained:  
The six counts against defendant were counts: (1) murder in the first 
degree of Alfredo Barros, in violation of § 11–23–1; (2) discharging a 
firearm while committing a violent crime, the murder of Alfredo 
Barros, in violation of G.L.1956 § 11–47–3.2; (3) discharging a 
firearm from a motor vehicle in a manner that created a substantial 
risk of death to [passenger of Barros’s vehicle], in violation of § 11–
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At trial, the State called an Assistant Medical Examiner to 
testify to the nature of the injuries that caused Barros’s death.7  
The State introduced a number of autopsy photos into evidence to 
demonstrate that the trajectory of the bullets that hit Barros 
suggested that there was only one shooter.8  Arciliares objected to 
the admission of the photos, arguing that they were too gruesome 
and would unfairly prejudice the jury.9  The trial judge overruled 
the objection and admitted the photographs into evidence.10 
Following the Assistant Medical Examiner’s testimony, Det. 
LaForest testified regarding his June 7, 2011 meeting with 
Baccaire, where Baccaire alleged that Arciliares had confessed to 
shooting Barros.11  Det. LaForest testified that he did not offer 
any details of the shooting to the ACI investigator who initially 
contacted LaForest about Baccaire’s information.12  On cross-
examination, Arciliares inquired about a May 17, 2011 meeting 
between Arciliares and Det. LaForest.13  Det. LaForest testified 
that he remembered the meeting, but when asked about the 
content of the discussion the State objected.14  Arciliares argued 
that this conversation could provide the jury with an alternative 
narrative for how Baccaire learned the details of the shooting.15 
Arciliares may have “vented” to his cell mate about Det. 
LaForest’s accusation.16  Seeing an opportunity to negotiate an 
early release, Baccaire could have used that information to 
fabricate Arciliares’s confession.17  The State argued that Det. 
LaForest could not testify about this conversation because it 
 
47–51.1; (4) assault with intent to murder [passenger of Barros’s 
vehicle], in violation of G.L.1956 § 11–5–1; (5) use of a firearm in the 
attempted commission of a violent crime resulting in an injury to 
[passenger of Barros’s vehicle], in violation of § 11–47–3.2; and (6) 
conspiracy to do an unlawful act, to wit, murder, in violation of 
G.L.1956 § 11–1–6. 
Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. at 1042–43. 
 11.  Id. at 1043. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 1043–44. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 1050–51. 
 17.  See id. at 1044 n.7.   
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would lead to an inquiry of Arciliares’s statements at the 
meeting.18  Criminal defendants are not permitted to introduce 
testimony of the defendant’s past favorable statements through a 
third party as the prosecutor does not have the ability to cross-
examine the declarant as to the content of those statements.19  
Arciliares argued that he intended to only inquire as to what Det. 
LaForest told Arciliares and not what Arciliares said to Det. 
LaForest.20  Despite the limited scope requested by Arciliares, the 
trial judge sustained the State’s objection and did not permit 
cross-examination regarding the meeting.21  Arciliares later 
attempted to recall Det. LaForest to inquire about the May 17, 
2011 meeting, but the trial judge again sustained the State’s 
objection.22  Det. LaForest never retook the stand.23  During 
closing arguments, the State focused on Baccaire’s inability to 
have learned details of the shooting in any way other than from 
Arciliares’s confession.24 
During jury deliberations, the foreperson sent a note to the 
trial judge indicating that the jury believed it was deadlocked.25  
The note stated that the issue troubling the jury was how Baccaire 
received the information to which he testified.26  Despite an 
objection from Arciliares, the judge “encourage[d the] jurors to 
listen to the opinions of other jurors to resolve [the] deadlock.”27  
The jury returned a guilty verdict later that afternoon.28  
Arciliares moved for a new trial because he was not allowed to 
properly cross-examine Det. LaForest, but the motion was 
 
 18.  Id. at 1044 n.8. 
 19.  Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36. 
 20.  Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1044. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 1045. 
 23.  Id. at 1046. 
 24.  Id. at 1046–47. 
 25.  Id. at 1047. 
 26.  Id. The note read:  
We are at a point when we cannot arrive at a unanimous verdict.  
We are currently at an 11–1 impasse.  The issue is the information 
given to Mr. Baccaire and if he was given all of this by the defendant 
or if some or all was from another source. 
Id. at 1047 n.15. 
 27.  Id. at 1047. 
 28.  Id.  
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denied.29  Arciliares was subsequently sentenced and filed a 
timely appeal.30 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Arciliares’s appeal was based on four perceived errors of 
law;31 though, only two issues were discussed at length by the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court:32 (1) the trial judge’s refusal to 
allow Arciliares to cross-examine Det. LaForest as to the May 17, 
2011 conversation;33 and (2) the admission of the gruesome 
autopsy photos.34  The court held that the trial judge’s only error 
was refusing to allow sufficient cross-examination of Det. 
LaForest.35  As a result of this error, the court vacated the 
conviction and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new 
trial.36 
The conversation Det. LaForest had with Arciliares on May 
17, 2011 was relevant as to the source of Baccaire’s information.37  
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.”38  All relevant evidence is assumed admissible, though 
it can be excluded based on the applicability of several 
exceptions.39  The State argued that the evidentiary bar set forth 
in State v. Harnois was one such exception, which would bar the 
 
 29.  Id. at 1047–48. 
 30.  Id. at 1048. (“The defendant was subsequently sentenced to two 
consecutive life sentences, . . . two concurrent sentences of twenty years . . . to 
be served consecutively to the two life sentences, and an additional twenty 
years . . . to be served consecutively to the entire sentence.”).   
 31.  Id. at 1048–49. 
 32.  The court did not discuss the trial judge’s instruction to the jury but 
stated simply that it was not an error.  See id. at 1049. 
 33.  Id. at 1049–51. 
 34.  Id. at 1051–52. 
 35.  Id. at 1049. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id.  (quoting State v. Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1244 (R.I. 2012)).   
 39.  Id. at 1049; id.  at 1049 n.19 (“Rule 402 of the Rhode Island Rules of 
Evidence provides: ‘All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by the constitution of 
Rhode Island, by act of congress, by the general laws of Rhode Island, by 
these rules, or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state.  Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible.’”). 
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line of questioning suggested by Arciliares.40  In Harnois, the 
court determined that while a defendant has a constitutional right 
to not testify at their trial, they could not avoid cross-examination 
by admitting evidence of the defendant’s previous statements.41  
In essence, a defendant is not permitted to “testify through” 
another person.42  The State would be unable to cross examine 
Arciliares on the statements made through Det. LaForest.43  Here, 
Arciliares did not seek the ability to testify through Det. LaForest; 
rather, Arciliares sought to enter into evidence only Det. 
LaForest’s statements to Arciliares;44 Harnois does not bar such 
evidence from being admitted.45 
The State also argued that the testimony of Det. LaForest, as 
to the content of the May 17, 2011 meeting with Arciliares, would 
be barred because it would create “confusion in the minds of 
jurors.”46  The court again disagreed.47  The court further 
disagreed with the State’s argument that Det. LaForest’s 
testimony would unfairly prejudice the jury48 because the 
probative value of the evidence would outweigh any unfair 
prejudice to the State.49 
The court also addressed the issue of the autopsy photos 
entered into evidence over Arciliares’s objection.50  The court 
found that weighing the prejudicial value of the photographs was 
within the discretion of the trial judge and would only be 
overturned if the trial judge went beyond the bounds of that 
discretion.51  The court determined that an abuse of discretion did 
not occur in the instant case.52  While the photographs may have 
 
 40.  Id. at 1049. 
 41.  See Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36. 
 42.  Id. at 536.  
 43.  Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1049; see Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36. 
 44.  Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1050. 
 45.  Id.; See Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36. 
 46.  Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1050. 
 47.  Id. at 1050–51. 
 48.  Id. at 1051. 
 49.  Id. at 1050 (providing that “[a]ll evidence supportive of [defendant’s 
theory of the case] is prejudicial to a prosecutor’s case, but such evidence will 
be excluded only if its prejudicial effect outweighs the degree of its probative 
value.”) (quoting State v. Tavarozzi, 446 A.2d 1048, 1051 (R.I. 1982)). 
 50.  Id. at 1051–52. 
 51.  Id. at 1051. 
 52.  Id. at 1052. 
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been gruesome, they are relevant for the jury to understand the 
Assistant Medical Examiner’s testimony.53  The trial judge, 
therefore, did not err in admitting the photos.54 
COMMENTARY 
Here, the Rhode Island Supreme Court clarified the role of 
Harnois when evaluating evidence55 presented at trial and 
affirmed the importance of allowing criminal defendants to put 
forth a proper defense, which includes the sufficient cross-
examination witnesses.56  The evidentiary bar against hearsay 
enforced in Harnois prevents defendants from de facto testifying 
without being subject to cross-examination.57  That goal is not 
effectuated by a rule that prevents statements made to defendants 
from entering evidence.58 
The court shows concern about the potential for creating 
reversible error by limiting the evidence admitted by a criminal 
defendant.59  The court’s opinion in this case stands as a warning 
sign to the justices of the Superior Court to proceed with caution 
when considering excluding evidence that a criminal defendant 
seeks to admit at trial.60  The likelihood of reversal is heightened 
when probative evidence proffered by the defendant is 
suppressed.61 
The court did affirm the discretionary function of the trial 
justice in determining the probative value of a piece of evidence in 
the context of autopsy photos,62 but indicated that that discretion 
is not without limit.63  The issue of photographs was secondary to 
the discussion of Det. LaForest’s testimony and was reached in an 
effort to preempt the possibility of a future appellate claim should 
Arciliares be convicted upon re-trial.64 
 
 53.  Id. at 1051–52. 
 54.  Id. at 1052.  
 55.  See id. at 1049. 
 56.  See id. at 1052 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 57.  Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36. 
 58.  See Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1049 (majority opinion). 
 59.  See id. at 1052 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 60.  See id. (majority opinion). 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  Id.  at 1051. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
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The trial court’s decision in this case departed from the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence, which closely mirror the Federal Rules 
of Evidence with regard to hearsay.65  Det. LaForest should have 
been able to testify to the statements he made because the 
purpose of the testimony was not to demonstrate the truth of 
those statements, but to offer an alternative means by which 
Baccaire could have learned the details of the crime.66  Arciliares 
intended only to demonstrate that the statements were made,67 
and statements proffered for such a reason are not hearsay.68  
Regardless of the accuracy of Det. LaForest’s statements to 
Arciliares, by demonstrating that Det. LaForest provided 
Arciliares with details of Barros’s murder Arciliares could 
establish a defense69 and quite possibly reasonable doubt. 
Despite the prosecutions assertion to the contrary,70 Harnois 
did not establish a new evidentiary bar; it merely enforced the 
longstanding bar against hearsay.71  The Rhode Island Supreme 
Court simply applied the hearsay rule to the facts of Harnois.72  
The Harnois defendant’s argument under Rule 40373 necessitated 
a discussion of defendants testifying through another person; 
however, it created no additional rule prohibiting the admission of 
such statements74 as they were already barred as hearsay.75 
 
 65.  Compare FED. R. EVID. 801, with R.I. R. EVID. 801. 
 66.  See R.I. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 67.  Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1044. 
 68.  See R.I. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 69.  Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1051. 
 70.  Id. at 1044 n.8. 
 71.  Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See R.I. R. EVID. 803(24) (“Other Exceptions.  A statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served 
by admission of the statement into evidence.  However, a statement may not 
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to 
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his or her 
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name 
and address of the declarant.”).   
 74.  Id.  
 75.  See R.I. R. EVID. 801. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Harnois is limited 
to statements made by the defendant and does not include 
statements made to the defendant thus mirroring longstanding 
rules barring hearsay.  The court further held that it is reversible 
error to deny a criminal defendant the ability to sufficiently cross-
examine a material witness when the testimony sought is 
probative, not unfairly prejudicial to the prosecution, and not 
otherwise barred by the rules of evidence. 
Kenneth J. Sylvia 
 





Family Law.  In re Max M., 116 A.3d 185 (R.I. 2015). The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court upheld a ruling of termination of parental 
rights where the father refused to cooperate with the Department 
of Children, Youth and Families and had an overall lack of 
interest in the child. DCYF made reasonable efforts of 
reunification where it attempted to work with the father, but he 
refused to cooperate. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On September 13, 2013, the Department of Children, Youth 
and Families (DCYF) filed a petition to terminate the parental 
rights of Eric M., the respondent father, regarding his son Max.1  
DCYF alleged two grounds for the termination of Eric’s rights.2  
First, pursuant to R.I. General Laws Section 15-7-7(a)(3) (1956), 
DCYF alleged that Max had been in the legal custody of DCYF for 
at least twelve months and there was not a substantial probability 
that Max could be returned  in a reasonable time.3  Second, 
pursuant to R.I. General Laws Section 15-7-7(a)(4) (1956), DCYF 
alleged that Eric had abandoned Max.4 
In support of its petition, Cheryl Csisar, a caseworker 
assigned to Max’s case, testified as a witness for DCYF.5  Ms. 
Csisar replaced another caseworker in June of 2013.6  She 
testified as to how Max came into the custody of DCYF.7  She 
testified that in May of 2012, DCYF was notified that Max’s 
mother, Amanda8, was “abusing heroin. . .  [and] leaving [Max] 
 
 1.  In re Max M., 116 A.3d 185, 188 (R.I. 2015). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id. 
 8.  A petition to terminate the parental rights of Amada was filed at the 
same time as Eric’s.  Amanda did not show up to the initial hearing and did 
not appeal.  Id. at n.2. 
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with relatives for extended periods of time and not providing for 
his care.”9  Ms. Csisar also testified that Eric could not take care 
of Max because he was serving time at the Adult Correctional 
Facility (ACI).10  In response, Max was placed in foster care with 
his maternal aunt and uncle on May 23, 2012.11 
Although Eric was in prison, a previous case worker created 
two case plans for Eric with the goal of reunification.12  In July of 
2013, a month after Eric was released from prison, Ms. Csisar 
created a third case plan for Eric with the same goal.13  As a part 
of the third case plan, Eric was expected to develop parenting 
skills, find housing, attend substance abuse treatment, address 
anger management problems and refrain from any illegal 
activities.14  Ms. Csisar was unable to execute the third case plan 
because Eric felt that he had already completed anger 
management and parenting classes while at ACI.15 Ms. Csisay 
testified that these classes were not adequate, although she never 
contacted ACI to determine if the classes met DCYF’s standards.16  
Ms. Csisar also originally testified that Eric’s home would be 
suitable Max, but later stated that it would not because 
Amanda17, Max’s mother, lived there. Ms. Csisar also stated that 
the home did not have heat or hot water when she visited in 
March of 2014.18 
Ms. Csisar testified that Eric only saw his son five times 
between June 2013 and May 2014, although he was entitled to 
visit with his son weekly, and the last visit had taken place in 
January 2014.19  Ms. Csisar stated that Eric never requested that 
the visits be lengthened and after January 2014, she could no 
longer get ahold of Eric to arrange visits.20  Ms. Csisar testified 
 
 9.  Id.   
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 188–89. 
 15.  Id. at 189. 
 16.  Id. at 189, 190. 
 17.  Id.  Amanda was also Eric’s wife and since her parental rights had 
already been terminated she would not be an appropriate care giver.  Id. at 
n.2. 
 18.  Id. at 189. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id. 
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that Max did not know Eric, and although Eric fed Max when 
visiting, Eric got very flustered and did not seem to know what to 
do when Max was upset.21  Ms. Csisar also testified that she 
talked to Eric about terminating his parental rights and at one 
point he agreed to sign a direct consent adoption.22 
Ms. Csisar testified that Eric had not met the goals of the case 
plan and a new case plan was undertaken for Max with the goal of 
adoption.23  Susan Carlson, a DCYF supervisor, also testified that 
Eric had not met the goals of his case plan.24 
Eric also testified at trial.25  Eric stated that he had done 
nothing to obtain custody of his son and he had not provided 
financially for his son since Max had been in the custody of 
DCYF.26  Eric stated that he did not visit Max when he got out of 
jail because he wanted to be stable first and he also stated that he 
could not remember the last time that he had seen Max.27  Eric 
also testified that when he agreed to sign the direct consent 
adoption he had many mixed feelings and nothing had been 
official decided.28 
The trial justice entered a finding that Eric was an unfit 
parent and a final decree terminating Eric’s parental rights was 
entered on August 21, 2014.29 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to 
determine two issues.30  First, whether the trial justice had erred 
in ruling that Eric was unfit to parent Max and second, whether 
 
 21.  Id. at 190.  
 22.  Id.  According to Ms. Csisar, “[Eric] said to me that he decided he 
knew he couldn’t parent and that he just wanted to sign the direct consent 
[adoption].  He did not want to go forward with the trial. That he knew there 
was no point in it. That he felt he would lose and that he couldn’t parent.”  Id.  
In a direct consent adoption, the biological parent agrees to an adoption for 
the child with the child’s current caregivers.  See R.I. Code R. 14-1-1100.0025.   
 23.  Id. at 190. 
 24.  Id. at 192. 
 25.  Id. at 190. 
 26.  Id. at 191. 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. at 192.  
 30.  Id. at 193. 
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DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify Eric and Max.31  
Eric argued that DCYF had failed to prove either of these points 
by clear and convincing evidence32 and as such, his parental 
rights should not have been terminated.33  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.34 
First, the court addressed the issue of whether the lower court 
had erred by ruling that Eric was an unfit parent.35  The court 
acknowledged that several principles are used to determine 
whether or not a parent is unfit.36  First, a parent has an 
obligation to maintain contact with a child and plan for the child’s 
future when the child is in the custody of DCYF.37  Second, the 
court has stated that an unwillingness to cooperate with DCYF is 
a demonstration of a parent’s lack of interest in a child.38 
The court examined the facts relied on by the trial justice to 
reach the conclusion that Eric was an unfit parent.39  Eric refused 
to cooperate with DCYF.40  He would not participate in case 
planning, and he refused to participate in any recommended 
programs because he felt that he had done enough while in 
prison.41  The trial justice also found support for deeming Eric an 
unfit parent based on his “overall lack of interest [in Max].”42  The 
court did not find that the trial justice had overlooked or 
misconstrued any material evidence when determining Eric was 
an unfit parent.43 
Second, the court addressed the issue of whether DCYF had 
 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id.  “[D]ue process requires that, before the state may terminate a 
parent’s rights in his or her own children, the state must support its 
allegations by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (quoting In re Steven D., 23 
A.3d at 1154, 1155).  
 33.  Id. at 193. 
 34.  Id. at 196. 
 35.  Id. at 193. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. (quoting In re Rosalie H., 889 A.2d 199, 205 (R.I. 2006).  
 38.  Id. at 194 (quoting In re Rosalie H., 889 A.2d at 205).  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.   
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id. at 195.  The trial justice noted Eric’s sporadic visits, failure to 
support Max and his belief that his family members or wife, whose parental 
rights had been terminated, would be primary caretakers as evidence of his 
parental unfitness.  Id. at 194–95. 
 43.  Id. at 195.  
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made reasonable efforts at reunifying Eric and Max.44  DCYF has 
to prove that reasonable efforts were made to strengthen the 
parent-child relationship.45  Reasonable efforts may vary and the 
reasonable efforts standard is subjective.46  In order to 
demonstrate reasonable efforts, DCYF must show that “. . . it has 
satisfied certain requirements, including case panning with the 
parent, arrangements for visitation, and keeping the parent 
informed of the child’s well-being.”47  However, the court also 
noted that DCYF cannot be to blame when “the treatment 
received does not resolve the underlying problem or when a 
parent’s recalcitrance to treatment precludes reunification.”48  
The court found that the trial justice’s findings were sufficiently 
supported to show that DCYF had made efforts at reunification.49  
The court found that DCYF had made reasonable efforts at 
reunification, supported by clear and convincing evidence.50 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed earlier decisions 
that involved the termination of parental rights. The court upheld 
a reasonable rule that provides a clear standard for terminating 
the rights of parents. The court continues to allow the facts for 
each situation to be considered. There is no one single objective 
rule that could be used to determine when parental rights should 
be terminated and the court continues to recognize this.  The 
court’s ruling continues to make it difficult for parents to prevent 
a termination of the parental rights when they make no 
reasonable efforts to allow for reunification. Parents cannot 
simply prevent a termination when they refuse to cooperate with 
DCYF and when they fail to take opportunities available to them 
to reunite with a child. This standard not only protects the best 
 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. (quoting In re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655, 665 (R.I. 2012)).  
 46.  Id. (quoting In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1156). 
 47.  Id. (quoting In re Lyric P., 90 A.3d 132, 141 (R.I. 2014)).  
 48.  Id. (quoting In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198, 203 (R.I. 2008)).  
 49.  Id. at 196.  The trial justice found that Eric had the opportunity for 
weekly visits with Max and DCYF had participated in case planning with 
Eric on three separate occasions.  Id.  The trial justice also found that DCYF 
did not need to make specific referrals for Eric because of his repeated and 
clear refusal to participate in any further programs.  Id.   
 50.  Id. 
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interest of a child, it also protects parents. The rule allows parents 
to be protected when DCYF does not try and work with them and 
it protects parents who are working steadily towards being 
reunited with their children. 
The court’s ruling also upheld the steps that need to be taken 
by DCYF to make reasonable efforts at reunification and 
continued to allow a subjective test as to what reasonable efforts 
include. DCYF does need to meet certain requirements, regardless 
of the chances of success, in order for a finding of reasonable 
efforts. This makes sense because regardless of how the parent 
reacts, DCYF needs to attempt to case plan with parents and set 
up visitation, as well as keeping parents informed about their 
children. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a termination of 
parental rights and ruled that the lower Court did not err by 
finding a father was an unfit parent and that DCYF had made 
reasonable efforts at reunification. 
Casandra A. Foley 





Insurance Law.  Western Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. 
ADM Associates, LLC, 116 A.3d 794 (R.I. 2014).  The beneficiary of 
a life insurance policy must have an insurable interest in the life 
of the insured.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded in 
this case, as a matter of first impression, that this insurable 
interest requirement should not be extended to annuity policies.  
In addition, the court held that an incontestability clause that 
takes immediate effect is enforceable, precluding all causes of 
action that seek to invalidate the policy. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
“Joseph Caramadre was an attorney who specialized in 
finding loopholes in insurance and annuity products that would be 
personally lucrative to him.”1  He took advantage of the 
application process and structure of annuity policies designed and 
sold by Western Reserve Life Assurance Company of Ohio 
(“Western Reserve”).2  Western Reserve’s “Freedom Premier III” 
annuity policy allows the investor, who is the owner of the policy, 
to direct how premiums are to be invested after paying for the 
premiums and also to choose to whom annuity payments are to be 
made.3  The investor also selects an annuitant, whose life is used 
as a measuring tool for the policy.4  The “Double Enhanced Death 
Benefit,” an additional option with the policy, guarantees that 
when the annuitant’s die, the beneficiary selected by the investor 
 
 1.  Western Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. ADM Associates, 
LLC, 116 A.3d 794, 796 (R.I. 2014).  Annuity is defined by the General 
Assembly as “all agreements to make periodic payments for a certain period 
or where the making or continuance of all or some of a series of the payments, 
or the amount of any payment, depends on the continuance of human life, 
except payments made in connection with a life insurance policy.”  Id. at 799 
(quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-0.1(a)). 
 2.  Id. at 796. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
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receives whichever is greater: “(1) the highest market value of the 
policy at a specified anniversary date or (2) a return of all the 
premiums paid into the policy plus five percent per annum 
interest.”5 
An investor who purchased the “Double Enhanced Death 
Benefit,” was essentially making a risk-free investment because it 
allowed the investor “to direct that his premiums be invested in 
speculative securities, name himself as beneficiary, and thus be 
assured that he would receive no less than the total premiums 
invested, plus five percent annual interest, upon death of the 
annuitant.”6  If the life of the annuitant was shorter, the potential 
for profits on the policy increased.7 
After discovering this loophole in Western Reserve’s policy, 
Caramadre recruited terminally ill individuals as annuitants by 
circulating flyers to hospice patients and churches and offered to 
pay the individuals cash for their role as the annuitant.8 
Charles Buckman served as the annuitant on a policy that 
ADM Associates, LLC (“Defendant”) owned and benefited from.9  
Buckman was paid a total of $5,000 for his participation as 
annuitant.10  Initially, the Defendant invested $250,000 as a 
premium to initiate Buckman’s policy, which included the Double 
Enhanced Death Benefit, and later invested $750,000 as an 
additional premium payment.11  Western Reserve issued the 
policy, which included a clause that the made it incontestable 
from the date of creation.12  Camaradre repeated this process 
many times over several years using plaintiff’s variable annuity 
policies and a variety of terminally ill individuals, brokerage 
companies, and their agents.”13  A year after its issuance, Wester 
Reserve attempted to rescind the Buckman policy after learning 
that the policy may have been tainted by Caramdre’s scheme.14 
Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 796–97. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
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District of Rhode Island against Caramadre and ADM seeking 
“rescission of the annuity policy or a declaratory judgment that 
the policy was void because ADM lacked an insurable interest in 
Buckman.”15  The Plaintiff also sought damages for fraud, civil 
liability for crimes and offenses, and conspiracy.16  The Defendant 
made two arguments in opposition to the complaint: “that the 
insurable interest requirement for life insurance policies was not 
applicable to annuities and that incontestability clauses in the 
annuity policies precluded plaintiff from litigating any of its 
claims.”17 
The District Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims and held that 
insurance and annuities are separate, distinct financial 
investment vehicles and that the lack of an insurable interest by 
ADM in Buckman did not render the Buckman policy void 
pursuant to Rhode Island Law.”18  The District Court also 
concluded “that the incontestability clause in the policy . . . was 
not in contravention of public policy and ‘serve[d] to deflect claims 
to rescind the annuities or have them declared void because of 
fraud.’”19  The plaintiff appealed to the First Circuit.20 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island sought to determine 
whether the insurable interest requirement should extend to 
annuity policies and whether an incontestability clause that takes 
immediate effect precluding all causes of action that seek to 
invalidate the policy is enforceable.21  The court held that the 
insurable interest requirement does not extend to annuity policies 
and an incontestability clause that takes immediate effect, 
precluding all causes of action that seek to invalidate the policy, is 
enforceable.22 
The insurable interest requirement for life insurance policies, 
 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. (quoting W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 
715 F. Supp.2d 270, 279, 280 (D.R.I. 2010)). 
 20.  Id. at 797–98. 
 21.  Id. at 798, 804. 
 22.  Id. at 804, 806. 
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which is the requirement that the beneficiary of a life insurance 
policy have an insurance interest in the life of the insured, has 
long been established in Rhode Island based on public policy 
concerns against speculative contracts upon human life because 
“to wager on human life is to provide an incentive to shorten the 
human life wagered upon.”23  In the court’s opinion, “the plain text 
of § 27-4-27(a) clearly indicates that the insurable interest 
requirement applies to life insurance only, as the phrase ‘any 
insurance contract upon the life or body of another individual’ is 
synonymous with ‘life insurance.’”24  The court also pointed out 
that looking at the entirety of Chapter 4 of Title 27 “reveals that 
the General Assembly contemplated annuities in some sections of 
[the] chapter that govern life insurance policies, but not others.”25  
Therefore, if the General Assembly intended the insurable interest 
requirement to extend to annuities, it would have expressly 
indicated that through the language of the section.26  The court 
also looked to the express language of the Life Settlements Act 
(LSA), which expressly prohibits stranger-oriented life insurance 
policies (STOLIs) and is silent on annuities.27 
In regard to whether this kind of annuity is a wagering 
contract, and therefore void as a matter of public policy, the court 
held that the lack of an insurable interest does not convert the 
investment into a wagering contract because “the investor’s 
payment of the premium does not depend on the occurrence of a 
certain event, and the periodic payouts to the beneficiary do not 
depend on the occurrence of a contrary event”—they are 
 
 23.  Id. at 800–01; see Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154 (1911). 
 24.  Id. at 801. 
 25.  Id.  The court explained:  
In the other sections within chapter 4 that mention annuities, the 
language expressly includes annuities within each of the sections by 
the use of phrases such as “life insurance and/or annuities” and “all 
life insurance policy forms and annuity contract forms” in § 27-4-24, 
“life insurance contract or annuity contract” in § 27-4-26, “[a]ny 
policy of life or endowment insurance or any annuity contract” in § 
27-4-12, and “[e]very individual life insurance policy delivered . . . 
and every individual annuity contract delivered” in § 27-4-6.1.   
Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 802 (“A STOLI is defined in § 27-72-2(26) as ‘a practice or plan 
to initiate a life insurance policy for the benefit of a third-party investor who, 
at the time of policy origination, has no insurable interest in the insured.’”). 
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guaranteed by contract.28  The court reasoned that since the 
unknown variable (the timing of the annuitant’s death) effects 
only whether the investor/beneficiary will either yield a large 
profit or simply a return of their baseline investment plus 
interest, the annuity is not a “purely speculative contract on the 
life of another.”29 
In determining whether an incontestability clause that takes 
immediate effect and is enforceable, precluding all causes of action 
that seek to invalidate the policy, the court pointed to the 
arguments in favor of enforceability in a leading treatise on 
contract law.30  These arguments reason that “the insurer drafted 
the clause and so should be bound by it” and “the insurer has an 
unlimited length of time to investigate the policy applicant prior 
to issuing the policy” and therefore “could have discovered 
whatever errors or misrepresentations might have existed before 
it accepts the risk of issuing a policy to the applicant.”31  The court 
disregarded the argument against enforcement to discourage 
fraud, and determined the clause is “enforceable against all 
attempts to escape the ‘deliberately assumed obligation[s]’ 
contained within these contracts.”32 
COMMENTARY 
Justice Robinson dissented from the majority and argued that 
“if the owner and beneficiary of an annuity with a death benefit 
like the one at issue in this case is a stranger to the annuitant, the 
annuity is indeed infirm for want of an insurable interest.”33  
While annuities are not the equivalent of life insurance contracts, 
are in fact “separate and distinct,” he points out that the focus 
should not be on whether or not the annuity is distinct in 
definition from a life insurance policy, but instead “whether or not 
the ‘Double Enhanced Death Benefit’ makes this annuity a 
wagering contract which this Court should refuse to enforce as a 
 
 28.  Id. at 803.   
 29.  Id. (quoting Cronin v. Vt. Life Ins. Co., 40 A. 497, 497 (R.I. 1898)). 
 30.  Id. at 805. 
 31.  Id. (citing 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49.97 at 845–46 (4th ed. 
2014)). 
 32.  Id. at 806 (quoting Murray v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 A. 800, 801 
(R. I. 1901)). 
 33.  Id. at 807. 
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matter of venerable and sound public policy.”34  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court, as well as the United States Supreme Court, has 
consistently held that wagering contracts are detrimental to 
society and against public policy.35  While the majority opinion 
does consider whether the contract at hand is a wagering contract, 
it fails to consider that “[i]f one turns to the reason that certain 
wagering contracts were determined to be void without an 
insurable interest—namely, the concern that the individual who 
would profit from the death of the other individual involved has a 
motive to potentially harm that individual—it becomes clear that 
the annuity in this case is an impermissible wagering contract.”36 
As Justice Robinson points out, “[d]ue to the ‘Double Enhanced 
Death Benefit,’ if the market is performing well, the owner of the 
annuity would have an incentive to end the life of the annuitant in 
order to reap a larger gain” since profits from the investment 
depend on the time of the death of the annuitant.37 
The majority admits that the structure of annuities has 
become “increasingly complex” and has “evolved to offer a variety 
of elective features, including a smorgasbord of investment and 
payout opinions, as well as death benefits” but fails to fully 
address how the feature of death benefits changes an annuity in 
regard to public policy concerns.38  With an investor standing to 
possibly gain large profits from their financial investment, 
depending on the time of death of the annuitant, it seems that 
death benefits may transform annuities into a “speculative 
contract on the life of another.”39 
CONCLUSION 
“[A]n annuity is not infirm for want of an insurable interest 
when the owner and beneficiary of an annuity with a death benefit 
is a stranger to the annuitant.”40  Furthermore, “an 
incontestability clause that takes immediate effect is enforceable, 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 807–08. 
 36.  Id. at 809. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 801. 
 39.  Id. at 800–01. 
 40.  Id. at 804. 
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precluding all causes of action that seek to invalidate the policy.”41 
 Christina Volpe 
 
 
 41.  Id. at 806. 





Insurance Law.  Peerless Ins. Co. v. Luppe, 188 A.3d 500 (R.I. 
2015).  A child of divorced parents can have multiple residences 
for the purpose of determining insurance coverage under a 
homeowner’s policy.  In determining whether a child is a resident 
of a given home, a court must resolve, using a totality of the 
circumstances approach, whether that child has the requisite 
intent to fulfill the definition of resident as set forth in Aetna Life 
and Casualty Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 980 (R.I. 1990).  If the child 
maintains a personal presence in a home with the intent to 
continue that presence for more than a temporary period, he or 
she is a resident of that home. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Maya is the minor child of divorced parents living in Rhode 
Island.  Maya’s parents, Denise Luppe (“Luppe”) and Christopher 
Henderson (“Henderson”), terminated their marriage pursuant to 
a judgment of absolute divorce entered in the Family Court in 
May 2010.1  The judgment awarded Maya’s parents joint legal 
custody, with Luppe gaining physical custody of Maya, and giving 
Henderson “all reasonable rights of visitation.”2  Maya 
infrequently stayed overnight at Henderson’s small studio 
apartment, which he obtained shortly after the couple separated 
in January 2009.3  Sometime after June 2010, Henderson 
purchased a two bedroom home with enough space to allow for “a 
regular schedule of overnight visitation with [Maya].”4  Per this 
schedule, Maya would stay overnight at Henderson’s house on 
 
 1.  Peerless Ins. Co. v. Luppe, 118 A.3d 500, 502 (R.I. 2015). 
 2.  Id.  The property settlement agreement defined joint custody as 
“shared responsibility for all major decisions concerning the upbringing, 
education, medical care, dental care, spiritual care, and all matters 
concerning the general welfare of the child.”  Id.  
 3.  Id.  Henderson testified that Maya spent the night at his studio 
apartment “no more than a couple” of times between January 2009 and June 
2010.  Id. 
 4.  Id. (alteration in original). 
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Wednesdays and Sundays.5  Luppe or her parents would pick up 
Maya from school after Henderson dropped her off on Thursday 
and Monday mornings.6  Maya generally slept in her father’s 
bedroom when visiting, however, she sporadically slept in the 
spare bedroom that contained some of her toys and extra 
clothing.7  Occasionally, Maya would use a bag to bring her 
belongings between houses.8  Maya also had toiletries at 
Henderson’s, including a toothbrush, hairbrush, and a hair dryer.9  
On Sunday, August 22, 2010, Maya was at Henderson’s house 
when his dog attacked Maya in an unknown part of the house 
while Henderson was in the kitchen.10  The dog severely injured 
Maya, who required “significant medical attention.”11 
In 2011, Luppe filed a personal injury lawsuit on behalf of 
Maya against Henderson.12  The complaint alleged that Maya 
“was disfigured, suffered personal injuries,” “may continue to 
suffer great pain of mind and body, and incurred medical expenses 
in connection” with the dog attack.13  Henderson sought a defense 
from Peerless Insurance Company (“Peerless”), which held 
Henderson’s homeowner’s liability policy at the time the dog 
injured Maya.14  Peerless denied coverage to Henderson, asserting 
that Maya was a resident of Henderson’s home at the time of the 
attack and so her injuries, as an insured of the policy, were not 
covered.15  The policy defined “insured” as the homeowner and 
“residents of [the homeowner’s] household who are: a. [the 
homeowner’s] relatives; or b. [o]ther persons under the age of 
 
 5.  Id. at 503. 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id.  Spare clothing and “backup items” included a “[s]weatshirt . . .  
shorts, a pair of jeans, sandals, [and] sneakers.”  Id.  
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  Luppe also filed her own complaint, not addressed by the Court’s 
opinion, alleging she “suffered a loss of consortium with [Maya] because of 
Maya’s injuries.”  Id. at n.4 (alteration in original). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id.  Peerless point to “Section II—Exclusions” of the homeowner’s 
policy in denying coverage, which excluded coverage for “‘[b]odily injury’ to 
you or an ‘insured’ within the meaning [of this policy].”  Id.  
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[twenty-one] and in the care o[f] any person named above.”16 
On January 10, 2012, Peerless filed a complaint for 
declaratory judgment with the Washington County Superior 
Court, seeking a determination on Maya’s status as a resident of 
Henderson’s home.17  During discovery, Luppe testified that Maya 
was listed as a resident of Luppe’s home on all of her school forms, 
Maya’s mail was addressed to Luppe’s home, and Luppe claimed 
Maya as an exemption on her tax return.18  Henderson testified 
that, despite the presence of Maya’s belongings at Henderson’s 
home, neither he nor Maya considered his house to be Maya’s 
home.19  Peerless filed a motion for summary judgment on August 
16, 2013, claiming that there were “no issues of fact in dispute” 
and arguing that “the undisputed facts supported a finding that 
Maya was a resident of [Henderson’s] household when she was 
injured.”20  Both Henderson and Luppe objected to the motion, 
and Luppe filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.21 
On November 18, 2013, arguments were heard on the 
summary judgment motions filed by Peerless and Luppe by a 
justice of the Superior Court.22 The parties agreed that there were 
no genuine issues of material fact and that application of the test 
recited in Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Carrera, a prior Rhode 
Island Supreme Court decision, was proper for determining 
residency in the context of insurance policies.23  During 
arguments, Luppe tried to introduce an affidavit offering a 
conclusion on the status of Maya’s residency, but the affidavit did 
not persuade the hearing justice that “custody could have been 
 
 16.  Id. (alteration in original).  
 17.  Id. at 504.  Henderson filed a counterclaim in response to Peerless’s 
pursuit of declaratory judgment, alleging breach of contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and bad faith, which was stayed pending the outcome of 
Peerless’s action.  Id. at 504 & n.6. 
 18.  Id. at 504. 
 19.  Id. at 503.  “[Maya] knows it as daddy’s house. You know, she knows 
[her mother’s] home as, let’s say, home, and she knows my home as daddy’s 
house.”  Id.  
 20.  Id. at 504 (alteration in original). 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id.  In determining residency for insurance purposes, courts look at 
“(1) the amount of time [one] spends in the locality (2) the nature of [one’s] 
place of abode (3) [one’s] activities in the locality and (4) [one’s] intentions 
with regard to the length and nature of [one’s] stay.”  Id. at 508. (citing Aetna 
Life and Cas. Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 980, 984 (R.I. 1990)). 
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crafted differently.”24  After hearing the arguments on the 
motions, the hearing justice held that “Maya was a resident of Mr. 
Henderson’s home and therefore concluded that there was no 
coverage for her injuries under the Peerless policy.”25  The justice, 
observing the issue before her as a question of law, issued a bench 
decision granting summary judgment for Peerless.26  Henderson 
and Luppe both filed timely notices of appeal.27 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Conducting a de novo review of the summary judgment 
ruling, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to determine 
whether the hearing justice disregarded the “unpersuasive” 
affidavit in error, whether the term “resident” as used in the 
insurance policy was ambiguous, and whether the hearing justice 
erred in her application of the Carrera test.28  Though Luppe 
argued that the affidavit submitted during the summary 
judgment hearing should be conclusive on the question of Maya’s 
residency, the court viewed the affidavit merely as the affiant’s 
legal conclusion and as raising “no material issue of fact.”29  The 
purpose of an expert, the court observed, is to formulate an 
opinion of fact to “assist the fact-finder,” and not to draw legal 
conclusions.30  The court further noted that because the parties 
agreed that no facts were in dispute and that the Carrera test 
governed, consideration of the affiant’s expert opinion was 
 
 24.  Id. at 504–05.  The affidavit was prepared by an experienced family 
law attorney who concluded that, “because during their divorce proceedings 
the parties had agreed that Maya’s physical placement would be with her 
mother, the young girl’s residence was with her mother only.”  Id. at 505. 
 25.  Id. at 504.  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 505–09.  “Summary judgment is appropriate when the hearing 
justice, after considering the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ 
finds ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as [a] matter of law.”  Id. at 505 (quoting Miller v. 
Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins, Co., 111 A.3d 332, 339 (R.I. 2015)). 
 29.  Id. at 505–06.  “[I]t is well settled that such an opinion is permissible 
only ‘when the subject matter is wholly scientific or so far removed from the 
usual and ordinary experience of the average lay person . . . .’” Id. at 506 
(quoting Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 851 (R.I. 1997)). 
 30.  Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 699 (10th ed. 2014)). 
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unnecessary.31  Accordingly, the court found that, although it 
believed the hearing justice could have been clearer in her finding 
as to the affidavit, she committed no legal error.32 
The court then evaluated the ambiguity of the term “resident” 
as it applied to the insurance policy, with the resolve of construing 
any ambiguity against Peerless.33  The court interpreted the 
policy de novo, giving the words their plain meaning.34  Prior 
cases had already defined the term resident in the context of 
insurance policies, and the court recognized the “common 
existence of multiple residences.”35  Being a resident of a home 
implies more than “being a mere transient guest,” explained the 
court; that a home to a resident is a “place . . . where he or she 
lives, sleeps, and carries on life with regularity.”36  The court 
determined that the plain meaning of the phrase “residents of 
your household,” when read in conjunction with a phrase in the 
same definition, “who are [ ] your relatives,” communicated an 
unambiguous understanding of the meaning of resident within the 
context of the Peerless policy.37 
Finally, the court addressed the hearing justice’s application 
of the Carrera test to the uncontested facts of the case to 
determine whether or not Maya was a resident of Henderson’s 
 
 31.  Id.  The Carrera test “does not contemplate matters that are outside 
the usual and ordinary experience of a layperson.”  Id.  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id.  “An ambiguity in an insurance policy is strictly construed 
against the insurer.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Koziol v. Peerless 
Ins. Co., 41 A.3d 647, 651 (R.I. 2012)). 
 34.  Id. “[W]e refrain from ‘engaging in mental gymnastics or from 
stretching the imagination to read ambiguity into a policy where none is 
present.’” Id. (quoting Mallane v. Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co. in Salem, 658 A.2d 
18, 20 (R.I. 1995)).  
 35.  Id. at 507 (citing Barricelli v. American Universal Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 
1270, 1271 (R.I.1990)). “Shared-custody arrangements are increasingly 
frequent . . . and we recognize that a child may call multiple dwellings his or 
her home.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  See also, Canfield v. 
Peerless Ins. Co., 692 N.Y.S. 562, 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (child bitten by 
dog during a scheduled visit in the home of her father) (“[T]he child of 
divorced parents can be a resident of both her mother’s and her father’s home 
for the purpose of being insured under the homeowner’s policy of each 
parent.”). 
 36.  Luppe, 118 A.3d at 507. 
 37.  Id. at 506.  The court traditionally gathers the meaning of seemingly 
ambiguous terms by reviewing the term in context. See Aetna Life and Cas. 
Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 980, 983 (R.I. 1990). 
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home for the purposes of the Peerless policy.38 Determining 
residency in the context of a homeowner’s policy was a matter of 
first impression for the court.39  Drawing on past experience with 
uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance policies, the court 
reasoned that “the term resident should not have vastly different 
meanings across multiple types of insurance contracts.”40 To 
determine residency in the context of a homeowner’s policy, the 
court adopted its reasoning in Flather v. Norberg, which addressed 
the definition of residency for state income tax purposes, and 
handed down several factors to be considered in determining 
residency: “(1) the amount of time [one] spends in the locality (2) 
the nature of [one’s] place of abode (3) [one’s] activities in the 
locality and (4) [one’s] intentions with regard to the length and 
nature of [one’s] stay.”41 
In Carrera, the court focused on the fourth factor—intent—
and found that, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, 
“one who maintains a personal presence in a home with the intent 
to continue that presence for more than a temporary period is 
considered a resident of that home under [Rhode Island] law.”42  
Shortly after the court pronounced the definition of residency in 
Carrera, it addressed the question in the context of divorce.43  In 
Barricelli v. American Universal Insurance Co., the daughter of 
divorced parents maintained “structured, albeit intermittent” 
contact with her mother’s household, including weekly visits to 
the mother’s home as well as overnight visits on alternate 
weekends, during which she would sleep on a pullout sofa.44  The 
daughter kept “one or two changes of clothing” at her mother’s 
house, but would use a suitcase when staying overnight.45  The 
 
 38.  Luppe, 118 A.3d at 507-509.  
 39.  Id. at 507. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. at 508 (citing Carrera, 577 A.2d at 984). 
 42.  Id. (alteration in original) (citing Carrera, 557 A.2d at 985).  In 
Carrera, the Court ruled that the decedent was not a resident of his mother’s 
home, and that the decedent’s estate was unable to maintain a claim under 
his mother’s insurance policy because the decedent lacked the intent to 
return to his mother’s home, or to the state of Rhode Island in general at the 
time of his fatal accident.  See Carrera, 557 A.2d at 985. 
 43.  Luppe, 118 A.3d at 508 (citing Barricelli v. American Universal Ins. 
Co., 583 A.2d 1270, 1271 (R.I.1990)). 
 44.  Id. at 508-09 (quoting Barricelli, 583 A.2d at 1271). 
 45.  Id. at 509 (quoting Barricelli, 583 A.2d at 1271). 
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court held that the daughter’s presence in her mother’s home was 
“mere[ly] transitory” in nature, and that the girl’s infrequent 
stays, lack of a regular bed to sleep in, and her need for a suitcase 
in transporting her belongings militated against her being a 
resident of her mother’s home.46 
Applying the Carrera test to the case at bar, the court 
distinguished the facts of Barricelli from the facts of Luppe and, 
after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, was “convinced 
by an analysis of the agreed facts that Maya was a resident of [ ] 
Henderson’s household” on the day she was injured because it was 
a place at which she had a “recent history of physical presence 
together with circumstances that manifest[ed] an intent to return 
to the residence within a reasonably foreseeable period.”47  
Specifically, the court pointed to Maya’s regular schedule of 
weekly overnight visits at Henderson’s house per an amicable 
custody agreement, which was maintained even after the date of 
the injury which brought rise to the lawsuit; Maya’s many 
belongings which stayed at Henderson’s house, including clothes, 
toys, and toiletries, and Maya receiving visitors at Henderson’s 
house.48  While the court acknowledged the argument that Maya’s 
residency was with her mother due to Maya being listed on 
Luppe’s tax returns, Maya’s mail being sent to Luppe’s house, and 
Maya being listed as residing at Luppe’s house, the court said that 
those facts did not disprove that Maya also resided with her 
father.49  Accordingly, the court held that the hearing justice 
committed no error in granting summary judgment, because of the 
uniform definition of resident across “all types of insurance,” 
regardless of the policy considered.50 
COMMENTARY 
This case culminates the efforts of the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court to coalesce the understanding of residency as it relates to 
 
 46.  Id. (quoting Barricelli, 583 A.2d at 1271-72). 
 47.  Id. (quoting Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 980, 985 
(R.I. 1990)).  “[Maya’s] presence in her father’s home establishes that Maya 
was there for more than ‘a mere transitory period’ . . . when Maya was at Mr. 
Henderson’s house, it was functionally her home.”  Id. (alteration in original) 
(citing Barricelli, 583 A.2d at 1272). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. at 507.  
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insurance policies under Rhode Island law, as well as reflects its 
desire to comport with the sentiments of other jurisdictions on the 
issue of a child’s residency in the home of a divorced noncustodial 
parent with whom the child visits under circumstances similar to 
those in the Luppe case.51  Favoring a “general principle . . . [of] 
broad coverage” in interpreting homeowner’s insurance policies, 
the court believed that it pronounced a holding consistent with the 
“purpose of homeowner’s insurance policies, which is to protect 
against claims from outsiders, and not for intrafamily injuries.”52  
The court also took its analysis a much needed step further when 
reinforcing its approach in Carrera and, by focusing heavily on the 
factor of intent in the residency consideration test, ostensibly 
foreshadowing the substantial role intent will play in the 
determination of future cases.53  In fact, without a determination 
of intent, the distinguishability of the facts the court relied on in 
ruling on the residency issue in the Barricelli and Luppe cases 
becomes far more debatable.54 
In this case, Maya kept a select few belongings, as well as a 
few spare articles of clothing at Henderson’s, transported some 
clothing and supplies in a bag for overnight visits and, though a 
spare bedroom existed, Maya rarely slept in it, instead sleeping in 
Henderson’s room.55  Similarly, the daughter in Barricelli kept a 
few changes of clothing and select personal belongings at her 
mother’s house, routinely transported further articles in a suitcase 
for overnight visits and, though there was no spare bedroom for 
the decedent, she was routinely accorded sole use of a pullout sofa, 
 
 51.  Id. at 509–10; see, e.g., Canfield v. Peerless Insurance Co., 692 
N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that a regular schedule of 
visitation coupled with the child’s keeping personal items at her father’s 
home was a “sufficient degree of permanency to establish that she was a 
resident of that household as a matter of law.”); see also Estate of Adams v. 
Great American Ins. Cos., 942 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding child a resident of her father’s home because “the child regularly 
spen[t] time in the household in question, such that there exist[ed] a 
continuing expectation of the child’s periodic return on intervals regular 
enough that the household [wa]s the child’s home during the time the child 
[wa]s there, as opposed to a place of infrequent and irregular visits.”). 
 52.  Luppe, 118 A.3d at 510 (quoting Carrera, 577 A.2d at 983) (citing 
Steven Plitt et. al., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 128:2 at 128-7). 
 53.  Id. at 508. 
 54.  See id. at 503, 509.  
 55.  Id. at 503.  
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which for the purposes of sleeping when visiting is essentially a 
bed, during her stays.56  On these facts, it is not at all apparent 
that Maya’s activities at Henderson’s home warrant an outcome 
different than that reached in Barricelli. 
Whereas the decedent in Barricelli had designated use of the 
pullout sofa during her visits, which is a bed for all intents and 
purposes, Maya slept almost exclusively in Henderson’s bedroom, 
sharing it with Henderson, and used the spare room primarily to 
store belongings, using it for herself only when relatives visited.57  
In a way, because the first three elements of the Carrera test focus 
on the activities and time spent in the home, and not the 
intentions of the stay in the home, without the element of intent, 
Maya, because she shared a bedroom with Henderson, had a less 
stable arrangement than that of the decedent in Barricelli, who 
was provided a bed of her own, albeit convertible.58  Absent the 
element of intent, the court would have a much harder time 
reconciling the two outcomes, as the cited lack of a “regular” bed to 
sleep in and the necessity to bring a suitcase in Barricelli also can 
apply to Maya’s circumstances.  However, when one takes into 
account the element of intent, the court’s reasoning becomes much 
clearer. 
While the decedent in Barricelli stayed at her mother’s on 
alternate weekends, her stay at her mother’s home was only 
“structured” insofar as she expressed a desire to visit.59  In fact, 
she generally stayed with her father, despite her mother obtaining 
physical placement in the divorce.60  Unlike that pattern of 
visitation, Maya’s personal presence in Henderson’s home was 
ongoing even after the dog bite and was more frequent, being a 
weekly occurrence, and was part of an amicable and adhered to 
plan of visitation, which delineated a clear intent for Maya to 
continue a routine presence at Henderson’s home.61  The Supreme 
Court, in granting summary judgment for Peerless and affirming 
the ruling of the Superior Court, delineated and reinforced the 
 
 56.  Id. at 509 (citing Barricelli v. American Universal Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 
1270, 1271 (R.I.1990)). 
 57.  Id. at 503, 509. 
 58.  Id. at 503, 509 (citing Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 
980, 984 (R.I. 1990)). 
 59.  Id. at 509 (citing Barricelli, 583 A.2d. at 1271). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
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intent element in the Carrera test as the hook upon which the 
issue of residency will turn, and provided a concrete, uniform, and 
very workable method of determining residency in the insurance 
context. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in the context of 
homeowner’s policies, a person is a resident of a home when that 
person maintains a personal presence in a home with the intent to 
continue that presence for more than a temporary period. 
Daniel F. Miller  





Labor Law.  Town of N. Kingstown v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 
Local 1651 AFL-CIO, 107 A.3d 304 (R.I. 2015).  A firefighters’ 
union has the right to negotiate with a town for the 
implementation of a unilateral change to the firefighters’ 
schedule, even if that implementation is considered a 
management decision.  The union waives its right to negotiate if it 
has been formally notified of the proposal and fails to timely notify 
the town under R.I. General Laws Section 28-9.1-13 of the 
Firefighters Arbitration Act.1  Additionally, a party waives its 
right to request interest arbitration if it has been formally notified 
of the proposal and fails to timely file such a request under 
Section 28-9.1-7 of the Firefighters Arbitration Act.2 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On June 30, 2010, a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) 
between the Town of North Kingstown (“Town”) and the North 
Kingstown Firefighters, Local 1651, International Association of 
Firefighters (“Union”) expired.3  Negotiations were ongoing, but 
both parties had vastly different views regarding the structure of 
the fire departments’ schedules.4  The Town proposed a three-
platoon structure which increased the average workweek from 
forty-two hours to fifty-six hours and made the firefighters work 
twenty-four consecutive hours followed by a forty-eight hour 
recess.5  The Union, on the other hand, wished to keep the current 
four-platoon structure which contained a forty-two hour 
workweek.6  When these negotiations failed, an interest 
arbitration panel was assembled to create a new CBA that would 
 
 1.  See Town of N. Kingstown v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651 
AFL-CIO, 107 A.3d 304, 316 (R.I. 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13. 
 2.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 317; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7. 
 3.  North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 307.  
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at n. 2. 
 6.  Id. at 307. 
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last from July 1, 2010, to June 30, 2011.7  Disagreeing with the 
Town’s position on its proposal, the panel awarded the same work 
schedule as the prior CBA.8 
Nearing the end of the arbitration CBA, on February 23, 
2011, the Union contacted the Town to negotiate for a new CBA.9  
The parties met together on October 28, 2011, and five more times 
after that, but negotiations again failed because the Town 
continued to press the three-platoon structure that the Union did 
not want.10  Most notably, an interest arbitration panel was never 
requested to resolve any disputes at this time.11  On December 19, 
2011, the Town informed the Union that it was going to enact an 
ordinance that would establish the three-platoon structure 
reorganization of the fire departments’ schedules.12  After two 
more failed negotiation attempts, the ordinance went into effect on 
January 30, 2012.13 
The Union then sued the Town on February 28, 2012, seeking 
relief in three forms: “(1) a declaratory judgment that the 
ordinance was invalid because it was passed in violation of the 
Town charter; (2) a declaratory judgment that the Town violated 
the Firefighters Arbitration Act (FFAA or ‘the Act’) and the State 
Labor Relations Act (SLRA); and (3) injunctive relief.”14  Nearly 
three months later, on May 23, 2012, the Superior Court 
concluded that the ordinance was invalid because it violated the 
Town’s charter and, even if the ordinance were properly passed, it 
still violated the Union’s rights under the FFAA.15  Although the 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 308. 
 13.  Id.  The Union and the Town assembled for another negotiation 
meeting to reach a settlement after the ordinance was enacted, but again it 
was to no avail.  Id. 
 14.  Id.  The parties were ordered by the Superior Court to enter into 
mediation before a decision was rendered, but no settlement was reached, 
and on March 11, 2012, the ordinance went into effect.  Id. 
 15.  Id.; see also Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651 AFL-CIO v. Town 
of N. Kingstown, No. C.A. WC 12-0127, 2012 WL 1948338, at *1 (R.I. Super. 
May 23, 2012) (hereinafter “North Kingstown I”).  The Firefighters 
Arbitration Act (“FFAA”) gave the Union its rights to negotiate changes to 
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, as well as a right to 
an arbitration process.  North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 308.  Because of this 
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Superior Court did admit that implementing a three-platoon 
structure was within the Town’s control if the parties’ could not 
come to an agreement, it nevertheless stressed that ‘“ . . . 
unilateral implementation of changes to wages, hours and terms 
and conditions of employment’ was improper.”16 
Prior to this ruling, on February 23, 2012, the Union 
contacted the Town to negotiate a new CBA for the contract period 
beginning July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013.17  On March 14, 
2012, the Union requested an interest arbitration panel for the 
July 1, 2011-June 30, 2012 contract year and that request was 
granted (hereinafter “2011-2012 Arbitration Panel”).18  However, 
negotiations for the 2012-2013 contract year again fell through 
between the parties, and another arbitration panel was requested 
and granted for that contract year (hereinafter “2012-2013 
Arbitration Panel”).19  In response to the Town standing firm on 
its new proposal, the Union then filed an unfair labor practice 
charge (ULP-6088) against the Town to the State Labor Relations 
Board (SLRB) on June 14, 2012.20  The SLRB, in response to 
receiving the complaint, then sued the Town on August 2, 2012, 
arguing that the Town’s implementation of the three-platoon 
structure violated state law.21  On September 5, 2012, the Town 
filed a complaint of its own, seeking various forms of relief.22  The 
 
ordinance, the Superior Court determined that these rights were stripped 
from the Union.  Id. 
 16.  Id. (quoting North Kingstown I, 2012 WL 1948338, at *1).  
 17.  North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 308. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id.  On July 9, 2012, the Town had also requested and was granted 
arbitration to determine the effects of the three-platoon structure 
reorganization (hereinafter “Effects Arbitration Panel”), but had withdrawn 
this demand for arbitration on November 5, 2012.  Id. at 308–09; n. 3.  
 21.  Id. at 309. 
 22.  Id.  The Town, in its original complaint, plead:  
(1) [T]he SLRB was without jurisdiction to enforce ULP-6088; (2) the 
Town’s actions in implementing the three-platoon structure were 
lawful; (3) jurisdiction to determine the effects of the Town’s decision 
to implement the three-platoon structure rests exclusively with the 
Effects Arbitration Panel; (4) the Union waived its right to submit to 
interest arbitration the unresolved issues arising out of the parties’ 
negotiations for a CBA for the July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012 
period; and (5) the 2011–2012 Arbitration Panel was without 
jurisdiction to decide any unresolved issues between the parties for 
the July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012 period.  
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Town’s central argument was that it had the inherent right to 
reorganize into the three-platoon structure because the Union 
failed to meet the statutory deadline to request interest 
arbitration when the CBA had expired.23  It also argued that the 
Union waived its right to collectively bargain altogether for it 
failed to properly notify the Town within the statutory 
requirement under Section 28-9.1-13.24  After listening to 
arguments on both sides, the Superior Court, on February 4, 2013, 
held that (1) the Town’s actions in implementing unilateral 
changes to a three-platoon structure were unlawful; (2) the SLRB, 
and not the Superior Court, had jurisdiction over the claim arising 
out of the ULP-6088 charge ‘“insofar as it is necessary to 
determine which terms and conditions have existed between the 
parties since the expiration of the previous CBA’”; (3) the 
arbitration panel does not have jurisdiction over the unilateral 
changes because these changes are invalid; (4) the Union and the 
Town both waived their rights to an arbitration panel; and (5) the 
arbitration panel had no jurisdiction over the above-mentioned 
claims because both parties waived its rights to arbitration for the 
2011–2012 contract year.25  The Superior Court also reinstated 
the original four-platoon structure.26  In response to the decision, 
the Town timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.27 
 
Id.  Additionally, the Town sought a motion to stay both the 2011–2012 
Arbitration Panel and the 2012–2013 Arbitration Panel, as well as a 
declaration that the SLRB was without jurisdiction to enforce ULP-6088.  Id.  
The Town amended its complaint on September 24, 2012, additionally 
seeking that the Union failed to meet requirements under Rhode Island 
statutory law for both the 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 contract years, thus 
forfeiting its right to collectively bargain “firefighters’ wages, rates of pay, or 
any other matter requiring appropriation of money by the Town.”  Id.; see 
also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13.  The Town also pleaded that the Union 
waived its right to request interest arbitration for the 2012-2013 contract 
year, and that the 2012-2013 Arbitration Panel was without jurisdiction to 
decide any disputes for that period.  North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 309. 
 23.  Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7.   
 24.  North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 309; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-
13.   
 25.  North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 310 (quoting Town of N. Kingstown v. 
Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651 AFL-CIO, 2012 WL 6638703 at *13 (R.I. 
Super. Dec. 14, 2012) (hereinafter “North Kingstown II”)).  
 26.  North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 310. 
 27.  Id.  Additionally, the SLRB held for the ULP-6088 charge that the 
Town had committed unfair labor practices by “failing to bargain in good 
faith and unilaterally implementing its reorganization in violation of the 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the North Kingstown II28 holding, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court first discussed whether the Town could 
unilaterally implement the three-platoon structure.29  Under the 
FFAA, the Union obtains the ‘“right to bargain collectively * * * as 
to wages, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and all other 
terms and conditions of employment.’”30  Additionally, a Town will 
be obligated to bargain in good faith with the Union on these 
matters so long as the Union complies with the applicable notice 
provisions provided for in the FFAA.31  While there are numerous 
matters and rights that are nonnegotiable on the Town’s part,32 
one in particular that is related to this case is the Town’s 
managerial decisions.33  Such decisions may still be nonnegotiable 
and not subject to review even when they may have profound 
effects on the terms and conditions of employment.34  However, if 
 
FFAA.”  Id. at 311; see also In re Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board & 
Town of N. Kingstown, 2013 WL 5755149 (R.I. Lab. Rel. Bd. September 27, 
2013). The SLRB found numerous remedies for the Union, including 
reverting back to the four-platoon structure, back pay and interest on back 
pay, and all contractually bargained-for benefits lost by the Union since the 
three-platoon structure had been implemented.  North Kingstown, 107 A.3d 
at 311; see also In re Labor Relations Board, 2013 WL 5755149.  The Superior 
Court, upon appeal by the Town, had affirmed the SLRB’s decision, but 
granted the Town’s stay until the Rhode Island Supreme Court rendered this 
decision.  North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 311; see also Town of N. Kingstown v. 
Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 2014 WL 185327 (R.I. Super. Jan. 
6, 2014) (hereinafter “North Kingstown III”).  Thus, North Kingstown III is 
not reviewed in this case.  North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 311. 
 28.  See supra note 26. 
 29.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 312. 
 30.  Id. at 313 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-4.  
 31.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 313. 
 32.  Such nonnegotiable rights belonging to the Town are its statutory 
duties and “powers and responsibilities . . . [in] the essence of [its] mission.” 
Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 915 
(R.I. 1991); North Providence School Committee v. North Providence 
Federation of Teachers, Local 920, American Federation of Teachers, 945 
A.2d 339, 347 (R.I. 2008). These same rights also cannot be delegated to an 
interest arbitration panel. See North Providence School Committee, 945 A.2d 
at 347; State, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals v. 
Rhode Island Council 94, A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL-CIO, 692 A.2d 318, 324 (R.I. 
1997).  
 33.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 313. 
 34.  See id. at 314 (quoting Providence Hospital v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 93 F.3d 1012, 1018 (1st Cir. 1996)).  
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the problem involved concerns both a question of management and 
a term of condition of employment, the employer has the duty to 
negotiate with the individuals involved, so long as the individuals 
do not waive their right to bargain.35  Upon reviewing other 
jurisdictions’ rulings, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that 
the Town’s unilateral change into a three-platoon structure was 
indeed a management decision.36 
Even though the Town’s implementation of the three-platoon 
structure was a management decision, the court noted that the 
Union originally retains a right to bargain.37  The court next 
determined whether or not the Union waived its right to negotiate 
the implementation of the three-platoon structure.38  Under 
Section 28-9.1-13 of the FFAA, for matters related to “wages, rates 
of pay, or any other matter requiring appropriation of money [by 
the town],” the Union has the obligation to request collective 
bargaining at least 120 days before the day of final approval of the 
Town’s budget.39  The Rhode Island Supreme Court previously 
held that failing to abide by this statute is fatal, for its terms are 
mandatory, not merely directive.40  Here, the day the Town’s 
budget was considered final for 2011 was May 4, 2011; thus the 
latest the Union could have requested bargaining the three-
platoon structure was 120 days before that date, which was 
 
 35.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 314; see also Providence Hospital, 
93 F.3d at 1018.  
 36.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 314; see also State ex rel. Quiring 
v. Board of Educ. of Indep. School District No. 173, Mountain Lake, 
Minnesota, 623 N.W.2d 634, 640 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (reorganization of 
organizational structure is a management decision); Appeal of Int’l Ass’n of 
Firefighters, AFL-CIO Local 1088, 462 A.2d 98, 100 (N.H. 1983) (alteration of 
fire department’s platoon size was a management decision); Borough of 
Atlantic Highlands v. Atlantic Highlands PBA Local 242, 469 A.2d 80, 85 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (a shift change in structure is a managerial 
decision).  Additionally, although the 2007–2010 CBA by no means adds 
terms to later CBAs between the parties, the court nonetheless noted how the 
2007–2010 CBA Agreement between the Town and the Union contained a 
management rights clause which retained all other rights and 
responsibilities to the Town.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at n. 7.  
 37.  See North Kingstown,  107 A.3d at 315. 
 38.  See id. at 316. 
 39.  Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13.   
 40.  See Town of Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge # 23, 372 
A.2d 1273, 1275 (R.I. 1977). 
LABOR LAW_GALINDO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2016  7:13 PM 
762 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 21:756 
January 4, 2011.41  The Union, however, did not request 
bargaining the three-platoon structure until February 23, 2011.42 
Therefore, the Union failed to meet the notice requirement of 
Section 28-9.1-13 of the FFAA, leaving the Town no obligation to 
bargain any matter requiring the appropriation of money.43 
Even though matters involving appropriation of money did 
not require bargaining, there were still other matters in dispute 
between the Town and Union.44  Section 28-9.1-7 of the FFAA 
states that if the Town and Union are unable to come to an 
agreement on any issues within thirty days from and including 
the date of their first meeting, the parties may submit a request 
for interest arbitration to resolve the matters.45  Here, the Town 
and Union first met to negotiate on October 28, 2011; therefore, 
thirty days from that date was the deadline to request interest 
arbitration.46  However, the Union did not demand interest 
arbitration until March 14, 2012, clearly beyond the thirty-day 
time frame.47  In response, the Union argued that there was an 
agreement to extend the notification deadline for interest 
arbitration; however, because there was no evidence indicating an 
express agreement between the parties, the court affirmed the 
Superior Court’s decision to reject that argument and keep the 
original deadline.48  Therefore, the Union failed to timely file for 
interest arbitration and thus waived its right to pursue that 
remedy.49  As a result, the 2011-2012 Arbitration Panel had no 
jurisdiction over any unresolved issues between the parties or to 
determine the effects of the three-platoon structure.50 
 
 41.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at n. 9. 
 42.  See id. 
 43.  See id. at 316; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13.   
 44.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 316. 
 45.  See id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7.   
 46.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 316. 
 47.  See id. 
 48.  See id. at 316–17. 
 49.  See id. at 317; see also Lime Rock Fire District v. Rhode Island State 
Labor Relations Board, 673 A.2d 51 (R.I. 1996) (holding that even though 
firefighters’ union complied with § 28-9.1-13 and timely requested bargaining 
on matters dealing with appropriation of money, and that both union and 
town had different views regarding town’s decision to lay off an entire class of 
employees, decision was nonetheless lawful because union failed to timely 
submit any issues to arbitration).  
 50.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 320. 
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Furthermore, the Union knew that the Town had intentions 
to implement the three-platoon structure as early as 2010, at the 
hearings before the 2010–2011 Arbitration Panel.51  Formal notice 
of the three-platoon structure proposal for the 2011-2012 contract 
year was also given on October 28, 2011.52  In Town of Burrillville 
v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court held that “a union with sufficient notice of a 
contemplated change waives its bargaining rights if it fails to 
request bargaining prior to the implementation of that change.”53  
The Town of Burrillville implemented a change of procedure to 
police officers’ receipt of injured-on-duty benefits, and notified the 
union one week before the change went into effect.54  The court 
noted that this notification by the town, though it was given only a 
week before the change was implemented, was nonetheless 
adequate notice to the union, and the union’s failure to timely 
notify Burrillville to negotiate thus waived this right.55  Here, 
then, because (1) the Union had knowledge of the three-platoon 
structure; (2) the Union failed to timely comply with Section 28-
9.1-13 of the FFAA; (3) the Town formally proposed to the Union 
the three-platoon structure on October 28, 2011; and (4) the Union 
failed to timely comply with Section 28-9.1-7 of the FFAA in 
requesting arbitration, “ the Town’s implementation of its decision 
to reorganize into a three-platoon structure was lawful.”56 
In addition to these findings, the court found that because the 
Town’s action in implementing the three-platoon structure was 
justified, there was nothing for the SLRB to review and therefore 
the Board had no jurisdiction over any matters from the 2011-
2012 contract year.57  The court also noted that this decision 
rendered the Union’s injunction against the Town from 
implementing the three-platoon structure meaningless and 
therefore vacated the order.58  Lastly, the court shifted its 
attention to North Kingstown III and assured the Superior Court 
 
 51.  See id. at 317. 
 52.  See id. 
 53.  921 A.2d 113, 120 (R.I. 2007). 
 54.  Id. at 116. 
 55.  See id. at 120. 
 56.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 318. 
 57.  See id. at 320. 
 58.  See id. 
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that if the issues surrounding the 2012-2013 Arbitration Panel in 
that case parallel the issues surrounding this decision, then there 
is no need to re-litigate a matter that has already been decided.59 
COMMENTARY 
Although some may believe this holding seems harsh because 
the firefighters will be forced to adhere to the new three-platoon 
structure, in actuality it was the Union who made the mistake 
here by not filing bargaining or arbitration requests on time.60  
Even though the court determined that implementing the three-
platoon structure was within the Town’s powers of management, 
the Union still had the power to bargain because it was a matter 
dealing with “ wages, rates of pay, or any other matter requiring 
appropriation of money [by the Town].”61  This power of 
bargaining, however, was subject to the Union timely notifying the 
Town that they wished to negotiate the Town’s decision before 
implementation.62  If the Town does not hear from the Union by 
that deadline, the Town assumes the Union abides by its decision 
and thus has every right to implement its management power 
without having to negotiate.63  This same notion applies to 
requesting arbitration.64 If the parties cannot come to an 
agreement on a key issue thirty days after their first meeting, one 
party, if they so wish to be heard by an interest arbitration panel, 
must file a request for arbitration within that time frame.65  
Again, the Union failed to meet this deadline, leaving the Town 
with the impression that silence means acceptance.66 
The court had also stressed that these statutory deadlines 
were mandatory, not merely directive, and pointed to numerous 
Rhode Island Supreme Court cases supporting that viewpoint.67  
 
 59.  See id. at 320–21. 
 60.  See id. at 316. 
 61.  Id. at 315 (quoting Town of Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police, 
Lodge # 23, 372 A.2d 1273, 1275 (R.I. 1977)). 
 62.  See id. at 316; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13. 
 63.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 316; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13. 
 64.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 316. 
 65.  See id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7.   
 66.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 316. 
 67.  See Town of Burrillville v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations 
Board, 921 A.2d 113, 120 (R.I. 2007); Lime Rock Fire District v. Rhode Island 
State Labor Relations Board, 673 A.2d 51, 54 (R.I. 1996); Town of Tiverton v. 
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge # 23, 372 A.2d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 1977).  
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What’s more, the Union had every reason to file these requests on 
time if they were displeased with the proposal, for they knew the 
Town’s intentions to implement the three-platoon structure at 
every negotiation meeting since the moment the parties began 
negotiating before the 2010-2011 Arbitration Panel.68 
As easy as it seems to say the Union missed deadlines and 
thus lost this case, it nonetheless is difficult to ignore the Union’s 
position on this matter.  Firefighters indulge in one of the most 
courageous and hardworking everyday tasks that we, as citizens, 
take for granted.  It is fair to say, then, that their voices should be 
heard when a town uses its management power to take away their 
hard-earned pay and wages.  Also important is that their voices be 
heard when their schedules are modified that take away much 
needed time with their families.  Maybe in another setting or in 
another profession can a decision this crucial be handed down 
because an employee missed a deadline.  But when we are dealing 
with a profession that promotes safety and wellness to our society, 
we must also pay attention to public policy considerations.  Some 
current or prospective firefighters may pursue another career 
because they may believe that meeting a deadline to file an action 
is now more important than the right to negotiate.  Regardless, 
the public may nonetheless fear that a town’s “managerial 
decisions” over a union has now officially exceeded its limits. 
Still, as much as these arguments may be convincing, the 
court has precedent to point out that these statutory deadlines 
were mandatory, and thus the Union had every reason to know 
how important meeting these deadlines were.  Perhaps if the 
Union was blindsided with the three-platoon structure, instead of 
having knowledge of the Town’s intentions for four years, the 
court might come to a different conclusion.  But regardless, a life 
lesson was certainly garnered from this decision: always meet 
your deadlines. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that (1) North 
Kingstown’s decision to implement a three-platoon structure was 
within the Town’s management powers; (2) the Union had 
knowledge of the three-platoon structure; (3) the Union failed to 
 
 68.  See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 317. 
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timely comply with Section 28-9.1-13 of the FFAA; (4) the Town 
formally proposed to the Union the three-platoon structure on 
October 28, 2011; and (5) the Union failed to timely comply with 
Section 28-9.1-7 of the FFAA in requesting arbitration. Because of 
these rulings, the Town’s unilateral implementation of the three-
platoon structure was lawful. 
Joseph Galindo 
 





Labor Law.  State of Rhode Island Department of Corrections v. 
Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 115 A.3d 924 
(R.I. 2015).  In disciplinary-action cases taken against a state 
employee, which are arbitrated, an arbitrator’s job is two fold: 
first, to determine if the State has “just cause” for that particular 
form of disciplinary action, and second, if the State does not have 
“just cause” for that particular penalty, he or she must fashion an 
appropriate punishment.  In determining whether the State has 
just cause to take disciplinary action against an employee, the 
arbitrator is required to resolve a dispute based on a portion of the 
applicable collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).  The 
arbitrator is not to look outside the four corners of the CBA in 
crafting his or her decision if an applicable section therein can 
solve the dispute.  If the arbitrator ignores an applicable section of 
the CBA then he or she  has abused his or her power and the 
award is subject to reversal. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On March 2, 2009, Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Chief 
Inspector Aaron Aldrich (“Inspector Aldrich”) received notice that 
Gene Davenport (“Officer Davenport”) and James Maddalena 
(“Officer Maddalena”) were smoking marijuana while on duty.1  
Inspector Aldrich confronted Officer Davenport—armed and on 
perimeter duty—and smelled a strong odor of marijuana 
emanating from Officer Davenport’s vehicle.2  Inspector Aldrich 
also noted that Officer Davenport’s eyes were blood shot.3  Officer 
Davenport then confessed to smoking marijuana and claimed that 
although Officer Maddalena was in the car with him while he 
 
 1.  R.I. Dept. of Corrs. v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 115 A.3d 924, 926 
(R.I. 2015). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id. 
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smoked marijuana, Officer Maddalena did not participate.4  The 
Rhode Island State Police investigated the matter and questioned 
Officer Maddalena regarding the marijuana incident and 
ultimately discovered that Officer Maddalena had not been 
truthful during his interview.5  As punishment, Officer 
Maddalena was placed on administrative leave with pay and a 
pre-disciplinary hearing was scheduled for April 8, 2009.6  
Director Ashbel T. Wall, II (“Director Wall”) subsequently notified 
Officer Maddalena that he was being terminated for his conduct, 
and the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers 
(“RIBCO”) filed a grievance on Officer Maddalena’s behalf, 
arguing that Officer Maddalena’s termination was without just 
cause.7 
On July 26, 2010, the matter proceeded to arbitration where 
the arbitrator was to determine whether Officer Maddalena was 
terminated with just cause; if it was determined that Officer 
Maddalena’s termination was not with just cause, then the 
arbitrator would dictate the appropriate remedy.8  RIBCO 
submitted documents as evidence, detailing the DOC’s past 
disciplinary action vis-à-vis dishonesty, which did not result in 
termination.9  Inspector Aldrich and State Police Sargent 
Benjamin Barney (“Sargent Barney”) testified on behalf of the 
DOC, outlining the imperativeness of safety and security in 
perimeter posts and the need for confidence in DOC officers.10  
 
 4.  Id.   
 5.  Id.  Officer Maddalena initially told police that he was present with 
Officer Davenport inside the vehicle, but denied seeing him smoke 
marijuana.  It was not until Inspector Aldrich informed Officer Maddalena 
that a witness reported seeing the two officers together while Officer 
Davenport smoked marijuana that Officer Maddalena confessed to 
witnessing Officer Davenport smoking marijuana while on duty.  Id.   
 6.  Id.  Officer Maddalena was charged with failure to report a fellow 
correctional officer smoking marijuana on duty, dishonesty during an 
interview with State Police, and dishonesty during an interview with the 
DOC’s Office of Inspections.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 926–27. 
 8.  Id. at 927. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  Additionally, Inspector Aldrich and Sargent Barney focused on 
the fact that officers receive training on reporting threats to institutional 
security and on site criminal activity and the need for trust and reliability in 
its employed officers to avoid any lapse in security, which could yield deadly 
consequences.  Id. 
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Despite noting that the DOC’s evidence and testimony were 
“compelling and convincing,” the arbitrator found that 
terminating Officer Maddalena would not be consistent with past 
disciplinary measures for the DOC in dishonesty cases and found 
there was no just cause for Officer Maddalena’s termination.11  
The arbitrator instead held that a sixty-day suspension without 
pay, making Officer Maddalena whole for lost wages and benefits 
less the sixty-day suspension, was more appropriate.12 
On November 19, 2010, the DOC filed a petition in Superior 
Court, seeking to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds 
that the arbitrator exceeded his power, while RIBCO contended 
that the dispute was arbitrable based upon the evidence presented 
as well as relevant law.13  The Superior Court justice determined 
that the dispute was indeed arbitrable pursuant to R.I. Gen. Law 
Section 42-56-10(24) and found that the arbitrator reached an 
irrational result as he disregarded the CBA.14  RIBCO filed a 
timely appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, seeking to have 
the Superior Court justice’s holding overturned and the 
arbitration award reinstated.15 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
At the very outset of the case, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court sought to reiterate the standard of review for arbitration 
awards.16  In doing so, the court was swift and precise in 
reminding the parties that there is a strong public policy in favor 
of an arbitration award’s finality,17 which will only be disturbed 
for “disregard [to] a contractual provision, a completely irrational 
result, a decision that is contrary to public policy, or any award 
 
 11.  Id.  The arbitrator relied on one instance submitted by RIBCO, 
which purported an instance where an officer lied twice concerning 
knowledge he had of a fellow officer’s participation in criminal activity, which 
did not result in termination.  Id.   
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  The DOC believed that R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-10, which 
enumerates the Director of the DOC’s power, including the ability to 
discharge employees, meant that the issue of Officer Maddalena’s 
termination was not arbitrable.  Id. at 927–28. 
 14.  Id. at 928. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. (citing Berkshire Wilton Partners, LLC v. Bilray Demolition Co. 
91 A.3d 830, 834 (R.I. 2014)). 
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that determined a matter that was not arbitrable in the first 
place.”18 
Before immediately jumping into the merits of the case, the 
court addressed the issue of arbitrability, determining that the 
issue was properly before them,19 and—on de novo review—that 
the issue of Officer Maddalena’s termination was substantively 
arbitrable because of the language contained in Article XVI, 
Section 16.4 of the CBA.20 
The court then delved into the arbitration award itself and 
properly recognized the two issues that the arbitrator was to 
determine: whether just cause existed to terminate Officer 
Maddalena, and if not, what the appropriate remedy would be.21  
The court ultimately concluded that the Superior Court justice 
overturning the arbitration award was valid for two reasons: first, 
the arbitrator impermissibly substituted his own remedy for that 
of the DOC’s, and second, the arbitrator failed to base his decision 
on any relevant provision of the CBA.22  In reaching its holding, 
the court noted that the arbitrator, by finding RIBCO’s evidence of 
past DOC disciplinary action limited in terms of usefulness and by 
finding Director Wall’s testimony “compelling,” regarding the need 
to take action to ensure safety and security, substituted his own 
remedy for the DOC’s.23  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the 
arbitrator blatantly ignored his duty to base his decision on any 
relevant portion of the CBA, specifically noting that the arbitrator 
did not turn to Section 4.1 (“Management Rights”), which gives 
the DOC power to “suspend, demote, [and] discharge .  .  .  such 
employees.”24  Lastly, to support its finding, the court cited to R.I. 
Gen. Law Section 28-9-18(a)(2), which states that an arbitrator’s 
award can be overturned where the arbitrator exceeded his power 
 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. at 928-29.  Here, the DOC properly raised the issue of 
arbitrability in its memorandum to the Superior Court and argued the issue 
before the Supreme Court at oral arguments.  Id. at 929. 
 20.  Id. at 930.  Article XVI, Section 16.4 allowed for arbitration if RIBCO 
or the employee notified the DOC of the request for arbitration.  Id.  The 
court also declined to find the DOC’s argument that R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-
10(2), which states the DOC is responsible for maintaining safety and 
security of all correctional facilities, overrode the CBA provision.  Id.   
 21.  Id.   
 22.  Id. at 931.   
 23.  Id. at 930–31.   
 24.  Id. at 931.  
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if “[a] definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made.”25 
As an ancillary argument, both RIBCO and the DOC 
contended that R.I. Gen. Law Section 42-56-10(24)26 was 
unconstitutional; RIBCO contended that the director’s authority 
vis-à-vis security is reviewable by an arbitrator, and the DOC 
countered that RIBCO essentially purported to classify all 
arbitration awards as unreviewable by the judiciary, thus making 
the amendment in violation of the separation of powers.27  
However, the court was able to avoid answering the 
constitutionality question28 and affirmed the Superior Court’s 
decision to vacate the arbitration award.29 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court definitively reiterated the 
statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award—where the 
arbitrator fails to base his decision on a relevant portion of a 
CBA—and the duties of the arbitrator in this labor dispute—
whether the DOC had just cause to terminate Officer Maddalena 
and, if not, what an appropriate remedy would be.30  Although the 
court laid the proper foundation for determining this case, it 
nevertheless appears to have departed from that very 
foundational basis.  In this instance, it would seem that the court 
substituted its own authority for that of the arbitrator’s, 
admonishing the arbitrator for looking outside of the CBA.  This, 
 
 25.  R.I. GEN. LAWS §28-9-18 (1956); id.   
 26.  RIBCO, 115 A.3d at 932.  The court explained:  
Notwithstanding the enumeration of the powers of the director as set 
forth in this section and notwithstanding any other provisions of the 
general laws, the validity and enforceability of the provisions of a 
collective bargaining agreement shall not be contested, affected, or 
diminished, nor shall any arbitration be vacated, remanded or set 
aside on the basis of an alleged conflict with this section or with any 
other provision of the general laws.   
Id. at 932-33.   
 27.  Id. at 933. 
 28.  The Supreme Court held that because it ruled the arbitration award 
was irrational, it need not venture into the constitutionality of §42-56-10(24).  
Id.  
 29.  Id. at 934.  
 30.  Id. at 930–31.   
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however, is exactly what an arbitrator is supposed to do.31  
Indeed, the majority seems to contradict itself; it argues that the 
arbitrator substituted his own judgment for that of the DOC’s by 
ignoring the DOC’s “compelling” evidence; shortly thereafter, the 
majority reasons the entire award is irrational because the 
arbitrator’s decision was not based on a relevant portion of the 
CBA.32  There is both substantive and logical error with this 
finding.  As the dissent points out, the arbitrator’s finding that the 
DOC offered “compelling” evidence was in regards to the need for 
disciplinary action to be taken, not the fact that the DOC had just 
cause to terminate Officer Maddalena, as that was the exact issue 
to be determined.33  If, however, the majority’s interpretation in 
applying “compelling” evidence to the issue of whether there was 
just cause for Officer Maddalena’s termination is correct, it would 
seem that the court is vacating the arbitrator’s award simply for 
his classification on a piece of evidence’s strength. 
Additionally, the majority overlooks the fact that the 
arbitrator did indeed look through the CBA in searching for a 
relevant provision that spelled out offenses and corresponding 
penalties.34  Not finding one, the arbitrator proceeded to look 
outside the four corners of the CBA, weighing the relevant 
evidence presented to him and ruling that just cause did not exist 
to terminate Officer Maddalena, but rather that a sixty-day 
suspension was more appropriate.35  The majority improperly and 
narrowly construed the Management Rights Section of the CBA; 
the exclusivity given to the DOC within that section implies that 
no other entity is responsible to enforce the rights enumerated 
within Section 4.1A, not that the DOC is granted the power to 
make unreviewable determinations.  If we follow the majority’s 
rationale, we are left with the scenario where almost no employee 
termination will be without just cause because Section 4.1A of the 
CBA grants the DOC exclusivity in terminating employees.  Put in 
other words, the majority believes that Section 4.1A automatically 
 
 31.  Id. at 934–35 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (citing United Steel Workers 
of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) 
(explaining that arbitrators may indeed look outside the CBA for guidance in 
determining an award)).   
 32.  Id. at 930-31 (majority opinion).   
 33.  Id. at 935 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).   
 34.  Id. at 934. 
 35.  Id. at 927 (majority opinion).   
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grants just cause, eliminating the need for the arbitrator to look 
elsewhere within or even outside the CBA and completely 
removing the ability for him to formulate another appropriate 
remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held, vis-a-vis union 
members, that an arbitrator exceeds his or her authority when he 
or she does not base an award on a relevant provision within the 
CBA and looks outside the CBA’s four corners.  Furthermore, the 
Court held that when an arbitrator does find just cause for the 
State to take disciplinary action, he or she has no authority to 
craft an alternative remedy; the finding of just cause is 
inextricably tied to the proposed disciplinary action taken by the 
State. 
Trevor T. Bernard 
 





Professional Responsibility.  In re Keven A. McKenna, 110 
A.3d 1126 (R.I. 2015).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over attorney conduct that occurs outside Supreme 
Court proceedings, including attorney conduct in federal courts.  
Additionally, the procedures utilized by the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court—promulgating and enforcing Rules of Professional 
Conduct, appointing persons to a disciplinary board, and 
ultimately determining how to sanction attorneys—do not result 
in a merger of investigatory and prosecutorial functions so as to 
deny an attorney due process. 
 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In May 2009, attorney Keven McKenna was practicing law 
under the duly licensed entity “Keven A. McKenna, P.C.” (“the 
PC”) when an employee of the PC, Sumner Stone, filed a claim for 
worker’s compensation alleging work-related injuries.1  The PC 
was unable to provide proof that it carried workers’ compensation 
insurance as required by statute and a pretrial order was entered 
ordering McKenna to make weekly compensation payments to 
Stone.2  McKenna did not pay Stone and repeatedly reiterated the 
same arguments to the court, as to why he should not have to 
make payment, despite the court’s denial of all of McKenna’s 
motions.3  The Chief Judge observed that McKenna was “simply 
using the procedures of this court to delay and harass.”4  Thus, the 
court dismissed McKenna’s claim for a trial and the pretrial order 
to pay Stone became the court’s final order.5  The Workers’ 
 
 1.  In re Keven A. McKenna, 110 A.3d 1126, 1131 (R.I. 2015).  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  McKenna refused to make payment on the ground that the order 
violated his due process rights.  Id.  He further argued that the Chief Judge 
of the Workers’ Compensation Court should recuse himself. Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY_MORAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2016  7:16 PM 
2016] SURVEY SECTION 775 
Compensation Court records contain numerous examples of 
McKenna showing contempt for the court proceedings, including a 
statement that McKenna would “drag this on forever”6 and, after 
being asked a question from the judge, McKenna responded “I’m 
not going to answer that question.  You’re not the prosecutor, Your 
Honor.”7  In December 2009, the Worker’s Compensation Court 
entered an order finding McKenna in contempt for his refusal to 
make payments to Stone as required by the pretrial order.8 
McKenna appealed this decision and his appeal was 
repeatedly denied.9  McKenna ultimately filed a motion with the 
Worker’s Compensation Court claiming an inability to meet the 
payment obligations “due to circumstances beyond his control, 
including but limited [sic] to a priority U.S. I.R.S. [sic] [levy] of 
[$]171,000 upon his bank account.”10  On January 25, 2010, one 
day before a hearing on this motion, McKenna filed a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition on behalf of the PC.11  He argued that this 
automatically stayed the worker’s compensation action against 
him.12  The Workers’ Compensation Court then asked for 
arguments that same afternoon regarding whether the 
bankruptcy applied to McKenna personally.  During a break in the 
proceedings, McKenna filed for bankruptcy personally.13 
Subsequent to the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee for 
the PC, McKenna applied to the Rhode Island Supreme Court for 
a license to practice law as a limited liability company as “The 
Law Offices of Keven A. McKenna, LLC.”14  The court denied 
McKenna’s request until he could satisfy the court that the PC 
would no longer engage in the practice of law.15  Despite the 
court’s order, McKenna continued to use a bank account in the 
name “Law Offices of Keven A. McKenna, LLC,” to cash checks for 
 
 6.  Id. at 1132. 
 7.  Other examples include McKenna’s statement to the judge that 
“[Stone is] making a mockery of this court, Your Honor, because of your 
dislike for me,” and “[t]his is a rump court proceeding.” Id.  
 8.  Id. at 1132–33. 
 9.  Id. at 1133.  
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
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expenses related to the practice of law.16  These actions formed 
the basis for count one, alleging McKenna’s violation of Rules 3.3, 
7.1, 7.5, and 8.4(c)17 by engaging in the unauthorized practice of 
law in violation of the court’s order.18 
The second count—alleging violations of Rules 3.3 and 8.4(c) 
for failure to disclose his income to the Bankruptcy Court, 
misrepresenting his interest in a receivable to that court, and 
engaging in conduct that amounted to dishonesty to the 
bankruptcy trustee—was based on McKenna’s failure to disclose 
the existence of a receivable for legal fees, totaling $63,000, on his 
initial corporate bankruptcy filing.19  On June 7, 2011, McKenna 
appeared in Probate Court in Bristol and asserted a lien for 
attorney’s fees in the amount of $93,000 against real property 
owned by his client’s estate.20  Although McKenna informed the 
bankruptcy court that the receivable was largely uncollectable, he 
did not disclose that there was real property that could potentially 
be used to satisfy the debt.21 
On August 4, 2011, the bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint 
objecting to discharge.22  In his answer, McKenna neither 
admitted nor denied many of the allegations, including those that 
were clearly within his knowledge.23  McKenna’s actions in 
Bankruptcy Court and his actions during the Workers’ 
Compensation Court proceedings formed the basis of count four, 
alleging violations of Rules 3.3 and 3.5(d) by demonstrating a lack 
of candor and an attempt to disrupt the proceedings.24 
Finally, on September 12, 2011, the Assistant Disciplinary 
Counsel, who was charged with bringing charges against 
McKenna for violations of the rules of professional conduct, issued 
a subpoena to McKenna directing him to produce certain records 
and to testify about them.25  While McKenna appeared at the 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See Article V, Rules 3.3, 7.1, 7.5, 8.4(c) of the Supreme Court Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  
 18.  McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1133–34. 
 19.  Id. at 1134. 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 1134–35. 
 25.  Id. at 1135.  
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deposition, he failed to produce the records and challenged the 
authority of the Assistant Disciplinary Counsel to issue the 
subpoena.26  McKenna’s failure to comply with the subpoena was 
the basis for count three, alleging a violation of Rule 1.19, which 
requires that attorneys keep financial records pertaining to the 
practice of law.27 
The Disciplinary Board, consisting of a three-member panel, 
conducted a series of eight hearings.28  During these hearings, 
both the Assistant Disciplinary Counsel and McKenna examined 
witnesses and entered exhibits into evidence.29  With regard to 
the first count, McKenna argued that he changed the name of his 
LLC to “McKenna Support Services LLC” and that the use of the 
account and checks bearing the name of the former LLC did not 
constitute the practice of law.30  Further, with respect to count 
two, McKenna argued that he had made no false statements on 
his bankruptcy filings and that he valued the Wells receivable at 
$63,000 because “[n]ot all of the estate[‘s] billing had been posted” 
and the unbilled time increased to $93,000.31  Next, McKenna 
denied the charges under count three by arguing that he had 
brought the records to the deposition but he only made them 
available for inspection, not for copying.32  Finally, as to count 
four, McKenna argued that his actions in Workers’ Compensation 
Court and Bankruptcy Court are outside the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction.33  He further represented that there was no evidence 
that he had engaged in conduct intended to disrupt any tribunal.34 
 ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Under Article III, Rule 6(d) of the Supreme Court Rules of 
Disciplinary Procedure for Attorneys35, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court reviewed the record submitted by the disciplinary board to 
 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 1135–36. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure for 
Attorneys, Article III, Rule 6(d). 
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determine whether McKenna should be disciplined for his 
conduct.36  While McKenna alleged many constitutional claims in 
his correspondence with the court, the claims were essentially two 
issues: first, he challenged the authority of the Supreme Court to 
regulate attorneys; and second, he argued that the proceedings 
before the board and the court had violated his procedural due 
process rights.37 
The court first addressed McKenna’s claim that the court’s 
authority was limited to appellate jurisdiction over statutory 
courts and/or that the judiciary’s inherent power was limited to 
adjudicating cases and controversies.38  The court rejected 
McKenna’s argument saying that the General Assembly had 
affirmed the court’s power to license attorneys and admit them to 
practice under section 2, chapter 322, G.L.1923, which said that 
“[t]he [S]upreme [C]ourt . . . shall by general or special rules 
regulate the admission of attorneys to practice in all the courts of 
the state.”39  Additionally, in In the Matter of Almeida, the court 
held that it  had “the authority to exercise necessary means to 
regulate and control the practice of law by promulgating and 
enforcing rules to discipline attorneys.”40 
McKenna further argued that the court did not have 
jurisdiction over attorney conduct outside of the Supreme Court’s 
proceedings.  Specifically, McKenna claimed that the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution41 prevented the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court from exercising authority over attorney 
conduct in federal courts.42  The court found no merit in either of 
these claims stating that these assertions would not only render 
much of the professional rules of conduct useless, but it also flew 
in the fact of the well-established notion that the “power  inherent 
in this [C]ourt to control and supervise the practice of law 
generally, [applied] whether in or out of the Court.”43  The court 
 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 1137.  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 1137–38.  This statute is now codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956  
§ 8-1-2. 
 40.  Id. at 1138 (quoting In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375, 1381 (R.I 1992)).  
 41.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 42.   McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1140–41. 
 43.  Id. at 1140 (quoting Rhode Island Bar Ass’n. v. Automobile Service 
Ass’n, 179 A. 139, 142 (R.I.  1935)).   
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also cited how rarely, if ever, attorneys come before the Supreme 
Court explaining that this would “utterly prevent this Court from 
protecting the public from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible 
representation.”44  Finally, the court dismissed McKenna’s 
supremacy clause argument by stating that the supremacy clause 
was only relevant when “there [was] impermissible state 
interference with federal law.”45  The court explained that there is 
no such implication here because “state and federal courts have 
consistently been in harmony as to the proper ethical conduct of 
attorneys practicing in their respective courts.”46  As an example, 
the court pointed to the United States District Court for the 
District of Rhode Island, which had adopted the Supreme Court 
Rules of Professional Conduct.47 
The court next considered McKenna’s claim that his 
procedural due process right to “present evidence and argue law” 
and to be heard by the full board were violated.48  McKenna 
argued that because the court promulgates and enforces the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, appoints persons to the board, hires 
disciplinary counsel, and ultimately determines whether and how 
to discipline an attorney for misconduct, this amounted to a 
merger of investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory functions 
so as to deny him procedural due process.49  The court used the 
Mathews test’s three factors to determine whether a procedure 
violated due process.50  The three factors were: “the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action”; “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards”; and “the Government’s interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal administrative burdens that 
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
 
 44.   McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1140.  
 45.  Id. at 1141 (quoting In re Petition of Almond, 603 A.2d 1087, 1090 
(R.I. 1992)).   
 46.  Id. at 1141.  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 1142.  
 49.  Id. at 1142.  
 50.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that an 
evidentiary hearing was not required prior to termination of disability 
benefits, and that administrative procedures in place during the case fully 
comported with due process).   
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entail.”51 
The court considered each of the Mathews factors and found 
that under the first factor, it was undisputed that McKenna’s 
license to practice law was “a property interest sufficient to invoke 
due process protections.”52  The third factor, which was conceded 
by McKenna, is met because the state clearly had an interest in 
regulating attorneys.53  With respect to the second factor, 
McKenna argued that he was not able to present evidence and 
argue law and was denied a full hearing by the board.54  The court 
disagreed, explaining that “it [was] indisputable that [McKenna] 
was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”55  The court 
went on to state “the mere existence of a combination of 
‘investigatory, inquisitorial, and adjudicative roles in a single 
administrative body’ d[id] not amount to a denial of due process or 
signify that the agency’s structure or operations is subject to 
constitutional attack.”56 
The court then addressed McKenna’s motion to have members 
of the Rhode Island Supreme Court recuse themselves on 
allegations of bias against him.57  McKenna asserted three bases 
for this allegation: first, he claimed that Assistant Disciplinary 
Counsel was appointed by the court; second, that the chair of the 
board that heard McKenna’s case applied to the Chief Justice to 
be appointed a magistrate during the disciplinary proceeding; and 
third, that the members of the court were friendly with a retired 
Chief Justice who McKenna claims is biased against him.58  The 
court rejected McKenna’s argument stating that McKenna “ha[d] 
failed to provide any facts that would demonstrate either bias or 
the appearance of bias.”59  The court noted that a party that raises 
this claim must overcome a “presumption of honesty and integrity 
in those serving as adjudicators”60 and that while judges are 
 
 51.  McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1142 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
 52.  McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1143.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 1143 (quoting In re Commission on Judicial Tenure and 
Discipline, 916 A.2d 746, 750 (R.I. 2007)). 
 57.  Id. at 1145. 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 1146. 
 60.  Id. at 1145 (quoting La Petite Auberge, Inc., 419 A.2d at 284). 
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required to recuse themselves under certain circumstances, they 
“have an equally great obligation not to disqualify themselves 
when there is no sounds reason to do so.”61 
Lastly, the court dismissed McKenna’s motion to stay the 
proceedings pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-33-2, known as the anti-
SLAPP statute, as there were no merits for this claim.62  
McKenna argued that the purpose of the disciplinary proceedings 
against him was to “chill the free speech rights of Keven A. 
McKenna as an attorney by having his [sic] suspended from the 
practice of law.”63  The court noted that the “purpose and 
application of the anti-SLAPP statute are wholly inapplicable to 
attorney disciplinary proceedings.”64 
The court then turned to the disciplinary board’s findings and 
McKenna’s sanction, and pointed out a unique characteristic to 
this particular litigation: that a client never brought these 
allegations forward and there was no allegation that McKenna 
improperly accessed any client funds.65  However, the court 
explained that “[t]he duty of candor. . .is the foundation of a 
lawyer’s profession.”66  This duty is not limited to Rule 3.3, rather 
there is a general duty of candor to the court that is broader than 
the rule.67  Here, the integrity of the judicial system was not 
served when an attorney who had been sworn to tell the truth, 
refused to answer simple questions or when an attorney 
disregarded orders of the Supreme Court or deliberately 
misrepresented his assets to a bankruptcy trustee.68  As such, the 
court found that the board’s findings were appropriate that 
McKenna violated Rules 1.19, 3.3, 7.1, 7.5, and 8.4(c).69  Finally, 
the court stated that it was satisfied with the board’s 
recommendation that McKenna receive a one-year suspension 
from the practice of law.70  The court noted that “the purposes of 
 
 61.   McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1145 (quoting State v. Mlyniec, 15 A.3d 983, 
999 (R.I. 2011)). 
 62.   McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1147.  
 63.  Id. at 1146.  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. at 1147.  
 66.  Id. at 1148.  
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 1148.  
 69.  Id. at 1149.  
 70.  Id. at 1150.  
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discipline are not punishment of the attorney but protecting the 
public and maintaining the integrity of the profession” and that 
this sanction appropriately served the dual purpose of professional 
discipline.71 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court detailed the reasoning 
behind its authority to regulate attorney conduct regardless of 
whether the conduct occurs within its courtroom or not, ultimately 
concluding that “it is undeniable that this Court may investigate 
and discipline attorney conduct regardless of where that conduct 
takes place.”72  The court explained that confining its authority to 
discipline attorney conduct to instances where attorneys appear 
before the court would effectively “prevent this Court from 
protecting the public from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible 
representation”73 due to the infrequency in which attorneys 
actually appear before the court, if at all.  Additionally, the court 
traced the history of its authority to discipline attorneys 
concluding that the regulation of attorneys is an “inherent judicial 
function.”74 
Moreover, the court explained that while no client brought 
this action and there was no allegation that McKenna improperly 
accessed any client funds, it was the responsibility of the court to 
“give full force and effect to all of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”75  The court noted the importance of demanding a high 
level of ethics and professionalism from members of the bar 
because “[w]e cannot maintain the integrity of the profession if we 
ignore persistent, intentional, and repeated violations of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct.”76  The court sought to balance this duty 
to uphold the integrity of the profession and the protection of the 
public with Chief Justice Marshall’s observation that, “the 
profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual, 
and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise.  
The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously 
 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id. at 1141.  
 73.  Id. at 1140.  
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. at 1147.  
 76.  Id.  
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taken from him.”77 
However, as Justice Goldberg explains in her dissent “the 
sanction adopted by the majority is inadequate and fails to 
respond to the egregious nature and sheer number of material 
misrepresentations made by the respondent and, importantly, also 
ignores the respondent’s conduct before the board.”78 While the 
court detailed the numerous violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, it adopted the board’s recommendation that McKenna be 
suspended for one-year, despite the Assistant Disciplinary 
Counsel’s recommendation that McKenna be disbarred.79  The 
majority offers little explanation for rejecting the Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel’s recommendation other than that they 
“customarily give great weight to the recommendation of the 
board.”80  But as Justice Goldberg notes the court has not always 
chosen to adopt the recommendation of the board.81  Further, 
Justice Goldberg points out that the sanction adopted by the 
majority appears inadequate especially when compared to 
discipline imposed on other attorneys for a single violation of the 
rules.82  Thus, while the majority details the importance of 
judicial regulation of attorneys, it undercuts this by imposing a 
sanction that seems inadequate, at least when compared with 
similar sanctions imposed for far less.83 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the court has 
jurisdiction over attorney conduct that occurs outside the Supreme 
Court’s proceedings.  Further, the court determined that the 
promulgation and enforcement of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the appointment of persons to a disciplinary board, and 
the determination on how to sanction attorneys did not result in a 
merger of investigatory and prosecutorial functions so as to deny 
 
 77.  Id. at 1149.  
 78.  Id. at 1151.  
 79.  Id. at 1157. 
 80.  Id. at 1150 (quoting In re Cozzolino, 811 A.2d 638, 641 (R.I. 2002)).  
 81.  See In re Schiff, 677 A.2d 422, 424-25 (R.I. 1996); Lisi v. Resmini, 
603 A.2d 321, 324 (R.I. 1992). 
 82.  McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1157.  
 83.  See, e.g., Schiff, 677 A.2d at 425; Lisi, 603 A.2d at 324.   
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an attorney due process. 
Christopher M. Moran 
 





Professional Responsibility.  FIA Card Services, N.A. v. 
Pichette, 116 A. 3d. 770 (R.I. 2015).1  Any attorney who prepares 
pleadings, motions, or other written submissions on behalf of a pro 
se client appearing in court2 is not in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or the Superior Court Rules of Civil 
Procedure, so long as she signs the prepared documents and 
discloses to the court her identity as well as the nature and extent 
of the assistance provided.3  The attorney must obtain informed 
consent, in writing, setting out the nature and extent of the legal 
representation she is undertaking and may note on the prepared 
documents that the signature does not constitute an entry of 
appearance.4 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In three separate, unrelated cases, the Superior Court, 
Providence County, sanctioned two attorneys for drafting 
pleadings, motions, and legal memoranda without signing their 
names or entering their appearances to the Court, on behalf of 
three separate and unrelated pro se litigants who were in court 
regarding debt collection actions. The sanctions were imposed 
under Rule 11 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil 
Procedure5 and under Article V, Rule 1.2(c) of the Rhode Island 
 
 1.  This case addresses the facts from three separate cases: FIA Card 
Servs., N.A. v. Pichette, 116 A.3d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 12-272A); HSBC Bank 
Nevada, N.A., v. Cournoyer, 116 A.3d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2013–156A); 
Discover Bank v. O’Brien-Auty, 116 A. 3d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2013-157A). 
 2.  This practice is colloquially referred to as “ghostwriting.”  Pichette, 
116 A.3d at 771. 
 3.  Id. at 784. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  R.I. SUPER. R. CIV. P. 11. Rule 11 states in relevant part:  
[E]very pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be personally signed by at least one 
attorney of record . . . The signature of an attorney . . . or party 
constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper . . . and that the pleading, motion, 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY_BERLING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/16  5:22 PM 
786 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:785 
Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct.6 
In the titular action, FIA Card Services initiated a credit card 
debt collection action against James D. Pichette in May 2011.7  In 
response to the action, Mr. Pichette consulted with the debt 
consolidation company, Morgan Drexen, which referred him to 
attorney Charles M. Vacca, Jr.8  In the first hearing, FIA’s counsel 
informed the hearing justice that Mr. Pichette’s pleadings had 
been drafted, but not signed, by an attorney licensed in Rhode 
Island.9  Mr. Pichette acknowledged that his documents were 
prepared by an attorney and admitted that he had not understood 
the affirmative defenses pled in his answer, the basis or substance 
of the counterclaims alleged, or the content of the objection to the 
motion to dismiss.10  Mr. Pichette further stated that he had 
declined Mr. Vacca’s full representation when he entered into a 
limited-scope representation agreement.11 
The hearing justice issued a notice to Mr. Vacca to appear 
before the court in order to determine three things: (1) the extent 
of Mr. Vacca’s representation of Mr. Pichette, (2) whether Mr. 
Vacca’s actions in drafting these documents violated either Rhode 
Island law or the Rules of Professional Conduct, and (3) whether 
Mr. Vacca’s actions warranted sanctions pursuant to any 
violations.12 At his hearing, Mr. Vacca reiterated that Mr. 
Pichette had declined full representation and had opted for a 
 
or other paper is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost 
of litigation. . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court . . . may impose upon the person who 
signed the pleading, motion, or other paper, a represented party, or 
both, any appropriate sanction.  
 6.  R.I. SUP. CT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(C).  This rule provides, in 
relevant part: “[a] lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the 
limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives 
informed consent.”  
 7.  FIA Card Services, N.A. v. Pichette, 116 A.3d 770, 772 (R.I. 2015). 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id.  Among the documents Mr. Vacca prepared for Mr. Pichette were: 
an answer, including affirmative defenses; a two-count counterclaim to FIA’s 
complaint; an objection to FIA’s motion to dismiss; and a memorandum in 
support of the objection to the motion to dismiss.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id.  
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limited-representation agreement.13  Mr. Vacca argued that his 
representation was reasonably limited in scope and thus 
permissible pursuant to Rule 1.2 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.14  Ultimately, the hearing justice found that Mr. Vacca 
had provided partial and inadequate representation in violation of 
Rule 1.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and was therefore 
subject to sanctions.15 
The facts of the second and third actions are parallel and 
concurrent, but with different parties and attorneys.16  In each 
case, a bank initiated a debt collection action against a pro se 
litigant and moved for summary judgment.  The pro se defendants 
in these actions contracted with the debt-consolidation firm, 
Morgan Drexen, which provided each defendant with an attorney 
to draft, but not sign, the necessary court documents.17  Both 
defendants represented to the court that they did not fully 
understand the documents they had filed and that they believed 
the attorneys who drafted the documents were, in fact, 
representing them in their respective actions before the court.18  
The hearing justice telephoned each attorneys during the initial 
hearing and ordered the attorneys to appear at a hearing on June 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  R.I. SUP. CT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(C); Pichette, 116 A.3d at 773. 
 15.  Pichette, 116 A.3d at 772–73 (reasoning that Mr. Vacca had “clearly 
provided only partial and inadequate representation”). 
 16.  The two actions are referred to in the opinion as “the HSBC Action” 
and “the Discover Bank Action.”  In the HSBC action, the pro se defendant 
was Robert L. Cournoyer and the attorney drafting his documents was 
Wendy Taylor Humphrey. Id. at 773. In the Discover Bank Action, the pro se 
defendant was Diana L. O’Brien-Auty and the attorney drafting her 
documents was Michael Swain. Id. at 775.  One notable distinction between 
the two cases is that, in the Discover Bank Action, the filings included a 
written disclosure stating: “[t]his document was prepared by, or with the 
assistance of, an attorney licensed in RI and employed by Consumer Law 
Associates, LLC.”  Id. at 774–75. The hearing justice did not find the written 
disclosure to be a distinguishing factor.  Id. at 775.   
 17.  Id. at 773, 775.  Each defendant filed an answer, an objection to the 
motion for summary judgment, and a memorandum in support of that 
objection.  Id. 
 18.  In the HSBC action, “Cournoyer also testified that he had not yet 
met [his attorney] Taylor Humphrey and thought she was going to be in court 
for the hearing that day to represent him.”  Id. at 773.  In the Discover Bank 
action, “O’Brien–Auty testified that she had been paying a monthly fee . . . 
and that she had never met Swain in person—had only spoken to him on the 
telephone—but believed that he was her attorney.”  Id. at 775.  
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6, 2011.19 
At the June 6 hearing, both attorneys testified that they had 
prepared, but not signed, the court filings pursuant to limited-
scope representation agreements, which were offered as 
“unbundled legal services.”20  The hearing justice issued a show-
cause order demanding each attorney show why their conduct 
should not result in Rule 11 sanctions for misrepresentation to the 
tribunal.21  Ultimately, the hearing justice found that both 
attorneys had ghostwritten pleadings and that this conduct was 
unethical and in violation of Rule 11.22 
The hearing justice issued a written decision on January 17, 
2013.23 In that decision, the hearing justice found the following: 
an attorney-client relationship existed as a matter of fact and law 
between each of the three pro se defendants and their respective 
attorney.  Furthermore, each attorney’s conduct violated Rule 8.4 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the attorneys’ failures to 
disclose their identities to the court was a violation of the Superior 
Court Rules of Civil Procedure.  Finally, the hearing justice found 
that Rule 1.2(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct did not 
preclude a finding of a Rule 11 violation.24 
Upon de novo review of the three cases, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court reversed the hearing justice’s sanctions as a 
matter of law, finding that Rule 11 did not apply to the drafting 
assistance provided by these three non-signatory counsel and, 
therefore, there was no Rule 11 violation on which to base the 
sanctions.25 
 
 19.  Id. at 773, 775. Both HSBC’s motion for summary judgment and 
Discover Bank’s motion for summary judgment were heard on the same day 
by the same hearing justice.  Id. at 775. 
 20.  Id. at 775, 781. 
 21.  Id. at 775. 
 22.  Id.  The hearing justice also imposed a $750 sanction on each 
attorney. Id. at 773–75.  With respect to Mr. Swain and the Discover Bank 
Action, the Supreme Court quashed the initial imposition of the sanction on 
the grounds that Mr. Swain had not been provided with an adequate notice 
and opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of the sanction at the 
June 6 hearing.  Id. at 775. 
 23.  Pichette, 116 A.3d at 774. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 781. 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Despite that trial justices typically receive wide latitude to 
formulate what they consider to be appropriate sanctions, the 
Supreme Court engaged in de novo review of these cases because 
it found that the sanctions at issue were “imposed based on an 
erroneous view of the law.”26  The court’s ultimate holding – that 
ghostwriting was not a Rule 11 violation – reversed the hearing 
justice’s conclusion that the attorneys violated the “clear intent of 
Rule 11” and breached their ethical duties of candor and honesty 
toward the tribunal when they failed to sign documents they 
drafted for pro se clients.27  The Supreme Court found this was a 
flawed application of Rule 11.28 
In answering the “threshold question”29 of whether an 
attorney who drafts court documents for a pro se litigant without 
disclosing his identity to the court has violated Rule 11, the court 
considered three factors:30 (1) the plain language of Rule 11; (2) 
the proper interpretation of Ellis v. State of Maine31, one of the 
grounds upon which the hearing justice imposed sanctions; and (3) 
the spirit or intent behind Rule 11.32 
The court found that the plain language of Rule 11 did not 
address the ‘author’ or ‘drafter’ of documents and only held the 
“attorney of record” accountable.33  Since all of the cases were 
brought by pro se defendants, none of the cases had an “attorney 
of record.”34  Thus, the plain language of Rule 11 could not apply 
to these attorneys, regardless of their influence on the defendants’ 
 
 26.  Id. at 776, 781. 
 27.  Id. at 779. 
 28.  Id. at 781. 
 29.  Id. at 778. 
 30.  Id. at 778–781. 
 31.  In Ellis, the First Circuit addressed the practical concerns 
underlying ghostwriting and found that an attorney who failed to sign a 
document could “escape the [Rule 11] obligation imposed on members of the 
bar.”  Id. at 779.  The fact that an attorney could shirk her Rule 11 
obligations and consequences simply by withholding her signature from a 
court document suggests that the attorney’s signature was vital to the 
application of Rule 11 and, consequently, to the imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions.  Id. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 781. 
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pleadings.35 
Contrary to the hearing justice’s interpretation, the court 
found that Ellis explicitly excepted non-signatory attorneys from 
Rule 11 sanctions.36  Additionally, the court noted that the First 
Circuit had never imposed Rule 11 sanctions on an attorney who 
had failed to sign documents, and so there was no precedent for 
the sanctions.37  As such, it was consistent with the circuit’s 
jurisprudence to reverse the hearing justice’s imposition of 
sanctions.38 
The court declined to apply Rule 11 as the enforcement arm of 
the rules of ethics, finding that Rule 11 was written in light of a 
binary system in which there was either full representation or no 
representation and that this system was at odds with “the reality 
of today’s legal practice.”39  The court suggested that it was self-
defeating to read Rule 11 in such a way that it punished conduct 
permitted by Rule 1.2(c).40  Instead, it distinguished between 
conduct that violated Rule 11 and conduct that offended the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, concluding that ghostwriting did not 
necessarily violate either.41 
 
 35.  Id. at 779. 
 36.  Id. at 779.  The court noted, “[w]e view the First Circuit’s 
acknowledgement that ghostwriting attorneys evade Rule 11 as support for 
our ultimate opinion that Rule 11 is not applicable to attorneys for the 
assistance they provided in drafting papers subsequently filed by pro se 
litigants.”  Id.  Nevertheless, the hearing justice determined that “the clear 
intent of Rule 11 *** is to enforce an attorney’s ethical obligations of candor 
and honesty in interactions with the tribunal,” and thus the imposition of 
sanctions on attorneys who failed to sign documents they prepared was both 
proper and in-keeping with the ‘spirit’ of Rule 11.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 779–80. The court did note, in footnote 12, that it 
distinguished between Rule 11 sanctions and sanctions imposed based on the 
inherent authority of the trial courts.  The implication is that the First 
Circuit may have previously imposed other sanctions upon attorneys who 
drafted, but did not sign certain court documents.  However, whatever the 
bases for these potential, hypothetical sanctions, none of them were based on 
a Rule 11 violation.  Id. at 780. 
 39.  Id. at 780-81 (“[W]e draw a distinction between conduct that offends 
Rule 11 and that which may violate one of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”). 
 40.  Id. at 781 (“We decline to interpret Rule 11 as applying to the 
drafting assistance provided by these three nonsignatory counsel and, 
consequently, perceive no violations thereof.”) Id. 
 41.  Id. at 781–82. 
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To determine the terms on which Rhode Island courts should 
permit ghostwriting, the court solicited amicus briefs addressing 
the benefits and detriments of the practice  as a form of limited-
scope representation.42  Based on these submissions and its own 
opinion, the court concluded that an attorney who prepares 
written submissions on behalf of a pro se client appearing in court 
is not in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, so long as she signs the prepared 
documents and discloses to the court her identity as well as the 
nature and extent of the assistance she provided.43 
COMMENTARY 
In allowing limited scope representation, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court relied on several amicus briefs, which outlined 
three primary benefits of ghostwriting and other forms of limited 
scope representation.44  First, limited scope representation can 
help the legal profession to ward off obsolescence by 
complementing, rather than combating, the “‘do-it-yourself’ 
mentality” that has emerged in response both to new legal 
technologies and to the wealth of free information available on the 
 
 42.  Id. at 781. 
 43.  Id. at 784. 
 44.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court also took note of  potential pitfalls 
inherent to limited scope representation, most of which were proffered by the 
Attorney General’s office in its amicus brief. See Amicus Brief of the Attorney 
General of the State of Rhode Island, FIA Card Servs. v. Pichette, 116 A.2d 
770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2012-272A) [hereinafter AG Amicus].  The brief makes 
two arguments opposing limited scope representation in Rhode Island: (1) 
that ghostwriting gives a pro se litigant an “unfair advantage” in court 
proceedings, and (2) that opposing counsel may walk into an “ethical 
minefield” if it communicates directly with the supposedly pro se litigant 
about “matters for which the party is represented.”  AG Amicus at 45.  The 
latter critique arguably has merit, but the former criticism presents two 
serious issues. First, it reveals that the Attorney General lacks faith in the 
judiciary’s ability to distinguish the work of a layperson from the work of a 
practicing attorney.  Second, and more problematically, the suggestion that 
pro se plaintiffs will be at an “unfair advantage” because they have received 
limited support during their ordeal with the court systems clearly discounts 
the incredible disadvantages facing pro se litigants in the first place.  See AG 
Amicus at 44 (emphasis added).  Such a suggestion is akin to the suggestion 
that children with dyslexia are at an unfair advantage when they receive 
extra time on spelling tests.  Indeed, the most common form of 
accommodation offered to pro se litigants comes in the form of additional time 
to file documents.  
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Internet.45  Second, limited scope representation can increase the 
efficiency of the court by mitigating the “tedious delay[s]” that 
self-represented clients unintentionally create as a result of their 
unfamiliarity with our complex and nuanced court systems.46  
Third, limited scope representation bridges the “justice gap” that 
exists “between those who need legal services and those who 
cannot afford them” by removing some of the barriers that have 
historically prevented attorneys from choosing to take on pro bono 
projects.47 
The question now “is not whether Rhode Island will or should 
have limited scope representation, but how best to implement 
limited scope representation across the state[?]”48  To answer that 
 
 45.  Amicus Brief for the Rhode Island Bar Association for the Appellants 
at 11-12, FIA Card Servs. v. Pichette, 116 A.2d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2012-
272A) [hereinafter “RIBA Amicus”].  According to the Rhode Island Bar 
Association (RIBA), “attorneys attempting to make ends meet are likely to 
find that offering limited legal services will provide a new client base among 
litigants who are ‘do-it-yourself’ motivated.”  Id. at 13; see also, Dee Crocker, 
Highlights from the 2012 ABA Techshow Technology Matters, OR. ST. B. 
BULL., June 2012, at 37 (“The growing number of [. . .] automat[ed] [. . .] legal 
services cannot be ignored by lawyers[. . .] However, lawyers can use some of 
those same systems, tools and techniques to boost their own law practices to 
attract clients”). 
 46.  Amicus Brief for the Rhode Island Bar Association for the Appellants 
at 11-12, FIA Card Servs. v. Pichette, 116 A.2d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2012-
272A). In the same section, RIBA points out that limited scope representation 
“benefits all actors in pro se litigation” – from the clerks of court who attempt 
to give direction without giving legal advice, to the attorneys who work 
opposite of a pro se litigant, to the court which has to balance the interests of 
justice in the face of a litigant who has failed to meet procedural 
requirements.  Id. at 13. 
 47.  See Amicus Brief of the Pro Bono Collaborative at 5-7, FIA Card 
Servs. v. Pichette, 116 A.2d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2012-272A) [hereinafter PBC 
Amicus]. One of the most pervasive barriers is what the Pro Bono 
Collaborative (PBC) has termed “mission creep”: when an attorney takes a 
case for a discrete purpose and ends up tied to that case “far beyond the point 
that [she] initially envisioned.”  Id. at 7.  A common example that arises in 
the context of prisoner re-entry in Rhode Island is when a child visitation 
dispute becomes entangled with a child custody case.  Id. at 8.  Relying on the 
various amici briefs and its own sound judgment, the Court ultimately 
concluded that “allowing attorneys to provide limited drafting assistance to 
pro se litigants will serve to encourage pro bono participation by more 
attorneys, will remove barriers and disincentives to such participation and 
will promote greater access to justice.”  Pichette, 116 A.3d at 783. 
 48.  Judah Rome, Comment, Give Up the Ghost Hunt: A Defense of 
Limited Scope Representation and Ghostwriting in Rhode Island, 20 ROGER 
WILLIAMS L. REV. 461, 462 (2015).  
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question, the Rhode Island Supreme Court must address three 
key elements of limited scope representation: how an attorney 
begins the representation, how the attorney and client define the 
precise scope of that representation, and how an attorney 
withdraws once he has fulfilled his limited purpose.  The court 
will also need to determine how much out-of-court oversight it will 
impose upon attorneys providing limited scope representation.  
Lastly, because the rules governing the procedure of limited scope 
representation will be used by lawyer and layperson alike, it is 
essential that the procedures are simultaneously comprehensive 
and user-friendly.  To achieve this, I recommend the court adopt a 
procedure that is a hybrid of those currently employed in 
Colorado,49 Illinois,50 and New Hampshire.51  In all three states, 
attorneys must fully disclose their name, address, and registration 
number on the documents they prepare for pro se clients, although 
the signature does not constitute an appearance.52 
Colorado courts inserted the procedure governing limited 
representation directly into their existing Rule 11, “Signing of 
Pleadings,” which requires that attorneys identify themselves and 
sign all filings in order to hold the attorneys accountable for the 
veracity of the document’s content.53  Subsection (b) specifically 
establishes that ‘limited representation’ does not amount to an 
‘appearance’ and does not hold the attorney accountable for full 
representation of the client.54  However, Colorado courts also state 
that any in-person appearance before a judge, magistrate, or other 
judicial officer on behalf of the pro se client will constitute an 
entry of appearance, thereby committing the attorney to full 
representation.55 
In Illinois, the procedure governing limited representation 
functions as a sub-category of “appearances,” inserted into Rule 13 
 
 49.  C.R.C.P. 11(B). 
 50.  IL. R. S. CT. RULE 13. 
 51.  N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 14. 
 52.  C.R.C.P. 11(B); IL R S CT RULE 13; N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 14. 
 53.  C.R.C.P. 11. 
 54.  C.R.C.P. 11.  “Limited representation of a pro se party under this 
Rule 11(b) shall not constitute an entry of appearance by the attorney for 
purposes of C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-1 or C.R.C.P. 5(b), and does not authorize 
or require the service of papers upon the attorney.”  Id.  
 55.  Id. 
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of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Procedure.56  Taking a 
much more thorough and comprehensive approach than Colorado, 
Illinois requires attorneys to file a Notice of Limited Scope 
Appearance with the court, stating the precise nature of the 
representation.57  Additionally, a lawyer may only withdraw his 
appearance by motion or notice to the parties; if the attorney has 
completed the tasks enumerated in the Limited Scope Appearance 
form, the court must grant the motion for withdrawal of 
appearance.58  Likewise, a party may only object to an attorney’s 
motion to withdraw his appearance if the objecting party believes 
the attorney has not yet fulfilled the duties required under scope 
of his limited appearance.59 
In a similar vein, New Hampshire has inserted these new 
procedural rules into their existing Rule 14 of the New Hampshire 
Superior Court Rules, which addresses “Appearances - General, 
Special, and Limited.”60  There, courts permit limited scope 
representation only in non-criminal cases, and, like Illinois, they 
characterize limited-representation as a form of appearance before 
the court.61  New Hampshire attorneys must file an appearance 
explaining the precise scope of representation offered.62  The 
courts presume that any action the attorney takes that is outside 
the scope of the limited representation is simply an extension of 
the limited representation, and does not commit the attorney to 
full representation.63 
In Pichette, the Rhode Island Supreme Court voiced its 
preference for full identification of the attorneys and an upfront 
articulation of the scope of the representation.64  As a practical 
matter, attorney identification is essential to ensure candor 
towards the courts and accountability in counsel.  The court 
 
 56.  IL. R. S. CT. RULE 13. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id 
 60.  N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 14 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See Pichette, 116 A.3d at 784 (holding that an attorney must “sign[] 
the document and disclose[] thereon his or her identity and the nature and 
extent of the assistance that he or she is providing to the tribunal and to all 
parties to the litigation”).  
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should further establish that limited scope representation 
constitutes a “limited appearance,” as the New Hampshire and 
Illinois courts have because this allows attorneys to appear in-
person at proceedings without committing them to full 
representation of the client.  Additionally, the court should 
strongly consider extending the options for limited scope 
representation to criminal defendants, to increase access to 
necessary legal services for those defendants who do not meet the 
low threshold required to obtain publicly funded legal counsel.  
Finally, the court should not adopt New Hampshire’s 
“presumption of extension” as this has a strong likelihood of 
blurring the lines between full representation and limited 
representation and risks misleading clients as to the role their 
lawyer plays.  Rather, Rhode Island should follow the example set 
by Colorado and Illinois and require that any additional tasks the 
client and lawyer wish to add to the scope of the limited 
representation must be specifically outlined and filed with the 
court.  For the sake of uniformity and simplicity, Rhode Island 
should adopt a standard form for extending the scope of 
representation, rather than requiring attorneys to request an 
extension of the scope of representation by motion.  This will allow 
the court filings to clearly and succinctly reflect the development 
of the lawyer-client relationship throughout a particular dispute 
and will limit the frequency with which the court must play 
“referee.” 
To maximize the impact of the court’s opinion and ensure that 
Pichette serves as the springboard for formally establishing a new 
category of accessible legal services in Rhode Island, these 
procedures and protocols must be imminently forthcoming.  In 
shaping these procedures, the court must address: “when it is 
appropriate to limit the scope of representation; how to apply the 
ethical standard of competence to limited scope representation; 
how the court and opposing parties should communicate with a 
party who is engaged in limited scope representation how an 
attorney can enter a limited appearance and then withdraw; and 
whether the rules surrounding conflicts of interest should be 
relaxed for limited scope representation.”65 
 
 
 65.  See Rome, supra note 48 at 483.  
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CONCLUSION 
A Rhode Island attorney who prepares written submissions on 
behalf of a pro se client appearing in court is not in violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct or the Rules of Civil Procedure, so 
long as she signs the prepared documents and discloses to the 
court her identity as well as the nature and extent of the 
assistance she provided.  Although the Court’s decision is not 
novel on its face,66 it still signals a new direction for the legal 
profession in Rhode Island that has the potential to increase 
access to quality legal services in while simultaneously 
encouraging attorneys to take on more pro bono work.  However, 
the long-term benefits of this decision will depend entirely on the 
quality and breadth of the procedural rules the Court implements. 
 Katherine Berling 
 
 
 66.  See Rome, supra note 48 at 473, 475, 477 (discussing the procedures 
for addressing limited scope representation as they have been enacted in 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, respectively). 





Property Law.  Renewable Resources, Inc. v. Town of Westerly, 
110 A.3d 1166 (R.I. 2015).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court held 
that the lower hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in 
granting the town’s emergency motion for relief.  The advanced 
deterioration of the mill’s building in the wake of Hurricane 
Sandy, as well as the plaintiff’s continued noncompliance with the 
signed memorandum of agreement, satisfied the requisite change 
in circumstances required to modify a preliminary injunction. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The Potter Hill Mill ceased operation in the 1950s.1  In 1980 
the town of Westerly sought to have the mill demolished because 
of its worsening condition and eventually issued an order to that 
effect.2  In 1984, the order was affirmed by a Rhode Island District 
Judge, however the demolition never took place.3  In 1992, the 
plaintiff, Renewable Resources Inc., purchased the mill for 
$50,000.4  In 2006, the plaintiff and the town signed a memoran-
dum of agreement (MOA) “in which plaintiff recognized the validi-
ty of the condemnation order and pledged to meet a series of con-
ditions in order to stave off demolition.”5 
The town requested proposals for the mill to be demolished in 
a newspaper advertisement in August of 2009, because the plain-
tiff had failed to “expeditiously pursue its development plan” and 
because of the ongoing deterioration of the mill.6  The plaintiff re-
 
 1.  Renewable Res., Inc. v. Town of Westerly, 110 A.3d 1166, 1168 (R.I. 
2015). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id.  “The MOA required that plaintiff fence off the property, clean up 
debris, and expeditiously pursue its development plan. Furthermore, the 
MOA explicitly granted the town the power to determine whether plaintiff 
was in breach of the MOA’s conditions.”  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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sponded in September “seeking a temporary restraining order, a 
preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction against the 
town” preventing the demolition of the mill.7  The town answered, 
alleging that the plaintiff’s failure to adhere to the MOA’s re-
quirements of due diligence granted “the Town the right to con-
demn. . .and demolish the building.”8  A Superior Court justice 
granted the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order.9 
In April of 2011, the Superior Court justice dismissed part of 
the plaintiff’s complaint that requested the court issue a mandato-
ry injunction against the town.10  The  justice then ordered an 
agreement between the plaintiff and the town.11 
In June of 2012 an order was entered allowing the town’s 
building official to inspect the mill every quarter.12  The order also 
allowed for the issuance of permits for the demolition and recon-
struction of the property, as well as a viewing of the mill by the 
court.13  The parties and the hearing justice viewed the property 
on October 16, 2012.14  On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy 
made landfall and “wreak[ed] havoc on what was left of the 
mill.”15  The town filed an emergency motion for relief from the 
preliminary injunction describing “the advanced rate of deteriora-
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 1169.  The town also objected to the temporary restraining or-
der as well as the request for the court to view the mill.  Id.  
 9.  Id.  Id.  The parties litigated the preliminary injunction for more 
than a year while the temporary restraining order was in effect.  Id.  
 10.  Id.  The plaintiff sought the authority of a court order in forcing the 
town to conform to the zonings classifications of the mill proposed in the 
plaintiff’s comprehensive plan.  Id. 
 11.  Id.  “The order provided plaintiff with a timetable for both submis-
sion of development plans and actual repair work for the mill, and it also 
provided that a preliminary injunction against demolition of the mill would 
remain in effect until further notice.” Id.  In June of 2011, the town filed a 
motion to hold the plaintiff in contempt of this agreement.  Id. at 1169 & n.2.  
The town alleged that the plaintiff had failed to submit a reconstruction plan 
and failed to repair a gravel road.  Id.  The court did not hold the plaintiff in 
contempt, but did order to begin reconstruction and repair of the mill and a 
court-appointed architect was assigned to oversee the project.  Id.  The plain-
tiff filed its development plan, but did not follow up when additional infor-
mation was requested by the town.  Id.  The town filed again to hold the 
plaintiff in contempt and again the motion was not granted.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 1169 n.2 (alteration in original). 
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tion and collapse of the buildings since the summer and requested 
that it be allowed to demolish the buildings so that it might pre-
vent immediate harm to children.”16 
In December of 2012, the town’s building official, David Mur-
phy, testified that the mill’s buildings were “unsafe” and “beyond 
repair.”17  Mr. Murphy concluded that the buildings should be 
demolished because “they posed a threat to persons on the proper-
ty and in the adjacent waterway.”18  Mr. Murphy also acknowl-
edged the potential risk and problems posed by trespassers and 
children on the mill property.19  The town planner, Marilyn 
Shellman, testified at the same hearing that she visited the mill 
property twice over the past year, and that during her second visit 
“ [t]he integrity of the buildings seem[ed] to be worse than [on her] 
first viewing.”20 
On December 18, 2012, the hearing justice relieved the town 
from the restraining order and permitted the town to issue a dem-
olition order for the mill property.21  On January 22, 2013, the 
hearing justice, in a written decision, found that the plaintiff 
breached the MOA and, on February 6, 2013, vacated the prelimi-
nary injunction.22 
 
 16.  Id. The town made its motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the Supe-
rior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id.  The operative language of that rule 
is “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 
or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: . . . the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application [.]”  Id. at 1169 & n.4. 
 17.  Id. at 1169-70. 
 18.  Id. at 1170.  “Mr. Murphy issued a notice of unsafe condition and or-
der to demolish, citing eight of the unsafe conditions listed in G.L.1956 § 23-
27.3-124.1” Id. at 1170 & n.5.  Westerly’s Building Code Board of Appeals de-
nied the plaintiff’s appeal of the demolition order.  Id.  The plaintiff again ap-
pealed, unsuccessfully, to the Rhode Island Building Code Standards Com-
mittee.  Id.  Finally, the plaintiff appealed on administrative grounds to the 
Sixth Division District Court.  Id.  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id.  Ms. Shellman specifically referred to the deterioration of the roof 
and sidewalls. Id.  Two neighbors of the property, Bonnie Bennet and Allison 
Goodsell, testified to the presence of children and trespassers on the property 
before and after Hurricane Sandy. Id.  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 1170.  
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The dispute on appeal centered on whether the trial justice 
abused his discretion in vacating the preliminary injunction.23  
The plaintiff argued that the trial judge erred in “failing to find a 
‘substantial’ change in circumstances warranting the vacating of 
the preliminary injunction.”24  The plaintiff specifically pointed to 
the trial justice’s “absence of any findings of significant deteriora-
tion” between the date that the preliminary injunction was grant-
ed and the date of the filing of motion for relief.25  The town ar-
gued that the plaintiff’s failure to adhere to the terms of the MOA, 
as well as the increased deterioration of the mill in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Sandy, “were sufficient evidence of a change in cir-
cumstances.”26 
Upon review, the court initially sought to determine whether 
there had been a sufficient change in circumstances that would 
enable the preliminary injunction to be modified.27  The court re-
counted the town’s series of witnesses at the December 11, 2012 
hearing.28  All of these witness “testified to the escalation of the 
dangerous condition” of the mill property.29  Specifically, the court 
cited to the fact that Mr. Murphy, the building official, testified 
that the buildings were “unsafe and on the verge of collapsing.”30  
The justice also relied on Mr. Murphy’s testimony that he was led 
to believe that the plaintiff had violated the MOA’s diligence re-
quirement.31  Furthermore, the court relied on the testimony of 
Ms. Shellman, the town planner, who spoke to the “worsening of 
the buildings’ condition,” the plaintiff’s “inaction with respect to 
 
 23.  Id. at 1171.  Before addressing the merits of the case, the Supreme 
Court explained their standard of review and clarified that even though the 
town’s emergency motion for relief was improperly brought under Rule 
60(b)(5), “a trial justice still retains the inherent power to modify any inter-
locutory judgment or order prior to final judgment.” Id. at 1170–71 (quoting 
Murphy v. Bocchio, 338 A.2d 519, 522 (R.I. 1975)).  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id.  The plaintiff obtained the preliminary injunction on April 26, 
2011 and the town filed a motion for relief on November 16, 2012.  Id. 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id.; see also Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321, 328 (R.I. 1995). 
 28.  Renewable Resources, 110 A.3d at 1172. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id.  The plaintiff filed an incomplete demolition permit application.  
Id.  
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the MOA,” and failure to submit a master plan.32 
The court held that the hearing justice acted within his dis-
cretion in vacating the preliminary injunction even though he did 
not “specifically explain what constituted a change in circum-
stance.”33  The court determined that the hearing justice was in 
compliance with Rule 52(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil 
Procedure because the justice “detailed the witness testimony he 
found credible.”34  The court also noted that the hearing justice 
“stressed that plaintiff’s noncompliance with the MOA was the 
impetus for vacating the preliminary injunction.”35  The plaintiff 
failed to persuade the court that the hearing justice’s references to 
the MOA were improper.36  In fact, the court found that the plain-
tiff had waived that argument when it failed to object when the 
town itself invoked the terms of the MOA as “a basis for vacating 
the preliminary injunction.”37 
Additionally, the court noted that the hearing justice’s deter-
mination that the plaintiff’s breach of the MOA was “sufficient to 
constitute the requisite change in circumstances.”38  The court 
reasoned that the preliminary injunction had certain require-
ments, most notably the repair and reconstruction of the mill’s 
buildings, and that the plaintiff failed to be faithful to these re-
quirements.39  Further, the court noted two prior unsuccessful 
motions to hold the plaintiff in contempt.40  The court emphasized 
that the plaintiff had been shown leniency on both occasions and 
that this “continued noncompliance” was sufficient to be classified 
as a change in circumstances.41  Finally, the court held that the 
 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id.  “[I]n granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court 
shall [ ] set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute 
the grounds of its action . . . It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court . . . .”  R.I. SUPER. 
R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id.; see also Town of Smithfield v. Fanning, 602 A.2d 939, 942 (R.I. 
1992) (“[T]his court will not consider an issue raised on appeal that has not 
been raised in reasonably clear and distinct form before the trial justice.”). 
 38.  Renewable Resources, 110 A.3d at 1173. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id.  The court elaborated and said that “[a]lthough plaintiff’s 
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hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in granting the town’s 
emergency motion because the town effectively demonstrated, 
with sufficient evidence, that a change in circumstances occurred 
with regard to the condition of the buildings on the mill proper-
ty.42 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court made a reasonable ruling in 
finding that there was adequate evidence presented to the hearing 
judge so as not be found as an abuse of discretion.43 The hearing 
judge was presented with evidence from city officials and neigh-
bors that documented how the mill had continued to deteriorate 
before and after Hurricane Sandy.44 Discretion to lower courts is 
essential to an efficient and just legal system, especially in cases 
that are so heavily fact-based.  Here, there was incontrovertible 
evidence that the property had subsequently been damaged by the 
hurricane and that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the 
MOA between the parties.45 
The court’s decision demonstrates the outer-bounds of a 
hands-off approach to dealing with parties that attempt to find 
their own agreement and parameters through a MOA.  The court 
also observed that the lower court was lenient on the plaintiff dur-
ing the towns prior motions requesting the court hold the plaintiff 
in contempt for failure to comply with the MOA requirements.46  
Society wants to encourage parties to find settlements that work 
for the parties involved in any given dispute while, at the same 
time, encouraging them to honor those agreements. Parties that 
can amicably settle their dispute will save their own resources, as 
well as those of the courts.  However, the court’s emphasis on the 
plaintiff’s continued noncompliance demonstrates that the legal 
system can sometimes run out of patience with those parties that 
do not follow what they say they will do.47  This mill had been out 
 
profered ‘substantial’ change in circumstances standard was not proper, we 
note in any case that the hearing justice heard and recited enough testimony 
to satisfy even that standard.”  Id. at 1173 & n.9.  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id. at 1172. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 1173. 
 47.  Id. 
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of service since the 1950s, the plaintiff had purchased the property 
in 1992, and the MOA was agreed to in 2006.48  There comes a 
time when parties need to move forward.  The result from this 
case may shorten the leash on the noncompliance of MOAs and 
encourage parties to act with more speed and alacrity in the face 
of potential legal consequences to their inaction. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the testimony of 
advanced deterioration of the mill’s building in the wake of Hurri-
cane Sandy, as well as the plaintiff’s continued noncompliance 
with the signed memorandum of agreement, satisfied the requisite 
change in circumstances required to modify a preliminary injunc-
tion.  The court affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that 
the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in granting the 
town’s emergency motion for relief. 
Peter M. MacArthur 
 
 
 48.  Id. at 1168. 





Public Contracts.  Kayak Centre of Rhode Island v. Town of 
Narragansett, 116 A.3d 250 (R.I. 2015).  The Rhode Island 
competitive bidding statute, R.I. General Laws 1956 Section 45-
55-5, clearly and unambiguously does not apply to public 
concession contracts.  Nevertheless, the competitive bidding 
process is still subject to the Gilbane1 standard of good faith in 
order to protect against public corruption. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In August of 2012, the Town of Narragansett (“the Town”) 
acquired a 9.5-acre parcel of land that included a property on 
which a Rhode Island company operated a paddle sports 
business.2  Subsequent to the Town’s acquisition of the property, 
the paddle sports business continued to operate on the land until 
August of 2013 when the Town invited competitive bidding for a 
five-year concession contract to operate a paddle sports business 
on the property.3  In preparation for the competitive bidding 
process, the Town’s purchasing agent and the Director of the 
Town’s Parks and Recreation Department jointly prepared a 
package and an invitation to bid on the concession award.4 
Ultimately, two companies submitted bids to the town: The 
first was Narrow River, also a Rhode Island limited liability 
company that operated a paddle sports business currently 
operating on the land in question.5  The second bidder was Kayak 
 
 1.  Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of State Colls., 267 A.2d 396, 399 
(R.I. 1970). 
 2.  Kayak Centre of R.I. v. Town of Narragansett, 116 A.3d 250, 252 
(R.I. 2015).  The property at issue is located at 94 Middlebridge Road in 
Narragansett, Rhode Island.  Id. 
 3.  Robert O’Neill, the Chairman of the town’s Land Conservancy Trust, 
explained the rationale behind the invitation.  Mr. O’Neill explained that it 
made “good business sense” for the Town to review interest in other proposals 
for the paddle sport’s concession at the property.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 251. 
PUBLIC CONTRACTS_SEMONELLI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2016  7:19 PM 
2016] SURVEY SECTION 805 
Centre of Rhode Island, a Rhode Island limited liability company 
that operates paddle sports businesses at two locations.  The Town 
asked each of the bidders to state the “annual payment” they 
would be willing to make to the Town for comparison.6  Kayak 
Centre submitted a five-year combined annual payment total of 
$180,505, whereas Narrow River submitted a five-year combined 
annual payment total of $100,500.7 
Once all the bids had been received, the Town’s Parks and 
Recreation Department examined the submitted bids and 
prepared a report that was subsequently submitted to the town 
council.8  The report established that Kayak Centre was “the best 
and most qualified bidder and recommended that the [t]own 
[c]ouncil award the municipal contract to [] Kayak Centre.”9  
According to the report, the Town recommended the award be 
given to Kayak Centre based on the totality of its 18-year 
experience in the paddle sports business, positive references, and 
bid offering.10 
The Department presented the report at the October 7, 2013 
town council meeting and a motion was made to award the 
contract to Kayak Centre.11  However, after comments from the 
public and discussion amongst the members of the town council, 
the council voted three to one to reject the motion seeking to 
award the concession contract to Kayak Centre.12  Following the 
town council’s decision to reject Kayak Centre’s motion, the town 
solicitor suggested that, under the review of the town council, a 
new bid package with additional criteria and qualifications be 
developed before the bid package would go back out to bid.13  At 
the advice of the town solicitor, the town council voted three to one 
to reject all submitted bids and begin the bidding process anew.14 
On December 3, 2013, Kayak Centre filed a complaint in 
Rhode Island Superior Court consisting of three counts: (1) a 
request for declaratory judgment that the Town violated Rhode 
 
 6.  Id. at 252. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. (quoting Parties Stipulated Facts). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
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Island’s competitive bidding statute, R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 Section 
45-55-5; (2) an allegation that the Town committed a criminal 
misdemeanor in its violation of Section 45-55-5; and (3) a prayer 
for injunctive relief alleging that it would be irreparably harmed if 
the Town was allowed to reject the bid and rebid the concession.15  
A Superior Court justice heard the case on February 10, 2014 and 
issued a written decision in which the court found that the 
provisions of Section 45-55-5 were inapplicable to the bidding 
process at issue and that the standard for fairness in competitive 
bidding did not apply.16  The justice ultimately denied Kayak 
Centre’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief and found for 
the Town on all counts.17 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, Kayak Centre argued that the trial justice erred in 
ruling that the requirements of Section 45-55-5 were inapplicable 
to the case and thereby erred in denying declaratory relief.18  
While Kayak Centre urged the court to rule that Section 45-55-5 
did apply, the court held that the statute did not apply to 
concession contracts.19  Conducting a de novo review of the 
statutory interpretation, the court concluded that the language of 
the statute was clear and unambiguous where Section 45-55-9 
required competitive bidding for contracts that exceeded “ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000) for construction and five thousand 
dollars ($5,000) for all other purchases.”20  The court focused on 
the language in Section 45-55-5 requiring that the contract be 
awarded to the “responsive and responsible bidder whose bid is 
either the lowest bid price, or lowest evaluated or responsive bid 
price.”21 
The court noted that a contract for expenditures did not 
include all of the same considerations as a concession contract.22  
 
 15.  Id. at 252–53 (citing in relevant part R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-5 
(2013)). 
 16.  Id. at 253 (citing Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. (citing in relevant part R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-5 (2013)). 
 20.  Id. at 254 (citing in relevant part R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-9 (2013)).  
 21.  Id. (quoting in relevant part R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-5(e)). 
 22.  Id. 
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The court found that Section 45-55-9 required competitive bidding 
for contracts that included “procurements” and “purchases,” thus 
Section 45-55-5 does not apply to competitive bidding processes 
involving concession contracts, which produce revenue rather than 
spend it.23  Absent an explicit mention of concession contracts, the 
court held that Section 45-55-5 makes clear that the statute is 
inapplicable to the concession contract at issue.24  The court 
considered the intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 45-55-
5 and noted that, in the court’s opinion, the Legislature “sought to 
regulate contracts that require the expenditure of public funds.”25  
The court further noted that the Legislature was free to include 
concession contracts within Section 45-55-5, but chose not to do 
so.26  Accordingly, the court held that the justice did not err in 
refusing to apply the statute to the Town’s action and, therefore 
affirmed the court’s denial of Kayak Centre request for 
declaratory relief.27 
Kayak Centre additionally argued that the trial justice erred 
in denying injunctive relief because the Town’s actions were 
governed by the standard of fairness established in Gilbane 
Building Co. v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges.28  Conducting 
a de novo review, the court considered the standards for conduct 
in concession bidding and noted that before the Legislature 
enacted the competitive bidding statute, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court used the Gilbane standard when it reviewed bid 
disputes.29  The court explained that the Gilbane standard 
provides that “[i]n the absence of any legislative requirement 
pertaining to competitive bidding, it is the duty of the appropriate 
public officials to act honestly and in good faith as they determine 
which bidder would best serve the public interest.”30  The court 
held that although Section 45-55-5 does not apply to concession 
contracts, the Gilbane standard does.31 
 
 23.  Id. (quoting in relevant part R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-9). 
 24.  Id. at 255. 
 25.  Id. at 254. 
 26.  Id. at 254–55 (citing Narragansett Food Servs., Inc. v. R.I. Dep’t of 
Labor, 420 A.2d 805, 808 (R.I. 1980)). 
 27.  Id. at 255. 
 28.  Id. at 253 (citing Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399). 
 29.  Id. at 255 (citing Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399). 
 30.  Id. (quoting Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399). 
 31.  Id. (citing Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399). 
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The Town asserted that the issue was not reviewable because 
the Town had not yet completed the bidding process, and so there 
was no award for the court to review.32  The court, however, relied 
on National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Fazzano where the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court reviewed an action brought in a competitive 
bidding case before the commencement of the bidding process.33  
Accordingly, the Kayak Centre court rejected the Town’s argument 
that its conduct was not reviewable.34  Furthermore, the court 
disagreed with the trial justice’s determination that the Gilbane 
standard did not apply and, therefore, mandated that the case be 
remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue 
of whether the Town acted “corruptly or in bad faith, or so 




Although the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the plain 
language of Section 45-55-5 rendered it inapplicable to the 
concession contract at issue, Justice Goldberg disagreed.  Justice 
Goldberg describes an alternative and, in her opinion, equally 
plausible, reading of the statute, which renders it ambiguous.36  
Justice Goldberg advises that rather than being read narrowly, 
the statute should be read in accordance with the entirety of the 
regulatory scheme, which requires the incorporation of all sections 
in the statute.37 
Historically, when the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
interprets “clear and unambiguous statutory provision[s], it is 
entirely proper [] to look to the sense and meaning fairly deducible 
from the context.”38  Typically, the court “‘consider[s] the entire 
statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the 
context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were 
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Kayak Centre, 116 A.3d at 255 (citing National, 307 A.2d at 771). 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. (quoting Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d at 485 (quoting In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 
150 (R.I. 2006).  
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independent of all other sections.’”39  In the past, when the 
Supreme Court has faced with statutory provisions that are in 
pari materia, it has “construe[d] [the statutory provisions] in a 
manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is consistent 
with their general objective scope.”40  Yet, here the court has 
failed to follow its own precedent.  The court’s narrow 
interpretation undermined the legislative intent of the statute; the 
statute was enacted in order to develop a uniform system for the 
award of contracts by municipalities utilizing open cooperative 
bids.41  The court erred in holding otherwise where the concession 
contract before the court undoubtedly fits cleanly within the 
Legislative intent of the statute. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision presents 
obstacles to Kayak Centre beyond those typically associated with 
an unfavorable ruling.  By finding that the statute was not 
ambiguous and hence ruling that the statute did not apply to the 
Town’s actions, the Supreme Court invites public corruption. 
Justice Goldberg hints at the risk of public corruption in her 
concurrence/dissent, pointing to the “dangerous waters” to which 
the Majority embarks.42  The risk of public corruption that Justice 
Goldberg noted is further illustrated by the strict Gilbane 
standard that Kayak Centre faces on remand.43  Kayak Centre 
must be able to exemplify that the Town committed a 
demonstrable abuse of discretion, a feat likely to prove difficult for 
the small-town business as the Town has demonstrable proof to 
the contrary.44  The record that was before the court demonstrates 
that the Town faced backlash from the public regarding the 
impending bid award to Kayak Centre, providing the Town with a 
justifiable reason to reconsider the award. 
Only if Kayak Centre is able to show that despite this noted 
public outcry, the Town itself demonstrated corruption and bad 
faith so as to warrant a holding that the Gilbane standard was 
 
 39.  Raiche, 101 A.3d at 1248 (quoting Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 
1002). 
 40.  Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 295 (R.I. 2007). 
 41.  Kayak Centre, 116 A.3d at 257 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-1). 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  267 A.2d at 399. 
 44.  Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399. 
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breached will its claim survive.45  Considering the uphill battle 
that Kayak Centre faces, Kayak Centre’s claim will likely be 
extinguished on remand because, even beyond the general 
undetectable nature of corruption, the proof of the townspeople’s 
concern will further protect the Town from any allegation of 
corruption or bad faith. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island competitive bidding statute, R.I. General 
Laws 1956 Section 45-55-5, does not apply to the bidding for 
public concession contracts because the statute explicitly applies 
only to contracts that produce purchases.  In the absence of an 
applicable statute, the Gilbane46 standard of good faith must 
nevertheless be applied to consider whether a party “acted 
corruptly or in bad faith, or so unreasonably or so arbitrarily as to 





 45.  267 A.2d at 399. 
 46.  Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399. 
 47.   Kayak Centre, 116 A.3d at 255 (quoting Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 400).   





Real Property.  Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc. et al, 112 
A.3d 703 (R.I. 2015).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court found no 
abuse of discretion when the Superior Court granted the Plaintiff 
landowner’s preliminary injunction to prevent the Defendant 
landowner from trespassing onto, interfering with, obstructing, or 
blocking the Plaintiff’s business.  The court further held that the 
lower court properly ruled on the merits of exclusive ownership 
and easement by prescription as the justice advised the parties he 
would not consider those claims. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The Plaintiff, Mario Gianfrancesco, owned the Geneva Diner 
at 1162 Douglas Avenue, North Providence, since 1992.1  The 
Defendant, A.R. Bilodeau Inc., owned a neighboring factory, 
located at 1164 Douglas Avenue, which began operating in 1998, 
which he leased to the co-defendant, Service Tech. Inc.2  The 
Plaintiff’s parking lot and the Defendant’s driveway abutted each 
other; divided by an unmarked boundary line.3  To conduct its 
business, Service Tech used independently owned and operated 
tractor-trailers (“trucks”), that ranged from thirty to fifty feet in 
length.4  During business, the trucks routinely drove through the 
Plaintiff’s property to access the Defendant’s property.5  The 
Plaintiff never gave the Defendant permission to do so.6 
A few incidents occurred between 1998 and 2001, whereby the 
trucks caused damage to the Plaintiff’s property.7  After those 
incidents, the Plaintiff “aggressively policed” his property to 
 
 1.  Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc. et al, 112 A.3d 703, 705 (R.I. 
2015).   
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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prevent further damage.8  Despite his policing, the trucks 
continued to pass through the Plaintiff’s parking lot.9  Conversely, 
diner customers would park in the lot directly to the right of the 
diner, encroaching on the Defendant’s property, and preventing 
trucks from entering the driveway.10  There was no mention of 
any specific incidents between 2001 and 2010.11 
On March 28, 2013, the Plaintiff filed a complaint in the 
Providence County Superior Court,12 seeking declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief.13  On April 12, 2014, the 
Defendant filed his answer, which included counterclaims for: (1) 
easement by prescription; (2) possession by acquiescence; (3) and 
trespass.14  On May 13, 2013 the Defendant sought a temporary 
restraining order seeking to enjoin the Plaintiff from blocking 
access to the diagonal path to the parking lot.15 
The hearing on the motions was held on May 23, 2013. The 
Plaintiff testified that a Service Tech employee asked him to move 
a car that was parked on the Defendant’s property.16  The 
Plaintiff called the police, who arrived and instructed him to put 
up a sign and traffic cones to prevent his patrons from parking in 
the driveway.17  The Plaintiff also told the officer he wanted to 
install a fence along the boundary line.18  Afterward, the Plaintiff 
installed a plywood sign and cones; however, on June 5, 2013, the 
Defendant testified that Service Tech employees moved the cones 
to make way for a truck.19  The Plaintiff also introduced 
photographs showing large trucks parking in front of the diner, 
obscuring the building from the street.20  A witness further 
testified the trucks would pass through the parking lot “every few 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 706. 
 11.  Id. at 705–06. 
 12.  Id. at 706.  The complaint demanded the Defendant cease and desist, 
requested quiet title, and claimed tortious interference with business 
relations and quantum meruit.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. at 707. 
 20.  Id. 
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days.”21 
The Defendant stated that he allowed the trucks to use the 
parking lot because “[it] was the only way to get the product into 
[the] facility.”22  The Defendant also testified that he had never 
given permission for any trucks to park in the parking lot.23  He 
further stated that if the Plaintiff erected a fence, Service Tech 
“would be shut down for the most part” because it “wouldn’t be 
able to get deliveries.”24  However, a video, recorded on May 31, 
2013, showed a large truck using the driveway without using the 
parking lot.25  The Defendant also conceded that skilled drivers 
could enter his property without using the parking lot, but they 
would have to make a “hard enough swing” to do so.26 
After the hearings, the hearing justice issued a bench decision 
granting the Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief 
and denying the Defendant’s request.27  The Defendant then filed 
an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court.28 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In reviewing the preliminary injunction,29 the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court limited its review to “whether the hearing justice 
erred in granting the Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive 
relief.”30  To determine whether the trial justice erred, the 
Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case warranting preliminary 
injunctive relief.31  The trial justice must consider four factors to 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 705.  
 23.  Id. at 706. 
 24.  Id. at 707.  A witness for the Defendant further testified that the 
driveway could not be used alone because “there is just not enough room. 
They wouldn’t be able to make it to the facility otherwise.”  Id. at 705. 
 25.  Id. at 707. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id.  The Defendant also moved to stay and/or modify the order, which 
was denied.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 708. 
 29.  Id. at 708 n.6. (“General Laws 1956 §9-24-7 provides in pertinent 
part: Whenever, upon a hearing in the superior court, an injunction shall be 
granted or continued, . . . an appeal may be taken from such order or 
judgment to the supreme court in like manner as from a final judgment, and 
the appeal shall take precedence in the supreme court”) (quoting R.I. GEN 
LAWS §9-24-7 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30.  Id. at 709. 
 31.  Id. at 708. 
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make his or her determination, including: whether the Plaintiff: 
(1) has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) will 
suffer irreparable harm without the injunctive relief, (3) has the 
balance of equities tip in his or her favor; and, (4) has shown the 
issuance of a preliminary injunction will preserve the status 
quo.32 
In analyzing the first prong, the court did not dispute the 
Superior Court’s finding that the Plaintiff owed the diner and 
parking lot for thirty years and had the right to use and control 
the property.33 The court then focused on the Defendant’s 
easement by prescription defense.34 According to the Defendant, 
he had gained title to the parking lot because the trucks 
continually crossed Geneva Diner’s parking lot for over ten years 
in an actual, open, notorious, and hostile manner to the 
Plaintiff.35  The court dismissed the defense, finding no error 
when the trial justice found that the Defendant lacked a 
reasonable likelihood of success on that claim,36 because of the 
undisputed fact that the Plaintiff continually objected to the 
trucks using his parking lot, thus preventing the ten years from 
accruing.37 Concluding that the trial justice did not abuse his 
discretion, the court found the first prong satisfied.38 
The court then briefly addressed the remaining prongs, 
finding no abuse of discretion.39  For the second prong, the trial 
justice properly found the size of the trucks posed an incredible 
disruption, and an economic and safety hazard to the Plaintiff, 
thus causing irreparable harm.40  For the third prong, the trial 
 
 32.  Id. (citations omitted).   
 33.  Id. at 709.  The trial justice found that “there has been no evidence 
that the [P]laintiff do[es] not own . . . the entire parcel including the area 
travel over from time to time by the [D]efendants.”  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 710. 
 35.  Id. (citing Butterfly Realty v. James Romanella & Sons, Inc., 93 A.3d 
1022, 1030 (R.I. 2014)). 
 36.  Id. at 710. 
 37.  Id. (quoting Reitsma v. Pascoag  Reservoir & Dam, LLC, 774 A.2d 
826, 832 (R.I. 2001).  The true owner can “stop the statutory prescriptive 
period from running” by “affirmatively communicat[ing]” objection to the 
use”).  
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. The court noted that the trial justice’s analysis was “somewhat 
scant” but “adequately addressed the issues.”  Id. at 711. 
 40.  Id.at 710.  The justice relied on the Plaintiff’s video showing a large 
truck enter the Defendant’s property in supporting that the Plaintiff would 
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justice properly balanced the equities by finding that the Plaintiff 
suffered greater hardships than the Defendant.41  Finally, the 
trial justice found that the status quo of the clear separation of 
properties would allow the Plaintiff full use of his parking lot.42  
According to the Supreme Court, none of these conclusions were 
abuses of discretion.43 
Finally, the Supreme Court struck down the Defendant’s 
argument that the trial justice abused his discretion by ruling on 
the merits.44  The court found no evidence of abuse of discretion as 
the trial justice consistently stated he would withhold deciding the 
case on the merits until the injunction issue was decided.45 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court gave wide discretion to the 
trial justice for preliminary injunctions by finding no abuse of 
discretion. Such discretion is necessary for trial justices to carry 
out their role as the primary deciders of justice. The court refused 
to become a helicopter parent of the lower courts, noting its 
limited review.46  However, the court noted the “somewhat scant” 
analysis of the trial justice’s rationale in granting the preliminary 
injunction,47 suggesting that lower court justices may need to 
further engage in the case at bar and begin more in-depth 
analyses of the law and facts of the case.  The court did not set the 
minimum standard justices must meet in applying the law, but 
agreed that the trial justice’s emphasis on the first prong was 
adequate when compared to the thin analyses of the remaining 
prongs.48 
 
suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Id. at 710-711. 
 41.  Id. at 711.  
 42.  Id. (quoting Iggy’s Doughboys, Inc., 792 A.2d at 705). “Prospective 
damage to a business’s good will and reputation ‘is precisely the type of 
irreparable injury for which an injunction is appropriate.’”  Id. (quoting The 
Fund for Community Progress v. United Way of Southeastern New England, 
695 A.2d 517, 523 (R.I. 1997)). 
 43.  Id. at 710. 
 44.  Id. at 711. 
 45.  Id.  During the hearings, the trial justice consistently stated he was 
not considering the merits of the claims and the injunction would remain in 
effect until the complaint was heard on its merits.  Id. 
 46.  Id. (citing Vasquez, 57 A.3d at 318). 
 47.  Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 711. 
 48.  Id.  
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The weighing of the various prongs suggests that preliminary 
injunctions are not merely a check-list, but a balancing scale, 
where one very strong prong may supplement the weaker prongs.  
Indeed, the court agreed that the trial justice did not err in 
emphasizing the first prong.49 However, an emphasis on one 
prong does not mean the other prongs can be ignored. The court’s 
review of the remaining prongs shows that all four factors must be 
considered by a trial justice when deciding a preliminary 
injunction.50 Yet, even one fact in favor of each factor is sufficient 
to satisfy them. For example, the court found the third factor, the 
balancing of equities, was satisfied simply by finding no error in 
the finding that the Plaintiff’s hardships were much greater than 
the Defendant’s.51  One fact can satisfy one factor. 
Regarding the first factor, trial justices must carefully tread 
the fine line between finding a reasonable likelihood of success 
without ruling on the merits of the complaint. The close 
similarities between ruling on the merits and reasonable 
likelihood of success could lead a justice to cross the fine line.  
Indeed, the Defendant argued the trial justice ruled on the merits 
of the case.52 Yet, the court took the trial justice’s refusal to rule 
on the merits of the claims at face value.  It did not probe into the 
justice’s actions, other than his statements during the hearings,53 
nor his visitation of the disputed property at the outset of the 
hearings.54 Such discretion by the court allows justices room to 
rule on injunctions without ruling on the merits of claims or 
constraining the formalistic rules and procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Superior 
Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Plaintiff’s 
preliminary injunction and denied the Defendant’s request for an 
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 708 (citing Iggy’s Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705). 
 51.  Id. at 711.  The forth prong of preserving the status quo was 
similarly satisfied by one fact: the preliminary injunction favoring the 
Plaintiff would allow him the full use of his property.  Id. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id.  The trial justice specifically stated the injunction “will stay in 
effect until the complaint, underlying complaints are heard on their merits.”  
Id. 
 54.  Id. at 706 n.4. 
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injunction despite a minimal decision from the trial court.  The 
court further found the trial justice did not rule on the merits of 
the complaint by his explicit refusal to do so, leaving the matter 
for the Superior Court. 
Gregory Henninger 
 





Tort Law.  Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n of 
Rhode Island v. Charlesgate Nursing Ctr., L.P., 115 A.3d 998 (R.I. 
2015).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the 
claim of negligence alleged against Charlesgate Nursing Center 
did not constitute an intentional act.  The court found that 
allegations against Charlesgate were in fact an “occurrence” or 
“accident” to which commercial general liability (CGL) applies.  A 
duty to defend an insured exists unless and until the tortious 
actions of the insured amount to an intentional act. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode 
Island (JUA) insured the Charlesgate Nursing Center under a 
policy that provided coverage for both hospital professional 
liability (HPL) as well as commercial general liability (CGL) from 
December 2008 until December 2009.1  In June of 2009, a resident 
at Charlesgate Nursing Center claimed that Josiah Ajibade 
Olowoporoku, a certified nursing assistant (CNA) and employee at 
Charlesgate, sexually assaulted her.2  The resident passed away 
in October 2011 and her son, acting as the administrator to her 
estate, “filed suit in the [Rhode Island] Superior Court against 
Charlesgate” as well as various partners and employees of 
Charlesgate for negligence and sexual assault.3 
The complaint asserted that Olowoporoku physically and 
sexually assaulted the resident on June 16, 2009.4  Furthermore, 
the complaint alleged that at the time of the assault, another 
CNA, Sandra James, “was at the nurse’s station where she heard 
the resident’s cries for help, but she did not respond.”5  The 
 
 1.  Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n of Rhode Island v. 
Charlesgate Nursing Ctr., L.P., 115 A.3d 998, 1000 (R.I. 2015). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
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complaint alleged that James reported the assault to a fellow 
employee, Lynda Gaboriault, who similarly failed to report the 
assault.6  On June 16, the resident reported the assault to a 
medical technician, Sharon Scott, and to James.7  On June 18, the 
family of the resident was informed of the assault and the family 
immediately insisted that Charlesgate file a report regarding the 
assault with the police department.8  That day a rape kit was 
administered to the resident and revealed “bruising, a laceration, 
excoriation, and trauma or penetration to the vaginal area.”9 
The estate’s complaint contained six counts altogether, five of 
which were claiming negligence against Charlesgate and its 
employees.10  The complaint alleged that Charlesgate and its 
employees failed to “properly supervise, train or screen its 
employees; to provide proper security measures; to report that a 
resident had been abused or mistreated within twenty-four hours 
in accordance with [General Laws] 1956 § 23-17.8-2; and to 
discipline its employees following the alleged sexual assault.”11  
The complaint also alleged that as a “direct and proximate result 
of [Charlesgate’s] alleged negligence” the resident suffered “severe 
personal injuries, shock and injury to her nervous system, extreme 
pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for the 
 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id.  When notified of the assault, Scott reported the incident to 
Gaboriault on June 16 and 17.  The opinion is unclear as to whether 
Gaboriault ever reported the incident.  It is also noted that following the 
assault Charlesgate continued to employ Olowoporoku.  Id.  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id.  The complaint also noted that the resident had been given at 
least three bed baths and one shower at Charlesgate in between the time of 
the assault and the time the rape kit was administered.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 1001.  One count of the complaint made a claim of assault and 
battery against Olowoporoku.  Id. 
 11.  Id.  The court stated:  
General Laws 1956 § 23-17.8-2 provides, in pertinent part, that: “(a) 
Any physician, medical intern, registered nurse, licensed practical 
nurse, nurse’s aide, orderly, certified nursing assistant . . . or any 
person, within the scope of their employment at a facility or in their 
professional capacity, who has knowledge of or reasonable cause to 
believe that a patient or resident in a facility has been abused, 
mistreated, or neglected shall make, within twenty-four (24) hours or 
by the end of the next business day, a telephone report to the 
director of the department of health or his or her designee for those 
incidents involving health care facilities.” 
Id. at n.4.  
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enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, [and] severe 
emotional distress.”12 
Once notified of the complaint against Charlesgate, the JUA 
conducted an investigation to determine whether it had a duty to 
defend Charlesgate in the pending matter.13  Upon investigation, 
the JUA concluded that no duty existed to defend Charlesgate 
against this particular suit, and that according to their policy, 
Charlesgate was not entitled to either HPL or CGL insurance 
coverage.14  The JUA decided that “the alleged sexual assault did 
not constitute a ‘medical incident’ within the ambit of HPL 
coverage, and . . . the alleged sexual assault ‘cannot be construed 
as an accident under any definition’ and therefore is not an 
‘occurrence’ within the meaning of the CGL insurance coverage.”15 
Upon this decision, the JUA filed an action in Superior Court 
seeking a declaration stating that it had no obligation to defend 
Charlesgate against the pending allegations.16  Charlesgate 
responded with a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the JUA had “a duty to defend each of the Charlesgate 
defendants” and also sought damages for the JUA’s alleged breach 
of contract.17  To follow up the JUA filed a motion for summary 
judgment in January 2013 and Charlesgate responded in 
February 2013 with an objection as well as its own cross-motion 
for summary judgment requesting the declaratory judgment from 
the court.18  In May 2013 the Superior Court denied the JUA’s 
motion for summary judgment and subsequently granted 
Charlesgate’s cross-motion for summary judgment.19  The court 
held that the JUA did owe a duty to defend Charlesgate and its 
defendants against the allegations.20 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the Superior Court order, the Supreme Court 
determined that it was most appropriate to interpret the terms of 
 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id.   
 17.  Id.   
 18.  Id at 1001, 1002. 
 19.  Id at 1002. 
 20.  Id. 
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the disputed insurance policy according the general rules that 
govern the construction of contracts.21  Essentially, the court 
would only consider the literal language of the policy unless they 
found any ambiguous language, in which case they would only 
apply the ordinary meaning to the ambiguous term.22  
Furthermore, the court decided that when it found an ambiguous 
term in the policy, it would interpret that term in favor of the 
insured and against the insurer.23  Once the court interpreted the 
literal meaning of the policy, it applied the “pleadings test” to 
determine whether the JUA owed Charlesgate a duty to defend it 
in the contested suit.24  Under the “pleadings test,” an insurer has 
“an unequivocal duty to defend” an insured party when “a 
complaint contains a statement of facts which bring the case 
within or potentially within the risk coverage of the policy.”25 
The literal language of JUA’s insurance policy is the central 
question in this suit.26 On appeal, the JUA argued that 
Charlesgate was not entitled to the CGL coverage included in the 
policy because the sexual assault complained of by the estate did 
“not constitute an ‘occurrence,’ which is defined in the policy as an 
‘accident.’”27  On the other hand, Charlesgate argued that the 
negligence claims against them in the suit did in fact constitute an 
“occurrence” under the policy’s guidelines, and they are therefore 
entitled to coverage by the JUA’s policy.28  It is then up to the 
court to determine if the language purported in the policy does in 
fact apply to the negligence allegations set forth in the complaint 
against Charlesgate. 
The court found that because the complaint only contained 
 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 1003. 
 24.  Id. at 1004. 
 25.  Id. (quoting The Employers’ Fire Insurance Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 
623, 632, 240 A.2d 397, 403 (1968)).  In Rhode Island, “a liability insurer’s 
duty to defend is predicated not upon information in its possession which 
indicates or even proves non-coverage, but instead upon the allegations in the 
complaint filed against the insured.”  The Employers’ Fire Insurance Co. v. 
Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 632, 240 A.2d 397, 403 (1968).  Essentially, the insurer 
has a duty to defend the insured when the facts alleged in the complaint are 
within the scope of the insurance policy.  See id.   
 26.  See Charlesgate Nursing Ctr., 115 A.3d at 1003.  
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
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allegations of negligence against Charlesgate, the court would not 
consider any allegations of intentional or sexual assault in the 
matter.29  In order to determine whether the JUA owed a duty to 
defend Charlesgate, the court endeavored to evaluate the precise 
and literal definitions of the terms essential to the JUA’s 
insurance policy.30  The court concentrated on the clause in the 
policy that offers coverage to Charlesgate “only for the risks of 
‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ that are caused by an 
‘occurrence.’”31  The court was thus tasked with determining if 
“the facts alleged in the estate’s complaint constitute[d] an 
‘occurrence’ to which CGL coverage potentially applies.”32  The 
JUA’s policy defined “occurrence” to mean an “accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general 
harmful conditions,” but failed to define exactly what the policy 
meant by “accident.”33  The court acknowledged that it had to 
define the ambiguous term “accident” in order to determine if the 
JUA had a duty to defend Charlesgate under the policy. 
The court first referred to Black’s Law Dictionary to 
determine the ordinary definition of “accident” and found the term 
to mean an “unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; 
something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that 
could not be reasonably anticipated.”34  The court further found 
that this definition of “accident” should be interpreted from the 
viewpoint of the insured, rather than from the viewpoint of the 
insurer.35  Therefore, the court held that the events alleged in the 
complaint qualified as unexpected and unforeseen to Charlesgate, 
because the alleged sexual assault was not within the usual 
course of events that generally took place between residents and 
employees at the nursing center.36  Upon the determination of this 
definition, the JUA attempted to argue that because the sexual 
assault itself was an intentional act, the facts alleged in the 
complaint did not amount to an accident that would be covered by 
 
 29.  Id. at 1004.  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 1005.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1248 (10th ed. 2014)).  
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id.  
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the policy.37  The court, however, found that allegations against 
Charlesgate qualified as an accident because the complaint 
alleged the count of sexual assault (the intentional act) against 
the individual defendant Olowoporoku, and not against 
Charlesgate.38  Ultimately, the court opined that the particular 
language expressed in the policy should be interpreted according 
to “the intent expressed by the language of the contract,” rather 
than by the intent of the insurer and, therefore, should be read 
more broadly than the JUA initially suggested.39  The court held 
that under a broader reading of the policy, the JUA did have a 
duty to defend Charlesgate against the claims made in the estate’s 
complaint. 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court interpreted this particular 
insurance policy in light of the fact that Charlesgate was not 
defending against claims of intentional sexual assault, but rather, 
was only facing charges of negligence.40 The JUA favored a very 
narrow interpretation of their policy, insisting that the facts 
alleged in the complaint did not constitute an accident, but only 
an intentional act that should not be covered by their policy.41 
The JUA relied on a number of Rhode Island cases attempting 
to argue that, in the past, insurance agencies were not obligated to 
insure against claims of intentional sexual assault.42 The JUA, 
however, failed to recognize that in both cases prior, the insured 
party had personally and directly committed the intentional 
sexual assault against the complainant,43 whereas Charlesgate 
did not directly commit the sexual assault, but is only defending 
against allegations of negligence.44 
The court in this case interpreted the intentions of the policy 
more broadly than the JUA would have liked.45  The court 
 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See id. at 1006.  
 39.  Id. at 1007  
 40.  Id. at 1004. 
 41.  Id. at 1005. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 1006. 
 44.  Id. at1004. 
 45.  See id. at 1007.  
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determined the most basic and ordinary meaning for the terms in  
question and applied that meaning to the facts alleged in the 
complaint.46  Charlesgate was not directly responsible for the 
assault, but rather the sexual assault can easily be interpreted as 
an event or occurrence that was “neither expected nor intended” 
by the nursing center and is not something that happens in the 
“usual course of events.”47  Therefore, because Charlesgate’s 
alleged negligence was not intentional, but purely circumstantial, 
the claims of negligence appropriately fit within the coverage of 
JUA’s insurance policy. 
This entire opinion hinged on the fact that the JUA was not 
specific enough with the terms and conditions in their policy. Had 
the JUA simply defined what an “accident” was and constructed 
its policy in accordance with that definition, it very well could 
have avoided litigation altogether. Furthermore, a more specific 
policy could have resulted in a different outcome since the court 
would have had to do more than just apply plain legal language.  
If the JUA had defined the terms “accident” and “occurrence” 
according to their objectives, the court would have been left to 
interpret the policy in a way the JUA had preferred for it to be 
read.  A specific contract ultimately gives a court less interpretive 
discretion regarding the terms in question. 
This case may be a warning to insurance companies going 
forward.  The court’s broad reading of the JUA’s policy should 
alert other insurance companies that courts are more inclined to 
interpret contracts in a light more favorable to the insured 
parties.48  The court’s decision here should warn insurance 
companies, in some sense, to be more careful and more specific 
when constructing and enforcing coverage policies in order to 
avoid liability in cases where accidents are concerned.  This 
decision shows that Rhode Island courts are more inclined to 
interpret insurance policies against the insurer and going forward, 
insurance companies should be very wary of the terms and 
definitions they do or do not include in their policies.49  A 
contract’s specificity could ultimately relieve an insurer of their 
duty to defend certain clients in certain instances. 
 
 46.  Id. at 1005. 
 47.  See id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1248 (10th ed. 2014)). 
 48.  See id. at 1003. 
 49.  See id.  
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This decision may also put a heavier burden on companies 
and individuals who choose to be insured. If insurance companies 
have been put on notice and begin to clean up their policies, it will 
be the insured party’s obligation to inspect their policies more 
closely than they may have prior.  Of course, insured parties today 
do not sign policies without some kind of reasonable inspection.  
However, this case should put any insured party on notice that, in 
the event that a dispute arises, insurance companies may be more 
prepared to defend their policies with more directed language and 
specific conditions.  As a result, this case may, as a whole, make 
both insured parties and insurers more accountable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the JUA had a 
duty to defend Charlesgate Nursing Center against the negligence 
allegations lodged against them in the estate’s complaint.  The 
court concluded that the terms “occurrence” and “accident” 
specified in the insurance policy applied to the negligence claims 
against Charlesgate, and therefore, under the “pleadings test” the 
JUA had an explicit duty to defend the Charlesgate Nursing 
Center against the estate’s complaint. 
Olivia Phetteplace 
 





2015 RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC LAWS 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 44, 46.  An Act Relating to Criminal 
Offenses – Threats and Extortion.  This Act adds magistrates to 
the list of public officials against whom it is felonious to threaten 
with bodily harm or death. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 98, 110.  An Act Relating to 
Uniform Controlled Substances – Offenses and Penalties.  This 
Act requires that a civil fine for possession of one ounce or less of 
marijuana be paid 30 days after the disposition of the case, a 
change from previous language that said “the offense.”  The act 
further specifies that no record by a state agency or tribunal that 
includes personally identifiable information of possession of one 
ounce or less of marijuana, by adults or juveniles, be open to 
public inspection. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 119, 153.  An Act Relating to 
Courts and Civil Procedure – Post Conviction Remedy.  This Act 
allows for someone convicted of a crime to file a petition 
requesting forensic DNA testing of evidence.  The Act eliminated 
any requirement that the petitioner be incarcerated or imprisoned 
in order to file such a petition. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 129, 151.  An Act Relating to Labor 
and Labor Relations – Fair Employment Practices.  This Act 
prohibits employers from refusing to make reasonable 
accommodations for employees or prospective employees if they 
have conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions, unless the employer can show that the 
accommodation would create an undue hardship to the employer’s 
business.  An employer may not require their employees to take 
leave if the employer can make another reasonable 
accommodation related to the employee’s condition.  An employer 
cannot prevent an employee or prospective employee from 
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opportunities if they are preventing it because of the pregnancy, 
childbirth, or a related medical condition. Employers must provide 
written notice to all of their employees regarding employees right 
to freedom from discrimination due to pregnancy, childbirth and 
related conditions.  New, perspective and current employees 
should also be notified of their right to reasonable 
accommodations for conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth or 
related conditions.  Any person violating the terms of this act or 
coercing others to do so would engage in an unlawful employment 
practice.  This act does not compel employers to create new 
positions that they would not have created, unless they do so for 
other employees.  Further, this Act does not compel employers to 
terminate or transfer any employee with more seniority or 
promote an unqualified person, unless they do so for other 
employees. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 138, 148.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses – Identity Theft Protection Act.  This Act seeks 
to protect Rhode Island citizens from identity theft.  Any state or 
municipal agency that stores or uses Rhode Island residents 
personal information must implement a risk-based information 
security program, containing reasonable security procedures and 
practices in line with other organizations of the same nature, 
purpose, size and scope.  The agencies must protect Rhode 
Islander’s personal information from any unauthorized access or 
disclosure, so that the information is confidential.  Any 
information that is collected is required to be destroyed in an 
appropriate manner, once the information has been used for its 
intended purpose.  If there is a disclosure of any Rhode Island 
resident’s personal information to a nonaffiliated third party there 
must be a written contract with the party that requires the third 
party maintain the information with reasonable security in line 
with other organizations of the same nature, purpose, size and 
scope.  The third party must also destroy the information after it 
has been used for the purpose for which the organization acquired 
the information.  If there is a breach of information collected by 
the agency or the information security system, which would 
threaten that information, the agency must provide notice, within 
forty five (45) calendar days, to any Rhode Islander who may have 
been affected.  If there are more than five hundred (500) Rhode 
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Island residents affected than the agency shall notify both the 
Rhode Island Attorney General and the major credit reporting 
agency of the timing, content and distribution of notices and the 
approximate number of those effected.  Notification may be 
delayed if a law enforcement agency notifies the breaching agency 
without unreasonable delay that they believe that the notification 
will slow or negatively affect a criminal investigation.  If there is a 
law enforcement agency delay, then law enforcement will notify 
the breaching agency when there is no more threat to an 
investigation, and the agency will make notification to Rhode 
Island residents as soon as practicable.  The breaching agency will 
cooperate with any law enforcement agency.  Any notification to 
Rhode Island residents who could or are victims of a breach must 
include a brief description of the breach and the number of those 
affected, the information that was involved in the breach, the date 
of the breach and its discovery, and a description of remedial 
measures that the agency will take, including contact information 
for credit reporting agencies, remediation service providers, and 
the Attorney General.  The agency will also provide information 
on how to seek a security freeze, file a police report or the fees 
required for consumer reporting agencies.  Any reckless violation 
of the chapter is a violation, each instance will have a penalty of 
not more than one hundred dollars ($100) per record.  Any 
knowing and willful violation of the chapter is a civil violation 
with a penalty of two hundred dollars ($200) per record.  The 
Attorney General, if there is suspicion of a violation, may bring an 
action against a person or business who has violated this section.  
Any agency, person or business will be in compliance with this 
section if the organization complies with this law or 15 U.S.C. § 
6809(2).  Any financial institution in compliance with the Federal 
Interagency Guidelines on Response Programs for Unauthorized 
Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice will be in 
compliance.  Any health care industry organization or covered 
entity governed by HIPAA will be deemed in compliance. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 160, 183.  An Act Relating to 
Animal and Animal Husbandry – Regulation of Vicious Dogs.  
This Act requires that any dog seized by law enforcement be 
placed in the care of the Rhode Island Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals (“RISPCA”).  The RISPCA is required to use a 
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process that is timely to determine where to place the dog, 
whether with a rescue organization or adoptive home.  The Act 
also requires that there be humane euthanization if the dog’s 
medical or behavioral condition requires it or after reasonable 
time and effort, there is no appropriate placement for the dog. The 
Act further requires that the determination of whether a dog 
trained for fight is deemed vicious can be made only after the 
RISPCA assess the dog. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 162, 178.  An Act Relating to State 
Affairs and Government – Department of Children, Youth, and 
Families.  This Act adds to the Children’s Bill of Rights a 
nondiscrimination clause for any child under the supervision of 
the Rhode Island Department of Children Youth & Families. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 174, 184.  An Act Relating to 
Property – Condominium Ownership.  This Act prohibits any 
landlord, owner or association from preventing or enforcing a 
restrictive covenant that prevents a tenant or unit owner 
displaying or posting on the entry to their dwelling any religious 
items displayed with sincere religious belief.  The Act is not meant 
to prohibit items that threaten public health or safety, 
discriminate in housing according to the Rhode island Fair 
Housing Practices Act, or federal or state law.  The Act does not 
apply to religious items located in any other part of the property 
not considered the entry way or displays that combined or 
individually total a size of twenty-five square inches.  The Act 
does not authorize material changes to the unit entry, changing 
material, color or other alteration to the entry door or door frame 
unauthorized by the covenant.  The property owner’s association is 
permitted to remove items that violate a restrictive covenant that 
the act permits. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 204, 224. An Act Relating to 
Education – Health and Safety of Pupils.  This Act requires that 
all public schools providing sixth through twelfth grade educations 
provide on-site an opioid antagonist, a drug that binds to opioid 
receptors that prevent opioids effects, like Narcan or naloxone.  
Any trained “nurse-teacher” may administer to opioid antagonist 
in an emergency to a student or staff, whom the “nurse-teacher” 
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suspects of being under the effects of an opioid overdose, whether 
there is a history or not.  A “nurse-teacher” may receive training 
in the administration of an opioid antagonist by the department of 
health. School physicians shall make standing orders that create 
procedures to follow in the case of a suspected opioid overdose at 
the school.  Those orders shall not require a specific “nurse-
teacher” to administer the drug.  The drugs will be kept in a 
quantity required by the department of elementary and secondary 
education and the department of health and shall be kept in an 
obvious place that is readily available, but secure.  Those 
departments will create regulations and procedures for the health 
and safety of students.  No “nurse-teacher” or school will be liable 
for civil damages for negligence or liable for criminal prosecution 
resulting from good faith administration of the opioid antagonist, 
but this does not apply to gross negligence or willful or wanton 
conduct.  Further, no “nurse-teacher” will be subject to penalty or 
discipline for refusing training for opioid antagonist 
administration. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 208, 232.  An Act Relataing to 
Education – Curriculum.  The Act “strongly encourage[s]” all 
secondary public schools to offer music courses to their students.  
The Act further specifies that the curriculum should make an 
emphasis of and attempt to develop appreciation for creative 
expression. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 210, 241.  An Act Relating to 
Probate Practice and Procedure – Uniform Adult Guardianship 
and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act.  This Act adopted the 
“Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings 
Jurisdiction Act” that is now in use in forty-four states.  Rhode 
Island courts may communicate with other state courts regarding 
the proceedings of guardianship and protective orders, including 
scheduling, calendars, court records and other administrative 
matters without a record.  The courts must allow all parties to 
participate in the communication and make a record of the 
communication, including the fact that the communication 
occurred and the identification of the participants, if it is not for 
administrative purposes.  Courts may cooperate with one another 
in a guardianship or protective proceeding by holding evidentiary 
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hearings, evidentiary or witness orders, evaluation or other 
investigatory orders.  The courts holding these hearings or making 
these orders must forward to the other court an official transcript 
of the proceedings.  Outside courts may also issue orders to appear 
and may, after a hearing, issue an order for the production of 
medical, financial or other relevant information in compliance 
with federal and state law.  Rhode Island courts may allow for 
testimony in a guardianship or protective proceeding to be taken 
in deposition or through video or audio of those in other states. 
Evidence taken by another state court and transmitted through 
electronic means, so that it is not an original writing, may be 
objected to because of the transmission.  The Act enumerates 
factors to consider when determining if a respondent has 
significant connections to the state.  The act allows for special 
circumstances to claim jurisdiction, and for specific reasons for 
jurisdiction.  A court may decline jurisdiction, however, if there is 
a more appropriate forum or because of unjustifiable conduct.  
Notice of any proceeding is requires by the act and must be 
granted to parents who would have been given notice in another 
state.  If there are two or more concurrent proceedings, then if 
Rhode Island has jurisdiction under this act, the court may 
continue.  If the Rhode Island court does not have jurisdiction, 
they are to stay the proceedings and communicate with the other 
court.  Any party may petition to transfer proceedings to another 
state or to have their proceedings transferred to Rhode Island.  
Registration may be filed for recognition in Rhode Island from 
other states with regards to both guardianship and protective 
orders.  After registration, those orders are to be respected in full 
by Rhode Island. 
 
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 214, 235.  An Act Relating to Motor 
and Other Vehicles – Comprehensive Community-Police 
Relationship Act of 2015.  This Act amends pieces of the racial 
profile act.  The Act allows law enforcement to ask for consent to 
search a pedestrian without reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause that the person is included in criminal activity.  The Act 
also requires reasonable suspicion or probable cause for any 
search of juveniles and that police may not ask for consent to a 
search.  The Act also required to document any search, even the 
search did not result in arrest, in a computer-aided dispatch 
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(“CAD”) or another police-generated report.  The Act requires data 
collection be police departments to show any disparities in traffic 
stops regarding race, and that they report this information to the 
department of transportation or its designee.  The information is 
to be used to address any inconsistences that show disparities or 
impermissible profiling. 
 
 
 
